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This thesis basically traces the expansion of commerce in Cape Town with 
particular reference to company growth from 1835 to 1859. 
Situated within the field of economic history, the nature of the study is 
primarily economic, though it attempts to avoid any narrow economic 
determinism, accepting the basic premise that the most useful method 
remains an inter-disciplinary approach. The content, however, acknowledges 
the importance of class in historical interpretation. The commercial 
bourgeoisie (defined as wholesale merchants~ wholesalers-retailers and 
ffnan~iers> thus assumes a central place in discussion here. 
Yet, inextricably bound up with the history of commerce du~ing the period 
is the editorial role of John Fairbairn. This connection was immediately 
apparent, once one began reading Cape Town's leading newspaper, the SoLtth 
African Commercial Advertiser, of which Fairbairn was sole editor between 
1835 and 1859. His comments in the paper's editorial columns reveal his 
intense interest in and his identification with commercial developments. 
His commercial orientation, whether in debates concerning the advantages 
df free trade, slave emancipation, the usury law, joint-stock companies or 
in his reporting of relevant extracts from overseas newspapers, government 
economic statistics and company reports, led to the coupling in this 
thesis of the role of John Fairbairn with the history of commerce. Indeed 
it is the years of Fairbairn's sole editorship which provided one of the 
most important reasons for the chronological framework employed in the 
study, viz. 1835-1859. Despite the importance with which historians regard 
Fairbairn, it is surprising how little his role in the economic sphere has 
been acknowledged, when considering the vigour of the economic campaigns 
he conducted in his newspaper • 
. Chapter One traces economic and commercial developments in the Cape prior 
to 1835, by way of introduction. Chapter Two details the substantial 
economic and commercial progress achieved in the aft~rmath of slave 
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emancipation and compensation, boom years in the colony's history. Chapter 
Three traces commercial and company developments in the remainder 6f the 
period, 1840 to 1859. Chapter Four focuses on social and political 
developments within the commercial bourgeoisie during the same period and 
the relationship of this sector to the farming bourgeoisie in the era of 
representative government. Events at this time are seen as a culmination 
of economic, social and political processes which had been unfolding in 
the preceding decades. Fair~airn's .key political intervention in attaining 
representative government forms an integral part of the discussion. 
The basic source utilised was the Advertiser, Fairbairn's newspaper. 
Recourse was also made to the Zuid-Afrikaan, as organ of Dutch/Afrikaans 
middle class opinion. Numerous official and unofficial manuscripts were 
examined. Use was made of official publications, as well as companies' 
privately-held archives. 
The information gathered led to a number of conclusions concerning the un-
acknowledged extent of comm~rcial progress achieved during the period, 
especially with regard to company growth and related infrastructural 
developments in the area of company legislation. Trends in the period 
highlighted and in fact confirmed the contradictory nature of merchant 
capital and its representatives, the commercial bourgeoisie, in the 
spheres of slave relationships, dependence on overseas short-term credit 
and in the attitude adopted by the commercial bourgeoisie to the farming 
sector. Merchant capital's strengths on the other hand were strikingly 
~vident in its contribution towards the spreading of market structur~s, 
commodity production and the stimulating of company development. In no one 
were both the strengths and weaknesses of merchant capital, as outlined 
above, better reflected than in John Fairbairn, though a neat identi-
fication of Fairbairn with the interests of merchant capital has been 
avoided and a more refined interpretation presented instead. 
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By the end of the~period covered in this thesis, Cape Town had evolved 
from the ·~leepy hollow' it had been in the 1820s to a bustling port and 
centre of commerce. In these processes, Fairbairn through the medium of 
the Advertiser, had played a very considerable role. 
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Aims and justification 
In the era before the advent of the mineral revolution and manufac~uring, 
commerce and agriculture represented the two main sectors of the 
bourg~oisie at the Cape. Certainly, by the end of the 19th century the 
comme~cial bourgeoisie constituted a very influential sector. Analysing 
class relationships and the nature of the state in South Africa in the 
mining period towards the end of the 19th century, Bozzoli attributes a 
key role to impoJ~t--e:·:poJ/t commeJ~ce. "Mining", she aJ~gues, "may have become 
the foundation for the imperial network of economic relationships, but 
import-export commerce was its central pivot, forming the indispensable 
link between the South African and the imperial econ6mies.'' Cl) Similarly, 
M~rks and Trapido have recently stated: 
In the 1870s at the beginning of the mineral revolution, South Africa 
was a geographical expression. Precapitalist and capitalist modes of 
production existed side by side, as did state forms of varying size 
with their own ruling groups and syst~ms of exploitation. There were 
two British colonies, two ostensibly, politically independent repub-
lics and numerous still autonomous African polities ... [ButJ Whatever 
their political and economic differences in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, all the people of southern Africa existed to a 
greater or lesser extent under the hegemony of a mainly British mer-
chant capitalism and a British imperialism. (2) 
But while the importance of merchant capital and the commercial 
bourgeoisie in the shaping of modern South Africa has frequently been ac-
knowledged, scholarly investigation of their origins and growth in the 
period before the discovery of diamonds and later gold, is still in its 
infancy. This study, therefore, traces economic developments in Cape Town 
from the mid-1830s to the 1850s, providing an introductory sketch of the 
period preceding 1835. Its particular focus is the growth of commerce and 
the spawning and subsequent expansion of a commercial bourgeoisie. It at-
tempts to make concrete the growth of one of the very important aspects of 
the classes and capitals, which under an imperial hegemony came to form 
the territorial conglomeration known as South Africa. Yet, despite the 
potential strength to be drawn from a linkage of interest between a 
hegemonic, imperial merchant capital and local <Cape) import-export com-
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merce, ?rientated to Britain, the commercial bourgeoisie at the Cape did 
not necessarily occupy a dominant, nor an unchallenged position in politi-
cal terms, a tendency already apparent in the period under discussion. (3) 
Access to developments in the period is provided by the commercial role of 
John Fairbairn, editor of the first private newspaper in South Africa, the 
of his sole ownership of the paper in 1835 serves as a point of departure, 
while his retirement from the newspaper in 1859 acts as the terminal point 
of this discussion. (4) As will become clear, the importance of his role 
leads to his treatment aa an integral part of events at the Cape. He 
helped shape them and they in turn shaped him. His role as intellectual 
exponent of the broad ideological needs of commerce provides the common 
thread of the present argument. Questions of the nature and role of the 
commercial bourgeoisie are often resolved by reference to his utterances 
in the Advertiser or to his political role as, for instance, in the fight 
for self-government. Consequently, the task of the study widens to become 
an examination of th~ commercial bourgeoisie, coupled with an assessment 
of the role of John Fairbairn, as ideological exponent of that 
bourgeoisie. (5) 
This thesis spotlights the growth of an essentially ruling class group in 
South Africa, which may at first seem to follow a direction opposite to 
current historiography. In his International Busines~ in the Nin~teenth 
~ent~:_u:.y: Thr- Rise and Fall o·f a Cosmopolitan Bourqeoisi_g (1987>, Charles 
Jones in fact made this pr~cise point, with regard to his own choice of 
subject. He observed that historiographical trends in recent decades, par-
ticularly evident in writings on Asia, Latin America and Africa, have been 
<:<.n "enthLtsiasm for neglected classes and dovmtrodden nationalities". This 
he attributes to ''a reaction against national and imperial historiographic 
traditions vJhich wet-e unashamedly Eurocentric". (6) South Afric£-a history --... 
too has been subject to fresh inputs and interpretations, which reflect a 
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new concern with the internal dynamic of pre-capitalist social formations, 
as well as the experiences of ordinary men and women under capitalism. 
These certainly have helped to rectify the failings of previous So~th Af-
rican studies, which were either biased towards the history of white 
colonists, or, at best, pointed to interconnections between the different 
peoples and systems in southern Africa. (7) Perhaps one of the earliest 
·and most useful formulations of this new approach in the South African 
context was the int~oducticn by Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore to a col-
lection of essays on the history of pre-industrial South Africa. They 
declared their objectives to be the exploration of the historical ex-
pe,~ienc.e of all South Aft-ica's peoples "not only at their points o-F 
'interaction', but also in terms of the internal dynamic of their various 
social formations and their articulation with the 19th century world 
economy." (8) 
Such a formulation does not amount to a faddish rejection of a particular 
'settler' ruling class as a focus of study, nor does it imply a dis-
interest in the history of the more advanced urban centres of colonial 
capitalism, e.g. the Western Cape and its capital Cape Town, subjects 
which indeed remain surprisingly poorly researched. The authors merely 
caution against treatment of any particular class in isolation from others 
.:..ncl encoLu~age a view o·f Cape society in terms of a "total histo,~y" (inte?J~­
~isciplinary) approach, especially dne which takes into account the con-
te>:t o-f inte,~national economic developments. With this in mind, the 
present study attempts an analysis of the internal dynamic of merc~ant 
capital by focusing on the commercial 6ourgeoisie, encompassing within its 
ambit the other main sector of the bourgeosie, the farmers, the emerging 
rural proletariat in the wake of emancipation, as well as the context of 
the growth of the world economy in the 19th century. Yet, the objective of 
this thesis remains unrleniably economic in nature, to trace the objective 
economic conditions which gave rise to the creation of a commercial 
bourgeoisie and to chart the growth of commerce <including companies) in 
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Cape Town. It does not attempt a social analysis of the commercial 
bourgeosie, nor a reconstruction of Cape Town's social history, though in-
evitably such aspects are drawn into the discussion. (9) 
In assessing the importance of the commercial bourgeoisie, this study ex-
amines their contributions in a number of_economic and political spheres. 
Their role in_expanding trade and markets, their accumulation of capital 
as a factor in company formation and their acquisition of financial 
skills, aiding in the establishment of credit and finance houses are all 
extensively discussed. (10) The part they played in creating an economic 
and legislative infrastructure necessary fcir the further expansion of cap-
italism is also examined. <11) Their particular contributions in the con-
stitutional and political sphere ~retraced as well. Their role, for in-
stance, in the 'popular' fight for self-government proved to be an im-
portant one. (12) Finally~ their participation in the events surrounding 
the passing of the Cape parliament's first Master and Servant law in 1856 1 
their impotence i~ opposing the measure demanded so voraciously by 
farmers, leads on to a discussion of the contradictory nature of merchant 
cap1tal. C13l The almost instant success of the Master and Ser~ant Law in 
the new Cape ~aliament contrasted starkly with the non-racial franchise, 
on which in theory, at least, the new parliament was based. Of this law 
Saul Solomon, liberal member for Cape Town remarked in 1859 it ''was a most 
oppressive law towards the servant.''C14) As lewsen has indicated, drawing 
on ·the Simons' and Bundy, the Master and Servant laws in the course of 
their history were in practice amended to impose special punishments for 
black 6ffenders. (15) A tradition of illiberal and racially oppressive 
legislation was thus concomitantly cemented by the first parliament. Such 
contradictory tendencies and strategies of the commercial bourgeoisie were 
to affect the course of future decades of S0uth African history, in the 
spheres both of capitalist growth and the institutionalizing of racism in 
Cape society. As Kay has thus aptly remarked of merchant capital in 
general: ''its [merchant capital 'sJ revolutionary edge is always blunted by 
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this conservative bias." (16) 
The course of discussion in turn poses other related .~uestions. Th~ prob-
lem of sources of capital during the period is examined, in an.attempt to 
establish the relative importance of local accumulation and overseas capi-
tal, particularly with reference to the flowering of Joint-stock companies 
at the~ C.:1pe at the time. (17) Politic:.::\1. camp.::ligns in Britain, le.>d by mid--
dle class representatives of commerce and manufacture, found their rever-
beration in campaigns conducted by the commercial bourgeoisie at.the Cape. 
(18) The growth of a cosmopolitan trading bourgeoisie in the period before 
1850 (19) was reflected in the colony in the establishment of a number of 
influential firms with branches in London, Cape Town and sometimes further 
afield. It also gave rise to the founding of a joint LondoM-Cape body of 
merchants called the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society based in London~ <20) 
Thus, a British-connected commerce was in the forefront of the commercial 
penetration of the colony. Local Dutch/Afrikaans inhabitants followed 
later. Tensions between these two groups were inevitably generated when 
the expansion of the economy during the 1830s and 1840s stimulated the 
development of 1 ocall y--based 1 c:\yer~~ of commel~ce. (21) 
Terminology 
Specific use of terms such as merchant, commercial bourgeoisie, and mer-
chant capital has been employed in this.study. As these terms tend to be 
used by different authors in a variety of ways with important analytical 
implications, they must be clarified at the outset. Merchant in the strict 
dictionary sense of the meaning, is defined as wholesale trader, especial-
ly one connected to trade with foreign countries. That this was the 
original meaning and in use at the Cape in 1822, is corroborated by W.W. 
Bird, ~ former merchant of Cape Town and afterwards Comptroller of 
Customs. <22> Describing the construction of the Commercial Exchange 
building, he notes: 
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At that moment no plan could be too magnificent for the rising self-
importance of Cape merchants, and the Exchange was erected en a scale 
rid i c u l ou s i f c omp ar· ed ·to t h ;;;: r· •::: qui ~- ed pur- p CJ·':;e::s. th~_rJeVE.:t:: __ QEI.:..?..9..0:.E:lLi. 
r:£.2J;l.£.£.t.~;\.!:.!...L~ ...... !I.!.SmL._!J.L...i.tU, ... ~:.....s;J .. a ::-:~~ ... .f;!.f ..... lf.!.§~::.~; .. tJ.fuJ.t_.JllQ.Y .... J~~-'1... the .. ..ILa 't.l::!T . .f"=-_Q.f:. 
tb.:.;;>_i..r:: ....... tx.:_€\.:g __ (:0: ........ t2 ...... !~.~-~-tsJJ.... T h •? Honour· a b 1 e E a·:::; t I n d i .,?. Camp ·3 n y se 1 1 a 
singl~ case of tea, two pots of ginger, and five pieces of calico or 
other goods. If such be the practice of these once imperial mer-
chants, what can be expected from the minor traders? all of whom take 
out a retail licence, and dispose Df their gCJods to an individual or 
to are-retailer by the piece or the pair. [author's emphasis] (23) 
R.B. Fisher in his description of the Cape's commercial environment in the 
sa.mt:" per·ic)cl dt:~c::lt=o.r-E·d~ ''l-'i:i.th the~~ c=~;-~cE•ption of a Vt~I'"Y fe~rJ Br·itish rno::~r .. chants;, 
now settled in Cape Townj the people there, known by the name merchants, 
would in England be deemed nothing more than mere factors and salesmen. " 
(24) R.W. Murray, journalist and editor writing about the merchants of 
then did not go outside the wholesale business; they did business in the 
lump and made money in like manne~ which the present generation say is not 
to be done now-a-days.'' (25) The concept of merchant continued tb imply a 
significant degree of status absent from trader - a perception persisting 
\.-'Jell int.o the c~?ntt.tt'"'.l <::i!"ld thr~ ne:-~t. in tht::~ t.:::;·-m. "m\:?n:hant princes", a.ppl if2d 
to the Jaggers and others~ with their social and economic imperial ties of 
great strength. (26) The stricter meaning of merchant is thus applied in 
this study. The term is used either for an individu~l, clearly engaged in 
wholesale and importing activities, or collectively for that elite, iden-
close links with metropolitan capital. 
As connections between commerce and finance were intimate, evident in men 
of trade founding and joining local ~anks and other finance houses C27l, 
the concept of commercial bourgeoisie includes the financial sector too. 
It will, however, no~ be as all-embracing as the definition employed by 
l{i;~k Etrld f"E•pe<:\tt:?d by V·,li~l'"l''en, in !rlhich tho::.:• COiTim€-'!I'"'CiaJ. (middlE~) ClC:'\SS is 
defined to include representatives of commerce, as well as the farmers, 
the professional strata of the middle class, such as attorneys, account-
ants and even, according to Warren, artisans. (28) Nor will the uMder-
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standing of merchant capital be limited mainly to that of import-export 
commerce. (29) In this study, therefore, the term merchant capital is used 
(in line with its de·finition o·f the commercial boLtrg-eoisie), to include 
both commercial capital (wholesale and wholesale-retail trade) and money-
deal i·ng capital. (30) Such an understanding thus encompasses 1 ocal com-
merce, though it does not thereby deny the centrally important place of 
the import-export sector in the economy and in the fabric of commercial 
life in Cape Town, in particular. However, the same overarching emphasis 
on merchant capital's dominating and reactionary comprador-style role at 
the turn of the 20th century, outlined by Bozzoli, appears, with the ex-
ception of the merchant elite, not to be reflected so strongly in the ear-
lier period covered by this study. The more pronounced trend in this 
period is the e>:pansi on o·f 1 ocal 1 ayers of comme1~ce. (31 > 
3. Periodisation and geographical scope 
Quite apart from Fairbairn's editorship, the ti~espan of this study is ap-
propriate in other respects as well. The start of the period is roughly 
contemporaneous with the emancipation of the slaves throughout the British 
Empire <1834). That year also marked a victory for free trade, with the 
passing of an Act to abolish all the remaining trade privileges of the 
English East India Company, an important indicator of economic and politi-
cal trends developing at that time in Britain. 
, 
Chapter One traces the economic and social origins of Cape Town's commer-
cial bourgeoisie from small isolated beginnings up to 1835, the year Fair-
bairn took over sole ownership of the Advertiser. It serves as an in-
traduction tb the period covered by this study. The chapter sketches in 
broad outline the restricted nature of the economy, a heritage of Dutch 
mercantilist policies under the Verenigde Oostindische Compajnie and the 
initially very slow improvements in the wake of the British Occupations. 
The period also marked the arrival in Cape Town in 1823 of the Scottish 
. ' 
immigrant, John Fairbairn, and his immediate intervention in the process 
of political and economic reform. 
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Chapter Two, the start of the core period, covers the years 1835-1840, the 
aftermath of slave emancipation and the compens~tion payment. The im-
portance of developments evidenced in this relatively short period, i.e. 
the substantial spurt to economic growth, the notable advance of market 
structures and the consolidation of new layers of the commercial 
bourgeoisie, were all reasons for assigni~g this period its own chapter. 
Chapter Three details the extensive economic expansion which occurred be-
tween 1840 and 1859, as joint-stock companies mushroomed on the basis of 
locally accumL•.lated wealth, while the final chapteJ~ e:-:amines t·he political 
growth of the commercial bourgeoisie over the same period (1840-1859), 
focusing on company legislation and the usury question, int§r alia. Chap-
ters Three and Four thus cover the same two decades. This relatively leng-
thy timespan and likewise the method of division of the period into two 
chapters, warrant some explanation. The take-off of merino wool farming at 
the Cape after 1846, set in ~otion significant growth in the Eastern and 
to a lesser extent the Western Cape. Yet, the economic aspects and 
developments discussed, such as local sources of capital, company growth 
and overseas capital, see only quantitative change or increase over the 
period to 1859. The pace of developments were such that no fundamentally 
important change occurred during the period. Such data is therefore best 
collated for the whole period, in order to gain a picture of the broad 
trends. A logical cut-off point is provided rather by the terminal point 
of the whole study itself. The year 1859 marked not only Fairbairn's 
retirement from the Advertiser, but witnessed the start of the first grave 
recession in the period after 1835. It also formed the prelude to crucial 
rulings and legislation affecting capital and company growth, such as the 
Supreme Court ruling on usury and the limited liability legislation, as 
well .:>.s the establishment o·F the first Imperial bank. <32> 
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The growth of th~ social and political power of the commercial and farming 
bourgeoisie is revealed particularly clearly during the Anti-Convict 
Agitation after 1848, culminating in the grant of self-government to the 
colony. With regard therefore to the political growth of the commercial 
bourgeoisie, the era of the first new parliament (1854-1859) also forms a 
convenient and more logical point of review. The absence of an earlier 
cut-off point as far as both economic and political aspects are concerned, 
and the resultant length of the discussion, led to the decision to divide 
Chapters Three and Four into economics and politics, respectively, rather 
than break them up chronologically. In so doing the necessarily integrated 
nature of these facets may perhaps have been obscured, but the connections 
are underlined in the course of the chapters, which hopefully serves to 
counteract the artificial effects of this separation. 
Difficulties are also encountered with the narrow geographical focus on 
Cape Town. Naturally, economic developments in an urban centre such as 
Cape Town cannot be divorced, even on a theoretical level, from those of 
the rural hinterland (the Western Cape), nor far that matter from the 
colony as a whole. The limitation taken into account in the study, by 
referring to general economic growth in the colony. Nonethel~ss, it cannot 
be ignored that Cape Town was still at this time the chief commercial 
centre of the colony and her merchants, financiers and traders could 
justifiably claim to be the leading members of the colonial commercial 
bourgeoisie, despite the Eastern P~ovince's economic challenge by the 
l850s. (33) 
l';)ources 
Whereas the period after the mineral discoveries in Kimberley and on the 
Rand has been dealt with in numerous published and unpublished works <34) 
the earlier 19th century economic history of the Cape remains comparative-
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ly poorly covered. Although general historical a~d social studies of Cape 
Town are increasing (35), economic developments in the Western Cape during 
the first decades of the British Occupation remain particularly inade-
quately researched. The few exceptions are the excellent contributions by 
Arkin and Giliomee and most recently Rayner. (36) For subs~quent decades, 
recent works have included Marincowitz's very illuminating thesis on wheat 
farming 1838-1888. (37) The importance of wool farming, the expansion of 
the Eastern Cape economy and the role of the Eastern Province gentry have 
been the subject of works by Le Cordeur, Kirk, Purkis and more recently 
Crais, while Mabin's economic geography of the colony from 1854 to 1899 
has provided a valuable overview. (~8) 
The literature 6n commerce and companies (including banks>, in the period, 
is even scantier. Immelman and Arndt prove the exception, though numerous 
popular works on companies exist. (39) Tony Kirk, Warren and Dubow have 
addressed themselves to studies most clearly topical to a study of the 
commercial bourgeoisie at the Cape in the early half of the 19th century. 
(40) Bradlow has in turn locked at aspects of their social history. (41) 
Trapido's treatment of the colony's first constitution (1853) and his ex-
amination of the social and political roots of Cape liberalism, remain 
outstandingly important contributions to an understanding of the rela-
tionship of class forces during the 19th century. <42) 
Recent y~ars have seen the publication by Botha of a biography on Fair-
bairn. This concludes in 1854, with the grant of representative govern-
ment, some ten years before Fairbairn's death. t43) The value of this work 
is Bctha's painstaking sourcing and its cl~im as the first full biography 
of Fairbairn. <44) Writers and historians have generally acknowledged the 
central importance of Fairbairn's political and editorial role, but have 
made no detailed study of it and have completely neglected discussion of 
his economic role, which as this study attempts to show, was of enormous 
importance. Botha has in general terms redressed the former failure and 
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very partially redressed the latter in a section of a chapter devoted to 
Fairbairn's economic contributions and 'new enterprises'. <45> The present 
thesis seeks not only to uncover in much greater detail the extent ·of 
Fairbairn's role in the economy, particularly commerce, but to integrate 
this with his political views, analysed within the context of Cape class 
relationships, in a way net attempted by his biographer. It hopes to go 
some of the way towards rectifying those_failings in Bctha's work identi-
fied by Trapido. 1-·le r~emar~ked rt:~ce·ntly: "This volume, clearly a labour of 
love, is immensely valuable for its biographical detail. Fairbairn's clas-
sical liberalism seems, however, to defeat Professor Botha and an under-
standing·of Fairbairn's political economy requires a re-reading of his 
newspaper. Botha's unflagging scholarship provides a most thorough guide 
to the SoLtth African Commercial Advertiser." <46) 
Arising out of thE· subjE~c:t matt£:~r-, therefor-<~, the flpvertiser for~ms the 
chief primary source throughout this study. From 1825, when Fairbairn took 
over sole editorial responsibility, to 1859, it remained his most powerful 
ally in his many political and economic struggles. As the leading English 
newspaper in the Western Cape at this time (47), the Advertiser was the 
foremost medium of information with regard to both economic and political 
events. While Fairbairn himself was not strictly a member of the commer-
cial bourgeiosie - his profession was that of newspaper editor and owner -
he nevertheless identified himself with commerce, initiating and lending 
support to commercial campaigns, as will be indicated in forthcoming chap-
ter~s. A r~ef 1 ect ion o·f this is found in the contfmt o·f the Advert;_i s..§!:.., 
which conveyed commercial information in editorials; carried reports of 
government statistics, company annual r~ports and tables of company share 
~rices; and published correspondence on commercial topics. The 
Advertiser's uniquely important role was expanded even further in a 
political direction after 1854. With the opening of the new parliament, 
Fairbairn began detailed reporting of parliamentary proceedings in the 
columns of the Advertiser. Indeed, in the period between 1854 and 1869, in 
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the absence of the Cape parliament's own publication of its debates, the 
(4EJ) 
sou1rces V·!E'!t-f? cCJn~:;ul ted. Thesr::;: inc: 1 udf2d, Ln.tr:'''L ... _S\l.J a., docu.mf?nts in thr2 Capf2 
Archives and in the manuscripts collection of the South African Library. 
(49) CDmpany records were slso used. Records of the Cape of Good Hope 
Savings Bank, the South African Association for the Administration & 
Settlement of Estates (later Syfretsl, the Board of Executors and the 
Mutual, have survived. While the Board's records are now safely housed in 
the University of Cape Town, the other records are held by the individual 
cCJmpanies and must await both sorting and classification. They form an ex-
tremely valuable and largely untapped source for the economic history of 
the period. An effort was made to examine the records of the Savings Bank 
.::mel thf2 ~'}outh (.';f;··· i cE•.n f-'l•;;~;oc: i ,:; •. t ion. Ti mE•""C_Dn~SI.Jtni 1'"1•] cl.fld unc!eni .::~b l y inter--est·-· 
ing as it was, systematic use of these and the other company archives, 
must await professional cataloguing. Finally, recourse was also made to 
t h £2 Z .. L..ti:..{!.::::l\:Lc.LJ::.:..s:~.f.UJ.. ~· <:1. ::; <::l r· e p , ... ~= ~, t.e n t. .--:··· t i v <.::· o ,~ <;J E:l. n of D 1 . ..1. t c:: h / A f ,~ i k e:1. C:\ n ~:; m i c:! c:! J. E~ 
cla.s~. opinion. (~.'50) 
To conclude~ while the economic history of the Cape in the period 1835-
1859 is in general under-researched, commercial and company developments 
and the economic:: role of John Fairbairn, aspects covered here, have been 
particularly poorly served in the past.By making systematic use of sources 
commercial developments in Cape Town 9 this thesis hopes to contribute to a 
mo~e material grasp of the colony's pre-mineral economy and the key role 
which Cape Town and her commercial bourgeoisie played in the shaping of 
modern South Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF COMMERCE IN CAPE TOWN BEFORE 1835 AND THE ROLE OF 
JOHN FAIRBAIRN'S SOUTH AFRICAN COI'ti'tERCIAl:. ADVERTISER. 
Then I saunter'd along, and continued my range, 
Where the aqueduct stood, there now stands the Exchange. 
But, 0 monstrous! the scandal and jeer of town-talk 
The've stuck a score shops in the Gentleman's walk-
Where the naked are cloth'd, and the hungry, if heedful, 
Can supply all their wants, by the help of the needful, 
What caus'd more surprise, as it will to my cousins, 
The Bookseller's shops are now starting by dozens. 
Once a very ·fe11-1 volumes was full qua.J}tum _suff. 
And the buyers of Goods were the vendors of snuff ••• (1) 
1.1 Introduction 
it: 
Chapter One serves as an introduction to the period covered by this study. 
It seeks to provide the economic context in which the steadily increasing 
number of m~rchants and traders in Cape Town were developing into a 
cohesive commercial bourgeoisie. They were eager to take advantage of new 
business opportunities presented to them and ready and able to expand 
their operations. Under the ascendancy of the merchant sector, th~y showed 
themselves increasingly determined to flex their commercial muscle. Once 
organized, they were ready to take up cudgels against various colonial and 
mercantilist restrictions which hampered their development. John Fair-
bairn, who arrived in Cape Town in 1823, and the newspaper, the South Af-
rican Commercial Advertiser, of which he later· became sole owner, played a 
seminal role in this process. 
1.2 Expanding opportunities for ths commercial bourgeoisie 
1.2.1 Under the VOC 
The closing decade of the 18th century at the Cape saw the final with-
drawal of a bankrupt Verenigde Oostindische Companjie <hereafter VOC>, 
from a poorly developed economy, characterized by a Company-regulated-
highly restricted commerce. But the idea of unremittent economic stagna-
tion during the VOC period has recently been challenged. Ross has argued 
that the agrarian economy of the wheat and wine farms of the south-western 
Cape in the period of VOC rule - particularly in the later 18th century -
witnessed a considerable degree of commercialization. These farms he des-
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cribes as owned by a rural gentry, who produced for the internal and ex-
ternal markets. Yet, merchant activity in the period was minimal. <2> 
The object of the VOC's trade policy during its rule at the Cape remained 
primarily that of supplying the Company with the provisions it required to 
fulfil the settlement's raison d'~tre as refreshment station. Improved op-
portunities for local commerce formed no part of its policy brief. A well-
supplied stock of food and goods for the settlers was very much a 
secondary consideration and keeping costs down was a major factor in all 
decisions. Trade was restricted by a system of monopoly concessions, con-
tracts, laws and price-fixing. The building of a basic com~ercial in-
frastructure was of no concern to Company officials. <3> 
In response to the VOC's mercantilist restrictions, trade largely took 
refuge in various semi-legal and illegal forms, though there wa~ some 
legal participation. The latter was in the form of trad~ in locally-grown 
agricultural com~odities, via the Company's pacht or concession system. 
This entitled a settler to purchase for a period of time the right to 
supply agricultural commodities such as meat, butter, wine and beer to the 
Company, sometimes directly to the public and sometimes even to passing 
ships, as for example with the wine concession known as the impost. (4) 
Out of this system arose a small, elite group of men, parasitic on the 
mercantilist order, yet with entrepreneurial ambitions and interests. Such 
was the meat entrepreneur, Dirk Gysberf van Reenen. <5> Maarten Melck was 
another, becoming the wealthiest burgher at the Cape during the third 
quarter of the 18th century, by supplying building materials to the Com-
pany and through the franchise for wine sales in Cape Town. (6) Schutte 
has argued that this entrepreneurial spirit underlies the third section of 
the Memorandum, presented in 1779 to the Company's directors in the 
Netherlands by a deputation from the Cape Patriot movement. In this, 
demands such as improved foreign trade opportunities, higher prices for 
local agricultural goods ahd a strict prohibition on Company officials' 
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private economic activities, were laid OLtt. (7) 
Large numbers of settlers employed a second avenu~ of trade. By no ~eans 
an area of specialist trade, this was private retailing of groceries and 
other goods. It was conducted both from home and storehouse and also in 
the street by slaves, on behalf of their owners (straathandel); the last-
named being pronounced illegal by the Company on a number of occasions. 
Linked to this street tJ~ade was illicit, private hawking or smou<=;ec.Y. in 
the rUJ~al aJ~eas. (8) 
The tradition of widespread petty trading amongst the Dutch was described 
towards the end of the 18th century by a visitor, C. de Jong, in his nar-
rati.ve of the Cape: "Aile, die koeijen hebben, verkoopen melk, die tuinen 
hebben, groentens; geen huijs is 'er bijna, - van de fatzoenlijksten 
slechts vijf of zes uitgesloten - of men vindt 'er iets te koop~ bij dezen 
hoeden, batisten en hammen; bij genen garens, schoenen en zuiker; hier 
lakens, gazen en scho~nsmeer; daar koussen, pomade en thee.'' (9) 
There is, however, evidence that some retail specialization existed at the 
Cape during the Company period but that this was on a small scale. Erasmus 
has stated that by 1786 there were thirty-six flour and wheat dealers in 
Table Valley, whose trading activities were more in the nature of gene1~a1 
dealers in merchandise, including hardware, soft goods and food. (10) 
Also widespread amongst the settlers was private importing and exporting, 
legal and illegal. This was frequently cond~cted with the help of passing 
ships' crew and again cannot properly be termed specialist trade. (11) In 
the absence of Company supplies, it often appears to have been a question 
of obtaining basic goods, as well as much desired Eastern commodities. It 
was perhaps more often than not undertaken by well-connected burghers and 
officials in their private capacity. An example is J.N. von Dessin, secre-
tary of the Weeskamer <Orphan Chamber>, which handled intestate estates 
and inheritances of minors, inter alia. During the mid-18th century Von 
Dessin imported goods <including slaves) both for his own needs and for 
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exchange. Eastern goods which he deemed profitable for the Cape trade in-
eluded certain textiles, wood, Japanese dishes, as well as young male 
slaves. For his own needs he placed orders for such articles as a palan-
quin, sombrero hats, sugar, candy, coffee, rice, sago, "atja,~" and bi1~d's 
nests from the East; and from Europe, building items such as window panes 
and clothing such as :.-ocks. (12) 
In the final years of its decline at the Cape, the VOC introduced a few 
measures to improve local trade opportunities. While it maintained a total 
monopoly of spices, pepper, sugar, coffee, by 1795 settlers were permitted 
to conduct an import trade with areas on the west coast of Africa, St. 
Helena and with some Dutch possessions in the East, but the export trade 
remained heavily restricted. In 1792 a proclamation was issued allowing 
the sale of agricultural goods to passing ships, once Company needs had 
been satisfied. <13) Outright smuggling (smokkelary), nevertheless, was 
commonly resorted to throughout the period, to satisfy local import 
demands and to supply passing ships with drink and food. This was so 
widespread and necessary that smugglers were not scorned as criminals. 
(14) 
Much of the trade, then, under the rule of the VOC was conducted by in-
dividual settlers from different walks of life. Private, specialist or 
full-time trading activities, wholesale or retail, remained in basic con-
tradiction to the Company's own commercial needs and policies. 
1.2.~ 1st British Occupation and the Batavian Republic 
The policies of the British colonial government and the English East India 
Company during the 1st British Occupation (1795-1803) were not qualita-
tively different from those of the VOC. (15) As Arkin has shown, the Com-
- "' pany, fearing that the Cape might become a "vast clandestine entrepot" 
2< 
leading to a circumvention of their own market operations in Leadenhall 
(London>, implemented a monopoly of Eastern trade. (16) Similarly, the 
colonial government acted with a heavy hand because of the uncertain na-
ture of the British occupation at the Cape and the general wartime condi-
tions prevailing. The mercantilist notion of the colonies as a source of 
profit for the colonizing power remained, despite the new ideas of 
laissez-faire, particularly the movement towards the limiting of govern-
ment intervention, which were gaining ground in Britain. <17> Not sur-
prisingly, ther~fore, smuggling of both Eastern and Cape goods continued • . 
(18) 
Nevertheless, prospects for the development of the economy did improve 
under British rule. Though a privileged company, the East India Company 
exercised only indirect power over government policy decisions in Lond6n 
and had no direct say in local government. Secondly, though the Company 
enjoyed a monopoly of foreign trade, this was limited to trade east of the 
Cape. (19) Important trade restrictions continued, such as the wine con-
cession, meat price restrictions and corn controlsi but the period at 
least saw attempts at alleviating the effect of some of these. (20) 
Consumption needs had certainly increased by 1801. In that year John 
Pringle, the Company's Agent at the Cape, requested an assistant, the 
business in supplying the Colony t-,avi ng gro~o-m "tenfold". <21) In the 1 ast 
few years of the 18th century a number of British merchan~s arrived at the 
Cape. Michael Hogan imported European goods on a large scale and was given 
permi.ssion to bring in rice and wood from the East on his own ships. 
Walker and Robertson, suppliers to Lady Anne Barnard and husband Andrew, 
were also large importers-exporters and ship hirers. John Murray was an 
importer who plied the coast and set up a shop at Mossel Bay. Alexander 
Farquhar was allowed to e>:port fruit and wine to India. <22) Evidence 
points, however, to a lack of continuity of development, under the;~~·. 
British, of the type of mercantilist era entrepreneur described pre-
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viously. (23) Many of those who had grown up on the basis of the previous 
•regime, such as D.G. van Reenen, for example, failed to survive the 
transition to British rule. <24) Of non-British merchants in the period 
the most well-known was the firm Dnkruijdt & Coi, which participated in 
the coastal trade, and there were others such as G.F. Goetz and J.J. Vos, 
D.:-,, v,•ell <::~s:; thE! G•iJecli s;h····born Is.:.iE:\C St.,~ombom. (~::'5) 
But full-time traders were few and trading continued to be conducted in a 
general way. Lady Anne Barnard wrote in a letter in 1797 to the Secretary 
o·f !3tate ·for· ~Ja;~ E\nd thE? Col<Jni0:s, l··lf:z·m-y Dunda.::;, in F:r";:Jl,:.~nd; " .. ,···· ~' 
tradespeople of all descriptions in a moderate number are necessary - par-
ticularly carpenters - a couple of shoemakers could live well - as there 
are No. shops here, a few people to unite 1n a retailing way a good many 
d if+ r2;····::2n t b;·-,;:\nCI!£·?S, 1-\•oud [ ~; i c: J ~;uccf.0E·<::d, a.n d m,:~ h~ E\ r:· \Jl'·tun e to them···· 
s:"'.': 1 \ ... E·s ••• " p,r·, d in c:H··, ot. h £~1··· l 1:2t. tf::·l"" o·f thE! £·<3.mc· YE'<O:ir ~ " • • • new· i ~,, t h E!n:~ 91!..(;:~ 
mannt:-!1"" i·f c\ tE'rnptinq p1··ic:e is; p,::•.icl .•• '' (26) 
The period of Batavian rule at the Cape (1803-1806) was too brief and too 
insecure to achieve any of the well-intentioned political and economic 
reforms suggested by Commi~sioner-General J.A. de Mist and others. The ad-
ministration sought to avoid the view of the Cape as an exploitable pos-
session. Yet~ little was achieved, saVe some attempts at establishing new 
markets for Cape produce and stimulating merino wool production. <27) Ac-
cording to one author, the period in fact witnessed a series of insolven-
cies among British people, not least of all merchants, among whom were in-
cluded Alexander Tennant and John Murray. (28) Arkin has indicated that as 
early as 1802, when news of the Dutch re-occupation first filtered 
through, British merchants had begun to sell their property in order to 
return horne. (29) 
1.2.3 2nd British Occupation and the period before 1833 
When Britain re-occupied the Cape in 180~, British merchants also began tc 
return and soon came to form an impqrtant, though a numerically small part 
of the urban community. (30) "It was this gJ~oLtp ~o-Jhi c:h hand! ed the bulk of 
the Colony's foreign trading activities and firms like Ebden & Watts, 
Hamilton Ross & Co., W. Wilberforce Bird and Shortt & Berry, were to 
figure prominently in the Company's Agency records.'' <31) Less than a 
quarter of Pringle's dealings locally were with merchants of Dutch origin. 
<32> The names of non-British merchants mentioned in Company cor-
respondence include P. Wo~tersen, Modyer Karsten & Co., J. van Bihl and L. 
Scholtz. (33) 
The limited size of the commercial bourgeoisie in Cape Town during the 
first decade of the century can be gauged from a list included in the 1809 
Cape Almanac. (34) UndeJ~ a heading "Alphabetical List of meJ~chants, etc. 
Cape To~-Jn" are 1 i sted the names of just over 40 merchants, nine of whom 
are called merchants and agents and five of whom are described as retail 
and wholesale merchants. In addition, two dealers in all sorts of mer-
, 
chandise, four retailers, three ship chandlers/shipping stock dealers, 
some th1~ee dealers in 1 i quor, one prize agent and one money cha·ngeJ~ are 
named. Whil~ there is a sprinkling of Dutch names among the merchants, 
these are more common among the general and retail dealers. An i~pression 
of the comparative growth of the centre of Cape Town's commercial sector 
over the period can be gained from the 1830 Almanac. Here are the names df 
54 merchants and merchants/agents and some 160 retailers. Also named are 
four a0ctioneers, 26 wine merchants and three ship chandlers. Of the 
retail~rs some a dozen would appear from their names to be Free Blacks, 
e.g. Achilles of Bengal and Betje and Mustapha of the Cape. (35) 
The Company's records continue to reflect the predominance of trade with 
English merchants, and, though import-export and more especially retailing 
were not the sole prerogative of the English, the records do reflect the 
objective ascendancy of English merchants in this period. Their supe-
riority was a result both of their capital connections and privileged con-
tacts with the colonial government (36), as well as their experien~e of 
commercial life in England, the world's leading trading and financial na-
tion. 
At the beginning of the 19th century.Cape Town's merchants, with ingenuity 
and perseverance, weaved their activities between Company regulations. 
Because of shortages of Eastern goods at the Cape, the Company's Agent was 
at times forced to allow merchants to import staples, such ~s rice for 
sale locally, under strict Company supervision. Eastern goods destined for 
the Cape at this time included such articles as rice, sugar, coffee, ~ago, 
textile piece goods, shawls, tea, spices, pepper and'china. (37) Conces-
sions were sometimes granted for the re-export of Eastern goods regarded 
as unsuitable for local consumption, on condition that these were sold at 
the Company's London auctions. A tight control on the tea trade was, how-
ever, retained. (38) But in all these matters the Agent was always most 
careful to prevent any precedent from being set for regular merchant oper-
ations. <39) He remained su~picious of even small-scale private imports. 
Thus, for example, A. Faure had to obtain permission to import four jars 
of pickles from his mother-in-law in Batavia in 1813. (40) Confusion was 
rife as to what was permitted in terms of which regulation, often leading 
to grave financial losses by merchants. (41) Many aspects of trade, which 
later became matters of private decision by individual traders or firms, 
at this time required government or Company sanction. 
Trade opportunities were afforded Cape Town merchants by the newly-created 
markets on the Mascarene Islands <Mauritius, R~union, Rodrigues), but more 
especially St. Helena. During the years 1810-1814 the Cape developed regu-
lar commercial contacts with these neighbouring islands. <42> On occupa-
tion of the Mascarenes by Britain, Cape Town merchants immediately re-
quested permission to trade there. John Bardwell Ebden, the grand figure 
of Cape Town's merch~~t~, was the first to trade with the islands and 
Ebden L Watts became the first mercantil~ house in Cape Town to hold a 
sale of goods from Bourbon CR~union) in 1810. <43) 
St. Helena, especially after 1812, proved a profitable area of commercial 
intercourse for merchants keen to expand the limited opportunities avail-
able to them. It was in relation to the wine trade with this island that 
local merchants such as G.J. de Vas and Alexander McDonald installed them-
selves. (44) In addition to a goods market, St. Helena also proved a boon 
for Cape Town merchant shippers. Until 1815 the Company's Agent, faced 
with inadequate shipping to transport Company's goods destined for the is-
land, was dependent on the few small brigs operated by local shippers, 
such as Hall & Rowe's Fancy, Ross & Twycross's Maria, Ebden & Watts 
Brisett and N. Seeberg's Good Hope. (45) From 1815 until the death of 
Napoleon in 1821 the island, whith doubled in population at this time, 
constituted the most important external market for C~pe produce. <46) 
In 1813 the Company's monopoly of the Eastern trade was abolished, though 
its control of the China trade, viz. tea and Canton goods, was left un-
touched. (47) Despite the enforcement of restrictions which continued to 
curtail Cape Town merchants' full participation in the Eastern trade, the 
Company's ascendancy over the business community began to decrease after 
1815. By 1821 the Company's indents including tea, amounted to less than 
300 000 rixdollars, whereas private.traders during the same year imported 
Eastern arti~les to the value of more than 1 250 000 rixdollars. (48) The 
monopoly of tea imports thereafter remained the greatest grievance of Cape 
Town merchants. 
After 1813 when preferential tariffs for Cape wines were implemented in 
Britain, wine production grew by leaps and bounds, as farmers and mer-
chants threw their energies into increasing production and sale. Despite 
the reduction of these preferential tariffs after 1825, wine remained the 
25 
Cape's largest export until the early 1840s. Between 1820 and 1824 the 
value of wine exports had stood at £165 000, falling off after 1825. By 
1840-1844 when wool overtook wine, the value of wine exports was £58 000, 
compared to wool, £73 000. <49) Wine's pre-eminence found commercial 
reflection in the expansion of the wine trade, which became one of the 
most important training grounds for early Cape businessmen. It certainly 
acted as a lucrative avenue for export merchants. British-born merchants 
had by 1820 com~ to dominate this trade and amongst their number were in-
cluded John Collison & Co., Saunderson & Co., Daniel Dixon, J. Carfrae, W. 
Wherter, Alexander McDonald and Marsh & Cadogan. (50) J.B. Ebden's parti-
cipation in wine exporting was notable too, both directed to Britain, as 
well as Mauritius, St. Helena; Colombo and New South Wales. (51) However, 
that local-born traders and merchants also participated in the wine tr~de, 
more particularly internal purchase, will become evident in the following 
chapter, dealing with the relationship between slavery and commerce. (52) 
Hopes for Cape Town's transformation into a great entrepot were regularly 
aired during the 1820s. The boundless potenti~l of Cape Tow~·s position, 
halfway between East and West~ was hailed in local merchant quarters. For 
instance, in 1829 at a meeting called to protest against the continuing 
Company monopoly on tea and Canton goods, a petition was drawn up, which 
sketched with overdrawn optimism, the prospects for the Cape e~onomy, once 
freed of Company control. It talked of the benefits to be expected once 
•• •.• this Colony •.. (has become], in consequence of its geographical posi-
tion, an Entrep~t for the productions of the East, from whence the markets 
of America and other parts of the world might in course of time be sup-
plied, and as articles of Colonial produce, together with British manufac-
tures, would be taken in exchange for Eastern commodities, this traffic 
may be rationally expected to become of incalculable value to the Colony, 
as well as of great advantage to the Mother Country.'' (53) 
A series of measures passed in the 1820s continued to improve op-
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portunities for local merchant participation in the re-export trade of 
Eastern goods and also made way for the development of Cape Town as a free 
port. The backgrbund to these free trade developments in Britain was her 
own industrialization 9 the consequent relative erosion of the political 
and economic significance of agriculture and the emergence of the middle 
classes (industry and commerce) at the expense of the landed gentry, 
though this process by no means involved the hegemonic destruction of the 
lc:\tter. ThE~ cf::nt.UI'"·y l7:~'!0·· ... 1D::')0 "~:;,;~.~'.1 t:.hr.-2 c:lestl'-ucti.cm uf the old c:oJ.onii::..J. 
system and the erection of an Empire of Free Trade, years which saw a mid-
dle class brought to a position of considerable wealth through the revolu-
tionary process of the new industrialism, determined to translate their 
control of the new productive powers of the factories into greater politi-
cal power within their country and then, if possible, to extend their in-
fluence throughout the world.'' (54) At the core of these dreams was the 
concept of informal dominion by virtue of Britain's position as 'Workshop 
of the World', though in individual cases, such as Gibbon Wakefield, it 
could even encompass ideas of formal colonization. (55) Obviously, with 
the advantage secured from both a large formal and informal empire, 
British industry had at this ti~e no need of government protection. (56) 
In 1823 Eastern goods re-exported from the Cape were placed on an equal 
Order-in-Council removed the bulk of discrimination agaihst foreign ship-
ping in the export trade: Foreign vessels could conv~y their own produce 
to the Cape and also carry Cape produce on the same term~ as British 
ships. All goods From British possessions were to be admitted at the same 
rate as those from Britain, though it wa~ only in 1D55 that differential 
custom tariffs favouring British, as compared to foreign imports, were 
'~ ' <:\bol i s;h.;:~cJ. C:5t3) In lf:r>1· .:~.n r~~ct. wa.s pi~.s:;~::,.t:~d \.'.Jh:i. ch ,,..E~:;:,c::i ndt::·d c:..J.l thE~ r-e;·rno:d. n·-·· 
ing trade privileges of the English East India Company. (59) 
Commercial horizons were therefore widened as former VOC restrictions on 
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trade (both internal and external) were lifted. (60) A new era of growth 
was heralded also by the Cape's incorporation into the British empire, 
which resulted in an increase in shipping and population, including 
siginificant additions to the garrisons. Ross described the multiplier ef-
fect of the increase of shipping traffic on internal trade. (61) The ex-
panding coasting trade provided several Cape Town merchants with new op-
portunities. In 1810 the intrepid John Bardwell Ebden applied for a 
licence to participate in the coasting trade as far as Plettenberg Bay 
(62), but no career in this regard is as famous as that of Joseph Barry of 
the firm, Barry & Nephews. By 1825 Barry was operating all along the East 
coast from Cape Town to Plettenberg Bay and Algoa Bay. (63) By 1823 he had 
opened a small store at Port Beaufort on the Breede River. Here he 
gradually built up an entrepBt of unusual size, which prospered until his 
death in 1860. By 1824 he ~ad already become the part-owner of a number of 
ships which he employed in the coastal trade. (64) 
The opportunities for local trade provided by the settlement in Albany 
after 1820 were manifold. Many Cape Town merchants and traders realized 
this and acted immediately to secure early advant~ge. Le Cordeur has 
listed Frederick Kersten, H.E. Rutherfoord and Charles Stone as examples 
of Western Cape merchants who intervened in the years after 1820 to gain 
access to the new markets of the Eastern Cape. So successful were these 
early efforts that when Eastern traders were ready to expand later in the 
1820s, they found themselves at considerable disadvantage. (65) Besides 
creating new markets within the colony and encouraging coastal shipping, 
the Eastern Cape settlement provided a further expansionary stimulus to 
the economy by creating new take-off points for the trade with African 
peoples. (66) 
Despite the.improvements initiated during the second decade of the century 
with regard to internal and external trade opportunities, the growth of 
the economy should not be exaggerated. Summarizing the effect of the Com-
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pany on the Cape economy, Arkin states: 
Moreover, although the Company's privileged position until 1814 had 
meant that the local mercantile community was hedged around by numerous 
vexations and impediments which limited entrepreneurial enterprise, 
whilst the continuance of the tea monopoly remained a source of irrita-
tion thereafter, it is not unreasonable to infer from this survey that 
the Agency was far from being the only major obstacle to commerciai ex-
pansion. The Cape colonists were severely handicapped in their efforts 
to make Table Bay a trading centre of the first rank; they !~eked 
desirable export items in sufficient and unfailing quantity, they were 
isolated by sheer distance from the main world markets, and frequently 
hindered by those portions of the Navigation Acts still enforced. These 
were the inherent drawbacks - John Company's presence for a time merely 
agg,~avated a situation fa1·· from promising. (67) 
Nevertheless, as already indicated, the early years of the 2nd British De-
cupation had witnessed notable economic growth. Schumann associated growth 
between 1806 and 1815 with the arrival of the British and the effects of 
the inflation of the paper money, but has detected a period of instability 
from 1815 to 1821, related to the effects of a recession in England 
amongst other things. The depression which followed between 1821 and 1826, 
he explains in terms of several factors. These included two seasons of 
wheat crop failures in 1821 and 1822; severe floods in 1823; the decrease 
of the British garrison on St. Helena after Napoleon's death leading to a 
decline in shipping and a contraction of exports; the conversion of a 
depreciated paper rixdollar currency at the rate of 1/6d and the effects 
of a similar crisis in Britain in 1825. (68) 
The depression years 1821-1826 were indeed difficult ones in the history 
of commerce. W.W. Bird, writing aboat the Cape in 1822, remarked how the 
"distress of tl~ade" had lovJel~ed the purchase price o·f land and houses. 
(69) Evidence of this bleak period is found in a discussion of the commer-
cial misfortunes of the immigrant, Edward Hanbury, ship chandler and 
general merchant in Cape Town from 1819 to the year of his insolvency, 
1825. In a letter written in 1823 to a trading partner in England, one 
Nixon, Hanbury·described conditions in Cape Town: 11 The times have been so 
bad as to knock Ltp many." He told o·f one of the 1 argest merchant houses in 
the colony, Marsh and Cadogan, going bankrupt in mid-1822. His own insol-
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vency, trlhich ·follotrJed soon after, he attribLrted to the "depressed state of 
trade" and his own poor health. (70) The year 1827, one year into the 
revival, as outlined by Schumann, saw the commercial misfortunes of Joseph 
Barry culminate in a declaration of his insolvency. He was forced to sur-
render his property to three large Cape Town merchants, viz. Ewan 
Ch~istian, A. Chiappini and Charles Stuart Pillans. <71) 
It is thus in the. context, on the one hand, of the loosening controls on 
commerce, the general increase in economic horizons, optimistic belief in 
future gre~t prosperity and, on the other hand, the basically poor, in-
secure nature of the Cape agricultural-based economy, dwarfed by the power 
of the British industrializing economy, that the emergence of the early 
Cape merchants is best understood. 
1.3 Increasing cohesion of the commercial bourgeoisie under merchant 
leadership and the role of Fairbairn's Adverti:..::er 
The first steps taken by members of the small and as yet isolated group of 
Cape Town merchants were to create institutions with which to facilitate 
their rise to a position of influence within colonial society. They began 
by est~blishing a Commercial Exchange and by strengthening their links 
with London merchants, who had access bath to Parliament and government 
departments in Britain. This indirect access to the British Parliament was 
important for Cape merchants because they had to initiate their struggle 
for influence in the absence of a local parliament. A nominated Legisla-
tive Council was only introduced in 1834 and representative government was 
first instituted in 1854. Nor, until 1824, was there any private newspaper 
~o voice independent public opinion. 
Yet, by 1827 the edi to1~ of the Advertiser was able to repol~t: "Si nee the 
Commercial Committee [i.e. Commercial Exchange] has been recognized by 
Government and the Officers of the Customs (only about two years ago) and 
treated with a decent respect, a number of beneficial alterations have 
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been effected, and some pernicious innovations anticipated and thwarted.'' 
<72) The group's own growth and success, ~s much as the colonial ad-
ministration's favour, was reflected by the end of this period in the 
Colonial Office's instructions of 1833/1834. The directive to local offi-
cials on that occasion, regarding suitable representatives in the new 
nominated Legislative Council, was to select members from amongst the 
chie·f landowners and merchants. (73) Step·:; t-:=\ken by the commercia.! 
bourgeoisie towards achievement of this status were largely orchestrat~d 
by the merchant element, predominantly British in origin, a fact evident 
in the names of members of the Commercial Exchange. (74) The government 
strategy of patronizing the merchant elite~ would, however, pay dividends 
in terms o·f allegiance in later yean;. (75) 
A body dealing with commercial issues had earlier been set up at the Cape 
by Commissioner-General de Mist during the Batavian Republic. This was the 
Kamer van Commercie established in 1804. Thereafter, it appears, some form 
of commercial group continued to meet but it was in 1817, in order to ac-
commod.ate regular dai 1 y meetings o·f the "commercial i hterests", that the 
group decided to hire their own private rooms and in 1818 proceeded to 
organize construction of their own building. (76) Writing in 1822, Bird 
summed up the attitude of mind behind the building as'' .•• the frog ex-
pected to S~->Jell the size o·f the m:." <77) 
It was indeed an edifice of neo-Cla~sical splendour, standing on the Grand 
Parade near the present OK Bazaars. So large was it that much of its space 
had to be rented out to various businessmen, firms, societies and institu-
tions, such as the South African Library. Completed in 1822, it rapidly 
became a centre of economic and social life for white middle class Cape 
Town - a venue for public meetings, banquets and balls, though it con-
tinued to be a financial worry to its owners during most of its existence. 
(78) It is noteworthy that finance for the building was raised by share 




scription had for instance been used in 1800 to raise the funds necessary 
for building the African Theatre, the present St. Stephen's Church on 
Riebeeck Square. (79) What distinguished the Commercial Exchange v~nture 
was that the shares were dividend-bearing, thus earning the Exchange the 
reputation of ''the forerunner of all jbint stock companies in South Afri-
ca." <80) It was, howeve1~, not a proper joint-stock company, in the sense 
of its establishment for the purpose of making profits. The main thought 
behind its floating was the raising of the finance necessary to construct 
the building. The Commercial Exchange building stood as symbol of the 
power of the commercial bourgeoisie, particularly its merchant layer, 
until its demolition in 1892. <81) 
The Commercial Exchange organization basically acted as a pressure group, 
petitioning and making recommendations on the many aspects of the economy 
in which their members were directly and indirectly involved - the trade 
in agricultural commodities such as wine, the import-export trade, ship-
ping and transport, government finance, customs, taxes and currency. It 
also performed a more routine and practical role for commerce by maintain-
ing a shipping register and arbitrating in ·shipping disputes. (82) 
Of assistance to the success of the early petitionings of the Commercial 
Exchange members was their development of formal connections to the 
London-based Cape of Good Hope Trade Society (83>, a body established 
abdut the year 1825, representihg ''Merchants~ Shipow~ers, Manufacturers 
and others interested in the trade of the Colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope". (84) As t.-Ji 11 emel~ge in fallowing chapters, several of these London 
merchants were linked to Cape Town merchants as partners or correspondents 
and some were connected through a worldwide commercial house system, uni-
que to the Bl~itish empire. (85) 
The role of the London met-chants fl~om 1825 to 1840 was, in association 
with the local group, to petition the British Parliament and government 
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departments, on behalf of the interests 6f both. There was much of common 
interest between the two. One of the first struggles taken up in 1825 was 
against the measure to reduce duties on foreign wines imported into 
Britain, which threatened the privileged position that Cape wines had en-
joyed since 1813. Petitions were subsequently presented with regard to a 
number of other issues, such as the establishment of a private bank in 
Cape Town, the reduction of the duty on Cape wheat, the East India Company 
monopoly, the Table Bay breakwater, the paper rixdollar c~rrency, slave 
emancipation and ft-ontiel~ compens.,:\tion. (86) 
The feeling by Cape merchants of the colw~y·s neglect by the metropolitan 
country, is captured by George Thompson, traveller and resident merchant 
of Ca.pe Tmm. In his account published in 1827, Thompson 1-'Jl~ote: " ... surely 
never did any unhappy settlement more requi~e the kindly and fostering 
hand of the parent country than this Colony, whose misfortunes it is to 
form no component part of the great 'Interests' that are accustomed in 
England to unite for the common benefit or protection. Tamper with the 
rum, sugar or slave population of the least of our American Islands, and 
the whole ·!.&Jest India Inte,~est' is in .:u~ms." He enumer·ated ethel~ 
"Intel~ests", such as the East India, agl~icultUt-al, manufacturing and ship-
ping, rhE·tor i call y contl~asted these vJi th the "feeble voice of this i so--
la ted Colony." (87> 
The Commercial Exchange therefore prized highly its contact with the 
London Society during this early period. Leaving aside the question of the 
practical success achieved by the London group, its usefulness lay in the 
creation of a social legitimacy for Cape Town merchants, during their 
. •arly progression into the upper eschelons of the colonial middle class. 
This social advance was, however, also facilitated by the lack of that 
hierarchical class structure operational in England, in which landed in-
terests remained the apex of the class pyramid. Cape merchants possessed 
that crucial aspect of colonial status, viz. high profile wealth. (88> 
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Developments in the second decade of the 19th century thus point to the 
transformation of a"small and initially rather isolated group of Cape Town 
merchants and traders into a self-conscious, organized social and ~oliti 7 
cal power bloc. 
Unti 1 1824 the only newspaper in the Colony was the weeki y Government Cape~ 
Town .. Gazette and .. African Advertiser, which containecj notices, adver·tise···. 
ments, shipping movements and occasionally a minimum of overseas news. 
Bird remarked of the publication in 1822: "f···feJ~e are no e;.:tracts from par-
iiamentary debates, nothing breathing opposition or leading to discussion, 
for this might create ~ habit of thinking; nothing scientific, for that 
might enlighten; but the whole is a mass of uninteresting, tasteless 
s tLtp i d it y. " ( 89) 
Governor Lord Charles Somerset's fear of a free press and his dictatorial 
but unsuccessful attempt to stifle the emergence of a private newspaper, 
is too well ~::nevin to document in detc:\i 1 , save to say that the newsp.:,pe,~ he 
sought to destroy, the South African Commercial Advertis~r, survived to 
become South Africa's first private and ·independent newspaper. (90) 
·Launched by George Greig on 7 January 1824, the newspaper's editorial work 
was handed over to two Scottish immigrants, John Fairbairn and Thomas 
Pringle, after the second issue. (91) Autocratic/censorship, only a few 
months ,:,FteJ~ the ?\dvert:!_ser 's. establ i shme·nt, pl~ompted the· decision by the 
three men to voluntarily suspend the paper. When it was re-started in Au-
gust 1825 after direct Colonial Office intervention, ownership was vested 
in George Greig and John Fairbairn, with Fairbairn simultaneously assuming 
editorial responsibility. Legal difficulties emerged again in 1827, when 
the paper was once more suspended. Then in 1829 a Press Ordinance was 
passed, which in large measure secured the general principles of a free 
press. Six years later, in 1835 Fairbairn became sole owner and editor of 
the Advertiser. (92) In this extended battle, he had played a cardinal 
r6le, ·especially after 1825. 
His confrontation with Somerset over press freedom and over the estab-
lishment of a Literary Society in Cape Town, as well as the battles he was 
to wage in ~he future for representative government, are partly explained 
by the nature of the Cape administration. (93) Fairbairn himself described 
colonial administration at the time as a refuge for reactionary Toryism 
and milital~i::-m. In 1839 he decla1~ed: "thel~e is Tory leaven in this Colony 
which assimilates to its own character every stray particle of liberality 
that chance may project upon our high places.'' <94) Some days later, 
elaborating on the same theme, he stated: ''It has long been suspected, 
that the real antagonist principle to Colonial Reform, resided in the 
Horse Guards, - the strong-hold of Toryism, and the natural reservoir of 
Pab~onage. " He eNpl ai ned that mi 1 j, tary gove1~nment was implemented in most 
of the colonies because they had mainly been won as a result of war. 
Thereafter, however, mi~itary men continued to be appointed to civil 
posts. While such men were not to be disallowed from holding civil posts, 
military qualification was not in itself adequate qualification, as was 
the present practice. Such customs have operated ''most banefully on the 
Colonies in holding them moored for a whole generation to imperfect and 
hurtful institutions.'' (95) At the same time Fairbairn's own background as 
a factor in his political development must briefly be indicated. Scot-
land's agricultural revolution, her recent flowering of industrialization, 
the emergence of a prosperous and mobile middle class, provided the social 
context for his development - as these factors had similarly for his fu-
ture father·-i n-.. 1 C:\W, the evangel i cc.1l mi ssi c.'nc:wy, 01~ John Phi 1 i p. (96) Key 
intellectual influences on Fairbairn before his arrival at the Cape in 
1823 were his student years at Edinburgh University, his participation in 
the Whig Edinburgh R~view and his membership of the Newcastle Literary and 
Philosophical Society. <97) Perhaps the clearest expression of Fairbairn's 
role in political reform at the Cape, was td be his fight for repre-
sentative government, but such tendencies were evident earlier in his 
historic struggle for freedom of the press and freedom of expression and 
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in his commitment to the survival of the Advertiser as an independent 
organ. 
Many colonists looked with enth~siasm to the launching of the AdvPrtiser 
in 1824. Particular interest was shown by the English element, ~pecifical-
ly a number of merchants. In the petition drawn up in 1824 to protest 
against the loss of a free press, merchants such as Ewan Christian, 
Stephen Twycross, Charles Stuart Pillans and Antonio Chiappini, featured. 
(98) An editorial statement i~ an early issue of the Advertiser reflected 
merchant support. It declared that ''The warm interest taken, and the un-
iversal support afforded .by the respectable commercial body of the Colony, 
demand our sincerest thanks.'' (99) A few months later the newspaper 
• reported the proceedings of the Commercial Exchange Anniversary dinner at 
which George Greig and his commercial press was applauded and toasted and 
where Greig, prompted to speak, talked of how he was '' unable to ex-
press his gratitude for the patronage and support he had met with from the 
mercantile body.'' (100) Interesting is the slightly more ambiguous supporf 
the Commercial Exchange gave Fairbairn in 1827, when he travelled to 
London to campaign for a free press~ Rather than sponsoring Fairbairn's 
passage, they decided instead to make him an honorary member of the Ex-
change. C101> In underscoring English merchant support for the founding of 
the newspaper, the appearance of some Dutch names in the 1824 petition for 
a free press should not be ignored, nor is it the intention to imply that 
the English merchants, as a group, would always be supporters of the 
Advertiser in the years to come. (102) 
The East India Company's monopoly of the China trade was one of the first 
issues taken up by Cape Town merchants. Armed with a newspaper run by a 
sympathetic editor, within the bastion of the Commercial Exchange building 
and with an overseas reserve of volunteer, experienced advisors, the mer-
chants began battle. 
The series of events that followed in 1827 has become known as the 
KersWPll Test Case. The local firm, Borradailes, Thompson & Pillans, with 
advice from the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society - then chaired by the 
London partner of the firm, Abraham Borradaile - ordered a cargo of tea 
from London. Investigation by Borradaile had shown that this re-shipment 
neither transgressed the provisions of the Company charter, as the tea had 
been bought legally at the Company's London auction, nor was there any law 
in force at the Cape which made the importation illegal. Yet, when the tea 
arrived aboard the t.~rsh•ej_L, the 1 ocal customs d':partment impounded the 
cal~go in defence o·f thE• Comp.:\ny·~; tJ~acle pl~ivilege. (103) . 
At this point the Commercial Exchange and the South African Commercial 
Advertiser intervened, the former with official letters of protest, the 
latter with in-depth discussion and extensive coverage of the issue. As a 
result of all the fuss, the Kerswell incident finally reached the govern-
ment Advisory Council and the Customs House was instructed by the 
Lieutenant-Governor, Richard Bourke to release the cargo. (104) This 
marked a defeat for mercantilist monopolies, a victory for Cape Town mer-
chants and a progressive step for the future of local commerce. Arkin has 
tenned the incident a. "F'hyrr i c victory" ( 105) because the re·-shi pment o·f 
tea cargoes from•London was not commercially viable, evidenced by the 
precedent not being followed by subseq~ent re-shipments. Nevertheless, he 
c-•.dmi.ts, "... in the 1 ong ,~un the epi sodt? and its outcome undoubted! y 
helped to add to the pressure which was to culminate in the abrogation of 
the Company's Canton monopoly and the closure of the Cape Agency.'' (106) 
The importance of the episode did not, however, lie in the success of this .. 
particular campaign, as much as in the mobilization of the merchants and 
the role of John FaiJ~bairn's Adygrtis(:?r. In editorial columns at the time 
of the Kerswell case, Fairbairn made stinging attacks on the Company. He 
talked of the'' ..• plunder amassed by the Company from this poor Colony, 
du,~ing the last t~rJenty years ..• " and ,~e-fen~ed to the Company as the "Kings 
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of Leadenhall-street". ( 107) F:eaders were kept in farmed of the 1 a test 
agitation in Britai~ against the Charter and when on two occasions, local 
meetings sponsored by the Commercial Exchange were held to protest-against 
the monopoly, Fairbairn gave these full coverage too. (108) An indication 
of the degree of seriousness with which he rega~ded the outcome was the 
transfer of the second petition to the offices of the Advertiser for fur-
ther signatures. <109) Fairbairn continued his press campaign through 
1831, in fact up until the Company's charter was on the point of being 
abrogated (a result, ultimately, of developments in Britain, rather than 
1 ocal pn=ssLu~e). ( 110) 
Arkin has argued that the results of the ending of the Charter in 1834 
were not of the magnitude prophesied by the merchants and by Fairbairn. A 
greater variety of teas, for example, did become available but the much-
vaunted idea of the Cape's transformation into a halfway house and 
" entrepot for the goods of Europe and the East, once the Charter was 
abrogated, did not materialize. (111) Yet, in trying to weigh up the pros 
and cons of the Charter ~truggle conducted by the Cape Town merchants 
within these narrow parameters, Arkin has missed an important point. To 
the merchants and to the reformer, John Fairbairn, the Charter took on 
significance as a symbol of outdated economic and political privilege; its 
continued existence was anathema to the new laissez~faire ideology that 
was beginning to permeate merchant circles at the Cape and which Fairbairn 
ai1~ed in the columns o-F the Adv~tiser. Its dest,~u.ction was a sine qua non 
for future economic development. In September 1826, Fairbairn wrote in an 
editorial: "Free trade, and the abolition o·f Monopolies, seem to be now 
the order of the day. This Colony will in a few years reap a share of the 
benefits resulting from the enlightened system adopted by Great Britain 
and America." (112) 
In the years before 1835 Fairbairn used the pages of the Advertiser to 
discuss many issues of direct interest to the commercial bourgeoisie. 
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Fairbairn debated and explained the measure which set the rate of exchange 
of the depreciated rixdollar paper currency at 1/6d <Ordinance No. 2 of 
1825). (113) He was active in the unsuccessful attempt to establish a 
private bank in Cape Town, the second attempt in the colony. In February 
1826 he was elected to a committee of 78 delegated to approach the 
Governor for permission to establish the Bank of South Africa on the 
joint-stock principle. In an editorial he explained the advantages of the 
joint-stock type bank which operated so successfully in Scotland. (114) In 
this, as in many issues, Fairbairn declared the need to abolish all forms 
of goverriment interference and monopoly. He wrote in the Advertiser of 22 
February 1826: ''The establishment of this Bank, will very soon, it is 
hoped, relieve Government from its unnatural connexion with Banking as a 
profession. Sovereigns are generally as unsuccessful Merchants, as Mer-
chants have always proved indifferent Sovereigns.'' (115) In the 1830s 
Fairbairn continued to alert readers to the inadeq~acies of government 
banking, a tradition begun under the VOC in 1793 and which survived with 
ever increasing disrepute in the form of the Government Bank, until 1843. 
With characteristic, almost missionary-like zeal, he ~ampaigned for a 
private commercial bank in Cape Town, until this was finally established 
by John Bardwell Ebden in 1837~ (116) 
Fairbairn's role as promoter of specific commercial ventures and his 
fight, individually and in co-operation with the Commercial Exchange, for 
general commercial reform on issues such as free trade were initiated, 
like his political struggles, within a few years of his arrival at the 
Cape. Evidence of his commitment to and identification with the cause of 
commercial reform, was strong even in the years preceding the start of the 
core period of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO '~ 
EXPANSION, EMANCIPATION AND THE ROLE OF THE ADVERTISER 1835-1840 
2.1 Slavery, abolition and the Advertiser 
On 16 September 1835 Fairbairn pronounced with delight and relief: "This 
is the brightest page in the history of the Co16ny ~ in the history of 
England- perhaps in the history of human Governments ••• After God, then 
let our affections be drawn out towards our Mother Country. ~ay she long 
set an example of Humanity, Justice and Honor to all nations!'' (1) Prompt-
ing Fairbairn's praise on this occasion was not the abolition of slavery 
throughout the British empire, as one might expect from his moral tone, 
but instead the British government's award of the slave compensation 
money. 
Editorial discussion in the Adve~tiser of the question o~ abolition in-
tensified in the wake o·f Ordinance No. 19 of June 1826, which provided for 
improved conditibns for slaves, including the appointment of a Guardian of 
' the Slaves. Modelled on the 1824 Trinidad Order-in-Council, the Ordinance 
resulted in uproar amongst slave owners at the Cape. <2> In July 1826 
Fairbairn admitted his reluctance to discuss the topic of slavery before 
Ordinance No. 19 was passed: 
We have hitherto avoided, as much as possible, all discussion on the 
subject of SLAVERY, although it was one of much interest to most of 
our Readers, who have frequent!~ blamed our silence, and called for 
some observations upon it. There were two reasons for this line of 
conduct ••• The First was, that we did not understand the case, nor 
could see any method of obviating the difficulties apparently in-
separable from every scheme that had been devised for effecting the 
final Abolition of Slavery, nor had we met with any modest person who 
pretended to be much wiser than oGrselves on these heads; and the~ 
second was, that, in our opinion, the question could not be agitated 
without deteriorating the value of Slave Property. (3) 
The most striking characteristic of Fairbairn's discussion of slavery is 
the virtual absence of any moral or social condemnation of the institu-
tion. Yet, in this respect his position was in complet~ alignment with 
English abolitionists. Biblical interpretation had seldom been an im-
portant issue in controversie• over the slave trade. "Despite the 
predominantly religious motivation of British Quakers and Evangelicals, 
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the abolitionists, with a few exceptions like Granville Sharp, made little 
use of Scriptural argument.'' Wilberforce even cautioned against introduc-
ing this aspect into discussions in the House of Commons. The main ~efence 
of the antislavery argument was secular, lying instead along lines of na-
tional interest and foreign competition. (4) However, here and there a 
pious statement, to be expected perhaps of Fairbairn as friend of the mis-
sionary movement, is to be found. For example: 
The Abolition of the Slave Trade was an open recognition of the prin-
ciple that man ought to have no property in man •.• The Religious 
Public, those who think nobly of the soul, and who anticipate the 
Reign of Faith, Hope and Charity upon earth, have therefore cause to 
rejoice above all others, at the removal of this impassable barrier 
(slavery] which has so long stopt the progress of all spiritual im-
provement. And we trust to see them on the morning of the First of 
December, in their churches and chapels, offering up praises to the 
GREAT DELIVERER for this manifestation of his GOODNESS. (5) 
This line of editorial discussion was, however, exceptional. That ha 
deliberately avoided a moral viewpoint (in line with overseas attitudes>, 
he acknowledged in March 1831: 
In treating this question [slavery] we h~ve from the beginning <1824) 
carefully abstained as much as possible from touching on the moral 
and religious grounds from which so many able writers have drawn 
their arguments in favor of Liberty. Not that we overlooked or were 
insensible of their paramount importance, or slighted the authority 
which the sanction of our Holy Religion sheds over every great 
design. But in discussing the propriety of Political arrangements we 
prefer, for ordinary use, the more generally intelligible principles 
of Political Science. The Ten Commandments, with the New Testament 
addition of Universal Benevolence, may be employed by others; we are 
content with the Multiplication Table <6> 
With what yardstick was Fairbairn measuring the propriety of ''Political 
arrangements'' that he could reduce political science to the laws of multi-
plication? His approach is revealed as pragmatic and materialistic. While 
he agitated hard for the cause of emancipation after 1826, often in oppo-
sition to the representatives of the slave owners <7>, his great concern 
remained the matter of adequate compensation for freed slave property. a 
concern inextricably bound up with his p~rception of the need for the ap-
peasement of the slave owners in the interests of stable, united colonial 
rule. 
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Fairbairn's wish for reconciliation can be understood against the back-
ground sketched by Rayner in her recent study of slavery and Cape wine 
farming, m6re particularly in her concept of the "weakening of the· 
British-Dutch alliance". (8) She characterizes those features of the early 
period of British occupation, which generally b~ought new possibilities of 
personal aggrandisement for the local gentry, as follows: offices in local 
government; pleasant social relationships between this gentry and British 
officials; official stimulus of wine farming; improved regulation of Khoi 
labour in Caledon's 1809 law, the regulations of 1812 and 1817; the estab-
lishment of the circuit court system in 1811; and a paternalistic but un-
systematic intervention ±n the master-slave relationship. (9) She then 
contrasts this with developments in the late 1820s and early 1830s which 
witnessed a reversal. The effect of the reduction of privileged tariffs on 
the import of Cape wine into Britain in 1826 and the resultant failure of 
the wine industry, was compounded by a series of orders regarding slavery, 
parti cul arl y Ordinance No. 19. ( 10> Rayner thus concludes: "For Cape 
slaveowners, the realisation of the powerlessness of the local government 
in the face of a Colonial Office committed to a comprehensive amelioration 
programme and ultimately to the abolition of slavery, led to a re-
evaluation of the alliance which had served the interests of the slaveown-
ing elite and the local government for several decades. The crisis over 
slavery was one more element on top of economic failure engendering disil-
lusionment with British rule." <11> 
It was thus as mediator and property owner that ~airbairn early formulated 
the problem of abolition, which was to engross his attention, viz. the 
question of the conflicting rights of slave and master, further compli-
cated in the colonial context. 
The abolition of Slavery, or Regulations for ameliorating the condi-
tion of Slaves, form but one side of the question. If the just rights 
of the Masters are left out of view, thes~ things can be easily ac-
complished by so a powerful nation as ~ngland. But the question 
before us is not a question of Power, but of Justice. It is - how 
these most desirable objects be gained for the one class, without in-
f 1 i cti ng a,n unmerited punishment on the other? How can the Slave ob-
tain his Freedom, while the Property of the Master, which is of at 
least as much- importance to him as Freedom is to the other ••. how tc 
make Abolition or Amelioration coincide with the rights of Property 
i? the problem, and it is one which readers will admit to be a very 
hard one. [author's emphasis] <12> 
Satisfied that emancipation in itself ~auld be adequate protection for the 
slaves, Fairbairn turned his attention exclusively to the slave owners. He 
set about proposing '' a Scheme which shall enrich the Slave-holder -
furnish the Colonies with an abundance of the cheapest, most manageable, 
and most profitable species of Labor, and bind all classes of men 
throughout the Empire by the bonds of an equal, personal, and immediate 
interest in the support or order,and due administration of all the Laws-." 
( 13) 
Once convinced of the viability of emancipation, he began a campaign to 
persuade his readers of the advantages. He instituted a process of 
opinion-forming in a variety of ways in the news~aper in editorials, by 
publishing correspondence and carrying overseas news. He carefully stated 
that the responsibility for slavery at the Cape was Britain's, particu-
larly as the Cape could boast of no representative government, and that if 
Britain wished to undo the "System", she would have to do it at her own 
expense. C14) He set out to convince slave owners and sympathizers that 
free labour would ultimately be less expensive than unfree slave labour. 
(15) He even resorted to the spurious argument that the overseas demand 
for Cape goods was restricted because slave labour was involved in their 
production. (16) Finally, Fairbairn began to prepare the Cape for the 
great change heralded by emancipation and compensation. His detailed 
formulation of a plan for slave compensation was evolved from an early 
date and, as he pointed out in 1835, it was almost identical to the scheme 
eventually sent out by the British government. (17) In 1833 he was already 
outlining the rosy prospects for the Cape economy once the compensation 
money arrived: 
One million sterling .•• is to be added to the Capital of the Colony at 
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once, every thing else remaining as it is. In the West India Colonies 
the glut of money will be much less sensibly felt as a very large pro-
portion of the grant destined for them will remain with the Mortgagees 
in England. Here the mortgagees are resident, and the whole sum in hard 
cash will enter Table Bay. 
Passing over immediate and temporary effects, such as the advance of 
prices and the decline in the rate of the interest, the ultimate effect 
will be a great improvement in the style of living throughout the Coun-
try Districts. We do not refer merely to the Farmers. The numerous 
class of Laborers will lay out their gains on food, clothes, and furni-
ture to an extent far beyond their present accomodation. 
There will be a great increase of buildings, both in town and country. 
Capitalists will be glad to invest their money in Joint Stock Concerhs, 
where there is a fair prospect of a moderate return -for not only will 
the borrowers be reduced in number, but what is more effective, 
securities will be diminished, laborers being no longer subjects of 
mortgage. ihe result of all this will be a vast increase of demand for 
Labor, an advance in wages, an increase in the number of Laborers by 
emigration, and the conversion of Idlers ••• In conclusion it is perhaps 
not too much to say that this sudden influx of. capital will raise the 
Colony as much in five years, in point of wealth, as we could have 
hoped to see it rise in Fifty under the present System of stinted 
Labor, and deficient Capital. (18) 
Simultaneously, cognisant of the large amounts of money due to the Cape, 
Fairbairn began to voice cautionary concern for the colony's economy. The 
sudden influx, an amount he estimated at six times the value of money cir-
culation at the Cape, he warned, could result in the unsettling of ''the 
1--Jhole financial arrangements of the Colony". (19) 
Thus in the years preceding emancipation Fairbairn campaigned for aboli-
tion in such a way as to placate slave owners and when news of the com-
pensation money arrived at the Cape, he immediately began preparing his 
readers for the effects of this huge amount of money. 
2.2 Slavery and commerce at the Cape before 1834 
The question that comes to mind is how far Fairbairn's concern with the 
issue of slavery and emancipation was reflected by Cape commerce general-
ly. The Genoveses developed ~he argument of what they term the "Janus face 
of merchant capital'', to refer to merchant capital's ability because of 
its base in relations of exchange, not production, to feed off and coexist 
within different types of relations of production, i.e. capitalism and 
pre-capitalist form~ of property like slavery. Was the commercial 
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bourgeoisie at the Cape able to adjust to and promote relations of advanc-
ing capitalism, yet at the same time remain tied to pre-capitalist ftirms 
of social relationships, simultaneously looking forward and backward, as 
Janus of ancient Roman mythology was believed to have done? (20) 
The views of the smaller general trader at the Cape <mainly 
Dutch/Afrikaans> are generally difficult to reconstruct as they lacked the 
organizational, economic and social power merchants enjoyed. (21) Judging 
from Fairbairn's account of the dinner of 1 December 1834 held to 
celebrate the abolition of slavery of that day, the organized merchant 
sector, represented by the Commercial E:<change, certainly had no misgiv-
ings. Fairbairn talks of the "Noble Britons" - chiefly merchants - who as-
sembled that night at the George's Hotel in the Heerengracht ''and in true 
English fashion expressed their gratitude for this Crowning Mercy''. During 
that day the meteor flag of England had been unfurled on the Commercial 
Exchange". (22) 
And what of the slaves, one of the two main protagonist groups in these 
events, but relegated by Fairbairn to mere shadows. Of these men and 
women, for four years hence apprentices (23), Fairbairn reported 
patronisingly: "Not a misled simpleton was there at the Police Office on 
the following day charged even with inebriety, or the breaking of a pane 
of glass. Large bodies of the 'Apprentices', of all ages and both sexes, 
promenaded the streets dLtring the day and night, many of them attended by 
a band of amateur musicians; but their amusements were simple and 
interesting; their demeanour orderly and respectful." (24> 
At the celebratory dinner. Francis Collison, wine merchant/brewer, was 
chairman and J.S. Herrington, attorney/notary, was croupier. The stewards 
were the merchants A. Chiappini, T. Tennant, George Greig and G. Hodgskin, 
the attorney/notary John Barker and, John Fairbairn. Merchant dominance of 
. 
the dinner was underscored by the speech of Mr Venning, merchant and mem-
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ber of the London-based Cape of Good Hope Trade Society, in which he men-
tioned ''being surro~nded almost exclusively by the Merchants of Cape 
Town.'' C25} In his toast that night Herrington indicated that the atcusa-
tion of "party meeting" had been levelled at the dinner and he talked of 
the es~rangement between the British and their ~ellow colonists. Trying, 
rather unsuccessfully, to counter the accusation that the Commercial Ex-
change represented the partisan interests of the English merchants, he 
stated that when the Commercial· E>:change was con tempi ated," the principal· 
object !-'las an Amalgamation o·f those who, by the final cession of the 
Colony, had become fellow subjects, that all might join in promoting the 
common interests of the Colony, in its Agriculture, Trade and Commerce. 
With this view the British, who formed the vast majority of the members, 
always selected such persons for their committees as might fairly be con-
sidered ·to represent all parties."· (26) 
.Yet, despite the festivities to mark slave emancipation held by English 
merchants, both English and Dutch/Afrikaans merchants had individually 
joined with slave owners in public meetings and petitions during the 
events leading to emancipation. The names of prominent English merchants, 
Hamilton Ross and Stephen Twycross, for instance, feature among~t the 
memorialists "conce,~ned and affected by Ordinance No. 19". Hamilton Ross 
and James Carfrae & Co. are mentioned in the original request for permis-
sion to hold a meeting, in order to draw up a petition against Ordinance 
No. 19. <27) Amongst such petitioners, however, Dutch/Afrikaan~ retailers, 
bu~ines~=en and most especially wine merchants, predominate. Thus the 
names of P. Woutersen, J.J. van den Berg, G.J. Vas, J.F. Beck, J.J. Vas, 
R.A. Zeederberg, J.A. Smuts and J.W. Hurter, all wine merchants, occur; 
L.W.C. Beck and P. G. van der Byl, retail shop owners, and G.E. Overbeek, 
member of the Orphan Chamber, are also 1 i sted. <28) In val vement of mer-
chants at the time of Ordinance No. 19 has been mentioned by Rayner. 
Evidence of their participation in the "Town House Committee" formedto 
have Ordinance No. 19 su~pended is a case in point. <29) Yet, attention 
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has not been drawn to the fact that the main impetus came from a specific 
sector of commerce, i.e. the group of smaller Dutch/Afrikaans wine mer-
chants, closely involved as they were with wine farming in the south-
western Cape, the slave-based sector of the economy par excellence. (30) 
English merchants too were very much in agreement with Fairbairn's agita-
tion for satisfactory conditions of compensation payment. In Memorials 
presented to HM Treasury and the Commissioner of the Slave Compensation 
Office by the Exchange's English affiliate, the Cape of Good Hope Trade 
Society, worries about London as the venue for payment and possible delays 
in the compensation were expressed. (31) The Memorial to the Slave Com-
pensation Office wished ''to represent that great excitement and distrust 
exist in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, with regard to the Slave 
Compensation Money, and that the Mortgagees of Slave Property are in a 
state of alarm as to the probable value of their securties." Were mer-
chants here admitting their commercial affairs to be extensively linked to 
slave property via mortgage and general credit, were they acknowledging 
their own slave ownership, or wer& they merely worried about the effects 
of emancipation on colonial property and capital generally? 
The first question is to what extent merchants were involved in transac-
tions in which slave property was employed for raising loans. Obviously 
this would be an aspect stressed by slave owners during the process lead-
ing to abolition. Shell's study of slavery at the Cape in the 17th and 
early 18th centuries has indicated the important role of slave mortgage. 
"Since there were no public lending institutions at the Cape, some in-
dividuals used the slaves as a peripatetic bank. Such owners sold slaves 
when they needed to make a 'withdrawal· ••• Over the course of the eight-
eenth century this scheme became an increasingly important feature of Cape 
slave society, especially for elderly slave owners. By 1806, Samuel Hud-
son, an English slave owner, talking of slavery at the Cape, flatly 
claimed: 'for the aged, tis their bank'. Thanks to the domestic market, 
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slaves were a negotiable commodity at the Cape, giving a fiscal meaning to 
the word 'bondsman':" (32) 
Van Zyl has stressed that during the early 19th century, too, slaves were 
frequently accepted as security by money lender~ and that it was on the 
basis of slave property that the expansion of wine farming between 1813 
and 1823 took place. (33) In 1823, according to the tommissioners of En-
quiry, the mortgages on 4 089 slaves stood at 12 375 000 guldens 
(4 125 (H)!) rb:dollars). (34) Slave owners stated in a petition drawn up in 
1827 <information which Van Zyl accepts unquestioningly) that by that year 
about 15 000 <i.e. roughly half) of the slaves were mortgaged. (35) Con-
temporary Dutch/Afrikaans opinion at the time of emancipation held that by 
the year of emancipation (1834), an amount of £400 000 or 5 333 333 rix-
doll a1~s was mortgaged on the basis of slave property. (36) 
While Van Zyl stresses the heavy mortgaging of slaves and does not indi-
cate the source of this mortgage credit, Rayner gives a different emphasis 
regarding the security used by wine farmers of the south-western Cape to 
raise mortgages. She also specifically analyses the source of this credit. 
From her examination of estate .records for the year 1823, she deduces that 
"Two-thirds of the 374 winefarming estates were heavily mortgaged primari-
lyon the basis of their fixed assets rather than of slave property.'' (37) 
"The value of tt·.eir [wine fc:\l~mel~s] mortgages on slaves amounted to only 5/. 
of the four and one quarter million rixdollars which the colonists as a 
whole had borrowed up to 1823, and only 18/. of the total value of loans 
taken out by wine growers.'' (38) Regarding the source of mortgage credit, 
Rayner furthermore states: 
Most of the mortgages had been contracted with the government-
contrblled Lombard and Discount Banks and to a lesser extent with the 
Orphan Chamber, which administered and settled intestate estates, and 
with private individLials. Large-scale farmers. district officials and 
annuitants, rather than merchants, were involved as individual 
lenders-of capital. [author's emphasis] The records of the insolvent 
estate of Dirk Gysbert van Reenen, for instance, indicate that he 
owed Rxds 35,221 in unpaid principal interest on mortgages contracted 
with the Lombard Bank, the Orphan Chamber, J.J.L. Smuts, an Orphan 
- J 
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Chamber official Ca member, ~s will be seen, of the Dutch/Afrikaans 
commercial bourg•oisieJ; Michiel van Breda, a leading 
agriculturalist; and P.H. van Reede van Oudtshoorn, a relative of the 
only Dutch nobleman resident in the colony. 
She cone 1 Ltdes: 
Merchants were apparently discouraged from investing 
fixed farm property by the great delays attendant on 
the principal. During a period of rapid depreciation 
currency, such delays could prove very costly to the 
tal on a fixed interest rate of 6 percent per annum. 
in mortgages of 
the recovery of 
in the colonial 
lender of capi-
<39) 
The Slave Office Day Books of Mortgages covering the period 1818-1836, 
lists those mortgages secured on the basis of slaves. (40) These were 
therefore examined with a view to further establishing how important a 
factor merchant capital was in such transactions. The result generally 
confirmed Rayner's propbsition that merchants were infrequent creditors in 
relation to slave mortgages. The Government Discount and Lombard Banks, 
indeed, appear very frequently as mortgagees; and most mortgagees a~e 
·nutch/Afrikaans private individuals, many having no apparent business con-
nection. Nevertheless, a group of Dutch/Afrikaans merchants and busi-
nessmen does, however, appear fairly frequently, while there is scattered 
mention of big English merchants. 
Examples of English merchant mort~agees are as follows. In the 1818-1821 
period Stephen Twycross, slave petitioner and wine exporter, extended a 
mortgage of f7 158' to Hester Johanna Maynier. (41) J. Collison, foremost 
wine exporter, is list~d as a mortg~gee of flO 584 advanced to M. Pentz of 
Stellenbosch, f6 000 to G.H. de Waal and f1 200 to J. Dick. <42) J.R. 
Thomson of the firm Thomson, Watson & Co., another major wine exporter, 
accepted a slave as security from G. Bennett for two promissory notes. 
(43) In the period 1829-1835, mentions of the following English merchants 
are encountered. In December 1833 Messrs Borradailes, Thompson & Pillans 
advanced a mortgage of £367-1-0 to Joseph S~arrett Needham on security of 
20 slave~ he owned. (44) S.B. Venning & Co., also a wine exporter, was 
creditor in a-transaction with Willem van Reenen registered in February 
1835: 
For better securing the payment of a Bill of Exchange bearing date 
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11th instant drawn by him upon & accepted by Petrus Johannes 
Redelingshuys ••• in favor of said firm of S.B. Venning & Co. or 
order payable twelve months after date for the sum of £152.1.9 as-
signed, transferred by way of Special Mortgage, all his right and 
title in & to the Compensation Money which may be awarde~ to ~im by 
the Commissioners under & by virtue of an Act of Parliament, for the 
loss incurred by the manumission of his late slaves named Adonis & 
Jan and as a further security for the due and punctual. payment of the 
said Bill of Exchange, he has also mortgaged all his right & title 
of, in and to the Apprenticeship & service of the said apprenticed 
Laborers for the resi dLie o·f their term of service. < 45> 
Thomson, Watson & Co. lent more than £1 000 to Michie! Johannes de Kock on 
security of 19 slaves and to the sa~e debtor the next year. (46) Simpson. 
Brothers, Messrs. Collison & Co., James Nisbet and William Dickson, Wil-
liam Gadney, William Anderson Sen. & Co. ,·George Thompson of Borradailes, 
Thompson & Co., William Heideman for James Carfrae & Co., slave 
memorialists, and Ewan Christian, all merchants and most of them exporters 
of wine, are named as mortgagees in the period 1831-1834, usually on 
single occasions. (47) 
But more frequent in the records is mention of Dutch/Afrikaans m~rchants, 
traders and agents. Andries Brink <Daniel's son), wine merchant, and Hans 
Hendrik Wicht, a retail shopkeeper, both appear with great regularity over 
the period 1818~1821 and 1829-1835. (48> The name of Roelof Abraham 
Zeederberg, wine merchant, occurs and even more frequ~ntly J.J.L. Smuts, 
secretary of the Orphan Chamber, who is mentioned by Rayner as an im-
portant mortgagee. (49) G.E. Overbeek, like Smuts, a member of the Orphan 
Chamber, is also named. (50) The brothers, Johan Hendrik Wicht, agent, and 
Johan Andreas Heyse Wicht, retailer, as well as Fredrik Godfried 
Watermeyer, for instance, appear on at least two, if not more, occasions. 
(51) H.G. Muntingh, merchant, lent an amount of f6 000 in 1820 and Messrs. 
Wolff & Bartman, auctioneers, were mortgagees on at least five occasions 
between 1830 and 1832. (52) The appearance, therefore, of names such as 
Zeederberg, Overbeek and several other mortgagees as petitioners against 
Ordinance No. 19, is not SLiprising. (53) 
It may be deduced from the above that commerce did not participate exten-
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sively in transactions based on the mortgage of bonded human property, 
though the wine merchant sector as a whole and particularly the 
Dutch/Afrikaans group of wine merchants, agents and moneylenders was more 
heavily involved. 
A second aspect of the commerce-slave relation, the extent of which cannot 
be gauged, was commerce's advance of credit for the purchase of slaves. 
The business sector, particularly in the absence of a formal banking 
structure, performed a banking function by discounting bill~ of exchange, 
so perhaps loans for the purchase of slaves were more general than the 
isolated case mentioned here. The instance that stands as example was re-
lated in correspondence to the Advertiser's editor. Major Parlby, an 
English farmer, detailing his financial distress, as a result of the 
reduced compensation awards, explained that he had borrowed the original 
capital for purchasing his slaves from Hamilton Ross & Co., whom he had 
paid 6% interest over a period of seven years. <54> 
Finally, what of the basic relationship between the propertied classes, 
including commerce, and the slaves, viz. that of master and slave? One 
could expect merchants and businessmen, a wealthy section of the ruling 
class, to employ slaves as domestic workers as well as labourers in their 
shops and firms. These urban workers at home and in the service sector 
formed an important section of the slave class. Therefore, the appearance 
of commercial men as claimants in the Lists of Compensation Awards is not 
suprising, especially if ownership in the li~ts also represented mortgage-
related transactions undertaken by them before emancipation. However, the 
as~ect of compensation awards to commerce will be dealt with in a later 
section. At this stage it is sufficient to state that commerce certainly 
encompassed slave ownership. (55) 
Fairbairn had rightly stated in April 1834 that not only slaveholders were 
going .to be affected by emancipation; other ''classes in the community too, 
to the extent of their property and transactions, were involved not only 
as Mortgagees, Creditors, or Partners with the Holders of Slaves, or simp-
ly partaking of the -good or ill fortunes of so important a cl-ass of 
customers, or employers, or neighbours engaged in the same occupations 
with themselves, but directly and immediately in their own-property and 
business.'' (56) Commerce's involvement in slave property during the pre-
emancipation period has been sketched. The general characteristic o·f com-
mercia! capital's Janus face is confirmed by its involvement in slave 
property relations and transactions, albeit not on an extensive scale. 
Yet, if in the years before slave compensation money, the fortunes of Cape 
commerce were not that closely tied up with slave property, in the years 
during the actual payment, its ·fortunes were to become intimately linked. 
2.3 Effects of abolition and compensation on the economy 
On 16 September 1835 Fairbairn informed his readers that an amount of 
£20 000 000 was to be paid to slave owners in the British colonies. Of 
this the Cape was allotted pro rata £1 247 401-0-7 for its 38 427 slaves, 
each valued at an average price of £73-9-11, calculated on the basis of 
prices obtained during the period 1823-1830. (57) These calculations were 
made in London on the basis of information regarding average prices and 
the total number of slaves, supplied by the local.B6ard of Assistant Com-
missioners, which was set up in Cape Town in early 1834. <58) The Board 
consisted of the Governor, Attorney-General and of the six unofficial mem-
bers, four were well-known merchants - Ewan Christian, W. Gadney, H.A. 
Sandenbergh and P.M. Brink - as well as the money-dealer, J.J.L. Smuts. 
1 <59> Encouragement for such a selection of men came from London. In •in-
structions to Governor D'Urban, Stanley recommended that the Board include 
men with ''a practical knowledge of slaves, which you will not find except 
amongst persons who are themsleves interested in that species of proper-
ty.'' (60) That this recommendation was followed is proved by the listing 
. 
of Christian, Sandenbergh, Brink and Smuts in the lists of the slave com-
pensation awards and in the mention already made of Gadney, Christian and 
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Smuts as slave mortgagees. (61) 
The small compensation awards, the delays in the arrival of the moriey, the 
inability of the rural slave owners to travel to Britain, their lack of 
business connections and acumen, their dependence 6n mainly British-
connected merchants to collect the money and general financial failure, 
are all writ large in the annals of traditional historiographical inter-
pretations of this period. Liebenberg cites historians aAd authors such as 
Cory, Thom, Gie, Marais, Stockenstrbm, De Kock, Grundling, Wild, Viljoen, 
Boeseken and Kruger, Fowler and Smit, Wilmot and Chase in this regard, 
believing their inspiration to derive from the writings of Theal, who in 
turn may have based himself on H. Cloete's writings published in 1856, 
Five lectures on the Emigration. (62) 
Yet, rather than the depression and bankruptcy so often assigned the 
period after emancipation, once a serious look is taken the picture that 
emerges is one of a stimulated economy approaching, if not attaining, boom 
conditions. While some scholars who have studied the period, such as 
Liebenberg and Hengherr, have identified it as a period of e>:pansion and 
growth, its main features have never been discussed in detail. <63) 
2.3.1 Money supply 
In November 1839 Fairbairn spoke of the abundance of money at the Cape ''in 
return for the abolition of a law - for a change in the relation of master 
and servant''. Despite his earlier quoted statement that an amount equal to 
six times the circulating medium of the Cape was to arrive in compensa-
tion, the whole amount of over £1 million certainly never reached the 
Cape. But. his prediction of 1833 regarding the effects of the compensation 
on the economy proved remarkably accurate. (64> 
From government figures available regarding the currency, it can be seen 
that the bulk of the money arrived in 1837-1838. These figures are some-
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what inconsistent but serve to indicate (1) the increase in specie import 
over the period, especially in the years 1837-1838 and (2) the great in-
crease in the component of privatly imported specie. The informati6n is 
summarized below: 
Table 2.1 IMPORTS OF SPECIE 1825-1838 
·. Commissariat (government military expenses] 1825-1829 
Commissariat [government military expenses] 1825-1829 
Commissariat [government military expenses] Year ending March 1837 
Commissariat (government military expenses] Year ending March 1838 
Private merchant imports up to end of 1837 
Private imports up to end of 1838 
(Source: Colony of the C4pe of Good Hope [Blue Bookl 1838) 
£ 169 800 silver 
£ 2 205 copper 
£ 80000 
£ 90000 
= £342 005 
£235 000 (or £235 080) 
£ 19 000 
= £254000 
A breakdown of the component of,private imports up to the end of 1837 was 
obtained from earlier Blue Books and can be summarized as follows: . 
Table 2.2 PRIVATE IMPORTS OF SPECIE 1835-1837 
1835 £ 25000 
1836 £ 18 000 
1837 £192 680 
(Source: Colony of the C4pe of Good Hope [Blue Book! 1835-1837) 
Thus, no private imports of specie occurred in the period between 1825, 
the year British sterling was introduced, and 1835. The £25 000 introduced 
privately in 1835 cannot be explained in terms of the slave compensation 
money inflow. Certainly, some of the 1836 imports and all the 1837 imports 
can be attributed to the compensation as claims began to be processed in 
late 1836. (65) 
Regarding the total amount of coin in circulation, government figures 
reveal the following: 
Table 2.3 COIN IN CIRCULATION 1834-1843 
1834 £ 75 000 £ so 000 1839 £300000 
1835 £100000 £105 000 1840 £250000 £300000 
1836 £150000 1841 £180000 £230000 
1837 £300000 1842 £160000 £210 000 
1838 £300000 1843 £155 000 £205000 
(Source: Colony of the Ctl)>e of Good Hope [SiutJ Book) 1834-1843) 
From the above it is app<:\rent that the circulation of specie doubled 
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during 1837, the first proper year of arrival of the compensation money, 
remaining at that level in the immediate aftermath, beginning to decrease 
in 1840 and falling to roughly 1836 levels by 1843. In 1840, therefore, 
the government was still refe~ring to ''The great and sudden increase in 
the Circulating medium by payment o·f the Slave Compensation claims .•. " 
(66) However, the increase of specie over the period to 1840 cannot be ex-
plained entirely in terms of the compensation money. It was also the 
result, as shown in Table 2.1, of the increased importations by the mili-
tary, as well as evidence of the first large-scale rewards of Eastern Pro-
vince merino farming in the late 1830s and the establishment of the first 
private, commercial bank, the Cape o·f Good Hope Bank, in 1837. (67) It 
should be borne in mind that there was in addition in this period a paper 
circLilating mediLim which between the years 1835-1840 amounted to some 
£180 000 - &200 000. <68) Interestingly, the government statistical report 
of 1838 also mentioned that large sums of specie, the produce of the slave 
compensation money and the sale of farms, had been taken by the "Emigrant" 
(i.e. trekking> ·farmers. (69) I·f this did indeed occur, then the 
debilitating effect on the economy must certainly have been balanced out 
by the sheer amount of specie introduced and still remaining. 
2.3.2 Imports 
It is obvious that much of the compensation money due to the Cape never 
left London. No doubt the money was used by commerce to pay off existing 
debts, which because of difficulties of remitting money, it was eager to 
do. Some money must also have found its way into the London branches of 
the merchant houses, as agency fees. Another probable explanation is that 
many merchants brought in goods, instead of bringing back actual- money or 
immediately returned the money to England in payment for new goods. 
Imports over the period 1834-1843 and the resultant custom dues paid to 
the Government (see_ Table 2.4 overleaf), show an enormous increase over 
the period of the slave compensation money. The reas6n for this increase 
again cannot be solely assigned to the compensation, but was also a 
reflection of a generally e~panding market demands. Yet, compensation 
should be seen as a major factor. And it was widely hailed as such.at the 
time. The Commercial Exchange's annual report published in the Advertiser 
in mid-1837, remarks on the unusual increase in imports which may be part-
ly ascribed to the payment of the slave compensation money. <70> The 
Government Blue Book for 1836 stated: "The i mportat i Ol'l o·f Goods ·from the 
United Kingdom has been very greatly increased of late, owing mainly to 
the payment of the Slave Compensation money; but it is not to be credited 
that this state of things will survive the cause which produced it, still 
however, the commerce of the Colony muust be held t6 have improved, and 
particularly that with other CoLintries." Elsewhere the large importations 
are_ascribed in great measure "to speculations in transactions, arising 
out of the barter and sale of compensation claims and partly to an in-
creased consumption of imported arti c 1 es." Such government sentiment ~sas 
repeated in 183"7 and 1838. <71) 
Trade (imports and exports) through Cape Town in the first half of the 
19th century has recently been tabulated. This shows that between 1831 and 
1835 the annual average stood at £630 000; between 1836 and 1840 at 
£1 596 000 <more than doubling) and between 1841 and 1845 it had fallen 
back slightly to £1 017 000. <72) In the Legislative Council the Hen. H. 
Cloete mentioned the slave compensation money as the probable reason for 
the increase of shipping in Cape To~n·s harbour. <73) When Advocate Mus-
grave gave evidence against the Usury Bill in 1839, he aimed to present 
merchants in an adverse way and by contrast paint a picture of the plight 
of poor farmers and small tradesmen who would suffer by a lifting of the 
6X interest limit on promissory notes and bills of exchange. He argued 
that the compensation money had passed ''Into the hands of the merchants, 
who passed it again in remittances to the mother country; and in exchange, 
we have got a huge quantity of merchandise whi~h is not wanted. The prin-
cipal merchants, finding_ the market glutted, that they are unable to dis-
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pose of their goods, found no difficulty in passing over certain 
quantities to shopkeepers, miners, and other persons, taking their notes 
for the amount at 6% II <74> Table 2.4 presents official figures in-
dicating increased Cape Town imports and exports during the period of com-
pensation with a peak reached in 1839-1840. The table likewise shows a 
notice~ble increase in customs dues~ 
Table 2.4 IMPORTS. EXPORTS & GOVERNMENT DUES, CAPE TOWN 1834-1843 
Cape Town Cape Town 
Imports Exports 
1834 £ 392 827 £ 297 574 
1835 £ 498 564 £ 328 579 
1836 £ 780 673 £ 336 199 
1837 £ 985 826 £ 327 659 
1838 £ 917 963 £ 311911 
1839 £ 231 362 £ 706 769 
1840 £1 371 582 £1011916 
1841 £ 824 974 £ 526 245 
1842 £ 600 131 £ 245.862 
1843 £ 665 338 £ 211 226 
(Source: Colony of the Cape of Good Hope [Blue Book] 1834-1843) 
•conflicting figures reported in [Blue Book] 1842-1843 
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The influx of money resulted in a reduction of the interest rate. In Au·-· 
gLtst 1838 Fairbairn 'attt~ibuted the fall to the inflow of compensation 
money and the lack of investment of that money in productive undertakings, 
such as harbours and agricultural improvements. (75) The 1837 Blue Book 
noted that the rate of discount had been lowered from 6% to 4 1/2% and 
even to 4% because of the substantial increase in the money supply, adding 
that the establishment of the new private bank had not been without its 
influence. The Blue Book for 1840 also explained that the great and sudden 
increase in the "ciJ~culating medium" was due to the slave compensation 
money, noting that the interest rate was now reverting to 6% because of a 
shoJ~tage of money. (76) 
On 12 September 1839 the Savings Bank, following the Government Bank, 
reduced the interest on depos~ts from 4% to 3% and on bonds in favour of 
the bank in the Western division from 5% to 4%. In its annual report pub-
lished in the Advertiser in January of the next,year, the bank stated that 
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the reduction of intere~t had not been an adequate for its large 
amounts of idle reserves and because of the difficulty of finding invest-
ment opportunities on good security, it had been decided to limit d~posits 
to £75 p.a. or £5 p.m. (77> 
2.3.4 Property 
I 
The property market was also ~ffected by the·compensation money. The 
. . I . 
colonial government reported as early as 1836 that land policy was to be 
a·ff.ected by the SLid den increase of money. "For two realons, and in order 
I . 
to take advantage of the recent influx of money into t1e Colony, op-
portunities have been given for the redemption of quit1rent lands at 20 
. I 
years purchase, and the granting of lands on that tenu1e has been checked 
I 
in orde~ that all persons desiring to acquire lands, m~y do so by pur-
l 
chase." <78) I 
\ 
Emancipation itself also stimulated the property markeJ.New areas of poor 
I 
housing inhabited by ~rtisans/labourers, many obvious!~ former slaves, 
were alluded to by Fairbairn. He reported in 1838 "To tihe low-brewed, 
. I 
I 
damp, unventilated cellars, and narrow lanes inhabited by the poor of Cape 
Town, a number of small cottages, as they are called, i~ the form of a 
bisected triangle, are making th~ir appearance in the v~cinity, con-
structed apparently for the purpose of proving, by dirept experiment, that 
pure air, light and cleanliness are not necessary to he~lth in this 
climate.'' (79> When the smallpox epidemic struck Cape Tlwn in 1840 the 
worst a·f fected areas were obviously these poor areas. Fli rbai rn ~rot'e in-
d i gnan t1 y at that tIme: "The upper ranks wou I d discover that t~ey ar1 
reposing over a magazine of death in which the torch is always smoulder-
ing •.• What do you think of ten, twenty, or even thirty\human beings 
sleeping night a·fter night in an ~artment twelve to foiLirteeQ foot square 
I 
- the floor damp clay - and many in the last stages of ~onfluent Small 
Pox?'' (80) He described the overcrowded housing conditi1ns, a result of 
"the C{i\pi tali sts ••• [having J not yet bLii 1 t proper houses 1... They [the 
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tenants] are, therefore, apparently from necessity, crowded in dozens into 
cellars, back courts and cavern--like holes." The obvious remedy, he said, 
would be to pass a law "prohibiting the letting of SLich places as human. 
habitations.'' (81) This new breed of landowning commercial bourgeoisie, 
with landlord wealth based firmly on these working class areas and holding 
the future reins of municipal power, will be touched on later in the dis-
cusssion of the expansion of the local commercial bourgeoisie during the 
e~nancipation period. (82) 
pn addition, the phenomenon of accelerated subdivision of e>:isting plots 
/in Cape Town and the suburbs, particularly the southern suburbs, is indi-
f: 
/ cated in the flurry of property advertisements placed in the Advertiser 
jl' 
; during 1838 and early 1839. The adverts provide evidence of .(1) the trans-
actions of future members of the Cape Town municipality indicating their 
steadily increasing ownership of property in the poor areas of Cape Town 
and (2) urban subdivision and rapid sub-urban expansion of Cape Town 
during 1838 and early 1839. 
Thus in March 1838 the Advertiser carried adverts for two property lots of 
F~s. Watermeyer, municip~l commissioner in 1842. On~ of the lots was an 
alley issuing at Rose-street in the present Bo-Kaap, containing ''5 newly-
built neat HIRE-HOUSES, and TWO more DWELLING APARTMENTS.'' <83) Later that 
year P.J. Pentz, municipal commissioner in 1844, advertised on his estate 
'Schotsche Kloof' in the same Lion's Rump area, 6 lots of land. Forming 
part of these were: "Two pieces Arable Land, producing annually a very 
rich crop, and having the advantage of a passage to Lion's Rump, and 
fronting Leeuw-street. This is an excellent op~ortunity for building 
Houses cheaply, as there is plenty of Stone and Clay on the spot.'' (84> 
Expansion in the southern suburbs was a noteworthy feature of the property 
market at this time. While the extent to which this expansion was linked 
to the compensation money is difficult to establish, it is highly likely 
J 
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that the two were tied together. One cannot neglect the significance of 
the timing of these advertisements so neatly corresponding with all the 
other e~pansionary effects around the years 1837 and 1838. A study of the 
advertisements reveal a great concentration around 1838 and early 1839, 
with few preceding and decreasing numbers after the period. Interesting 
too, is the emphasis in these adverts on the suitability of the plots for 
small cottages, perhaps indicating the growth in numbers of a white petty 
bourgeoisie and lower middle class as a result of the gen~ral growth in 
the economy. (85> 
During 1838, for instance, building lots of ground suitable for small cot-
tages on the recently divided property, 'Leeuwenhof', were advertised; 14 
lots. in Papendorp <Woodstock>; 7 eligible building lots in Wynberg; 
eligible pl~ts on 7 acres in Rondebosch; 15 building allotments on the 
estate 'Claremont', 30 valuable plots above Government Gardens and 6 
building allotments behind the Castle. (86) On 15 September 1838 a divided 
property, 'Musselburgh Mount' situated behind the Castle was advertised 
for sale in one lot to provide scope for speculation. On 6 October 100 al-
lotments nearly 20 acres of land in the vicinity of Cape Town were ad-
vertised by Elliott Brothers as suitable for tradesmen and mechanics. 
Again in October 200 cottages, part of the Newlands estate 'Vineyard', 
were advertised. During the same month 50 building allotments were offered 
in Rondebosch on the estate 'Molenvliet' on the Liesbeeck River, suitable 
for cottages or carrying on trades, ·such a~ bakers and butchers. On that 
same day 28 building lots on the estate 'Grove~ were offered. t87) Part of 
'Klein W~stervoort', Rondebosch, was offered in 100 building lots and in 
Wynberg 20 lots of ground fronting the Main Road were advertised. (88) 
In October 1839 a correspondent to the Advertiser mentioned that substan-
tial quantities of land had been exchanged in the last two years and great 
improvements made to existing buildings. <89) Government statistics for 
the period, summarized in Table 2.4 above, attest to this too. Transfer 
... 
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dues to the Government rose from £17 791 in 1837 to £23 636 in 1838. In 
the Blue Books' lists of the colony's industries, the number of brick-· 
fields in Cape Town shot up from four in the 1834-1837 period to t~n in 
1838 (90), offering proof of the increased building activity in that year 
and obviously also indicating the increased number of freed workers in the 
town. Interestingly enough, according to overseas news carried by the 
Adve(tiser at this time, property prices in Barbados witnessed a similar 
rise after the abolition of slavery, showing an increase of some 50-30% or 
1 0-15/.. ( 91 ) 
The second half of the 1830s, therefore~ witnessed an economic boom in 
Cape Town, providing the context for the expansion of the commercial 
bourgeoisie, including both old and new layers, and a great spurt in com-
pany formation. 
2.4 Compensation money and the merchant sector 
In March 1836 Fairbairn was still talking of the compensation money being 
paid locally. Then in June he published news that the money was definitely 
to be paid in London. (92> Finally, in January of the next year he in-
formed readers of the latest decision of the British government, viz. that 
the money was to be paid in 3 1/2 % government stock. (93> As a result of 
the new decision former slave owners became dependent on merchants with 
largely English connections to collect the compensation funds. As Hengherr 
has stated: "The f i •-ms and the i ndi vi duals transmitting the compensation, 
have been represented as callous profiteers exploitihg the plight of the 
helpless claimants by charging exorbitant agency fees or buying claims far 
below their value.'' (94> In August 1835 the Zuid-Afrikaan, voice of the 
Dutch/Afrikaans community and of the slave owners, par excellence, already 
. / 
mentioned the losses that would be incurred by the appo1ntment of agents 
in London. A meeting was therefore called in the Commercial Exchange and a 
petition drawn up and forwarded to the King. (95) Intere~ting is the fact 
that several of the merchants who will later be named as compensation 
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agents, have already been mentioned as slave mortgagees. 
As early as February 1835 two English merchant firms began advertising as 
intermediataries for the compensation money. J.B. Ebden announced that he 
' would accept compensation claims as payment at an auction of saxon and 
merino sheep newly imported ~rom Sydney, New South Wales. Heideman, Car-
frae and Co. announced they would accept transfer of compensation claims 
in payment for their assortment of merchandise. And in January 1836 at a 
time when Fairbairn was still talking hopefully of payment being made lo-
cally, the s~me firm offered its services and those of its London office 
in receiving sums due from compensation, as agents by power of attorney. 
They stated they would also purchase claims on reasonable terms and of-
fered in exchange manufactured goods, of which they had a large stock. 
<96> Thus, side by sid~ with Heideman, Carfrae and Co. of Cape Town ran 
the connected London firm of Carfrae, Heideman and Co. (97) This in-
traduces the important role that connections with British merchants played 
in the successful transaction in London of the compensation money. 
The London connection wa~ typical of many of the Cape Town merchant houses 
handling the claims. The absence of a commercial banking institution at 
the Cape <the first such bank began operations in August 1837 (98)) must 
have proved a contributory factor in commerce obtaining the agency of 
claimants. A further advantage in collecting the money in London was the 
opportunity this afforded merchants to make payments in London for goods 
purchased there, the problem of remittance being a perennial one. (99) 
London merchants with Cape Town links were typically members of the Cape 
of Good Hope Trade Society. Thus with regard to the London-based Carfrae, 
~leideman and Co., James Carfrae and Co. is mentioned as a London 
memorialist in connection with the slave compensation money; Carfrae, 
Heideman as a member of the London committee form~d for the purposes of 
establishing a bank in Cape Town and James Carfrae as a member of the 
Trade Society meeting in London's Jerusalem Coffee House to petition the 
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British government for frontier compensation to Albany residents. (100) A 
look at the surviving Power of Attorney Registry Book (1836-1837) amongst 
the records of the Cape Town Slave Compensation Office (101), reveals the 
frequent presence of such dual-connected (i.e. Cape Town/London) merchant 
houses. 
The Registry Book makes frequent mention of Thomas Simpson and John Price 
Simpson. Thomas Simpson and Co. appear as London memorialists on the slave 
compensation issue and a J.P. Simpson is mentioned at the bank meeting. 
Simpson Bros. of Cape Town offered the services of their London house for 
compensation agency in the Advertiser of 1836. (102) Charles and Henry 
Maynard also appear in the Registry Book. Maynard Brothers are listed as 
London memorialists in connettion with the slave compensation; a Henry 
Maynard is mentioned at the bank meeting in London and as a member of the 
Trade Society petitibning for frontier compensation. In December 1836 the 
Advertiser announced the new Port Elizabeth partnership between Charles 
and Henry Maynard and Joseph Blackburn. <103) S.B. Venning, W.A. Venning 
and Joseph Busk are mentioned in the Registry Book. William Venning and 
Co. is named as London memorialist on the slave issue and a W. Venning, 
jun. at the bank m~eting in London and i~ the petition on Eastern Province 
compensation. In the Advertiser V~nning, Busk and Co. notified the public 
that the services of their London firm, Wm. Venning and Co. were available 
for obtaining the compensation money. ( 1 04) 
Another similarly-linked partnership evidenced in the Power of Attorney 
Registry Book is that of Thomas Donaldson and Daniel Dixon of London with 
its Cape Town counterpart 8udson, Donaldson and Dixon. (105) Also men-
tioned are Henry C. Christian and John Scales Christian of London, with 
the well-known Cape Town merchant Ewan Christian as the Cape Town connec-
tion. (106) J.W. Borradaile, Ab~aham Borradaile and George Ravenhill of 
London, connected to the premier Cape Town firm, Borradail es, Thompson an.d 
Pillans, likewise occur. <107> Other London men mentioned on a number of 
67 
occasions as appointed agents by power of attorney, include D.C. Guthrie .. 
and J.C. Cheape, whose specific merchant connection in the Cape is not im-
mediately apparent. (108> J.D. Thomson and W.G. Thomson of London, ·part-
ners in the well-known Cape Town firm Thomson & Watson, appear frequently 
too. (109) The name of J.D. Thomson occurs in connection with another 
group of London merchants, R. Currie, J. Cockerell and W. Scott. The 
presence of a Charles Cockerell with J. Cockerell in the Registry Book 
points to the intervention of the London firm of Sir Charles Cockerell and 
Co., mentioned as attending the london meeting called to discuss the 
formation of a bank in Cape Town. <110) 
However, the most frequently mentioned triad appointed by power of at-
torney is that of Silvanus Phillips, John King and Charles Phillips. They 
were partners of the London firm, Phillips, King & Co., which was to play 
a major role in the early development of Namaqualand's copper mining and 
whose role is discussed in more detail in a later chapter. (111) 
The London merchant connection was particularly significant in this early 
period as a means of transacting the large sums of money due to the 
colony, which was devoid of a banking structure to assist in the matter. 
The advantage fell to the London-connected Cape merchants, who <as the 
able French Consul to the Cape, Monsieur E. Blancheton noted in an exhibi-
tion pamphlet of 1855), often enjoyed the facility of worldwide correspon-
dents. <112) The scope of London-baied merchant involvement in the exer-
cise was thus much wider than indicated by Hengherr. In this period the 
.role of the corresponding firm and the worldwide multi-branch commercial 
house, the latter a unique feature of British colonialism, was crucial. 
(113) 
The activities of compensation agents took three forms: agency, purchase 
and exchange. The already-mentioned advert of Heideman, Carfrae & Co. of-
fered all three types of service. Hengherr has stated that though the sums 
6E 
handled by the firms as agents were very large, most of the colonists ob-
tained their comperisation money by direct selling of their claims for 
cash. This was a less favourable method for claimants because of the heavy 
discounts demanded, but often unavoidable because of more immediate finan-
cial pressures. (114) A study of the Power of Attorney Registry Book 
reveals some 2 870 entries of power of attorney. Bearing in mind that the 
Book covers 1836-1837 only, but that this period is probably the one in 
which most of the agency arrangements.were made, it can be calculated that 
of the approximately 4880-6400 awards made, roughly between 45%-59% was 
handled by power of attorney 45% if 6400 and 59% if 4880. < 115) 
It is difficult to establish accurately the rate of profit earned by mer-
ctlant houses in agency and purchase of the compensation awards. In a let-
ter to the editor of the Advertiser in October 1835, 'An old emgrant' men-
tioned the costs involved in obtaining the money as the following: 5% com-
missio~ for power of attorney in London, another 5% for freight, in-
surance, etc., while a country person would, in addition, have to employ a 
town agent at further cost. In 1836 Thomas Sutherland advertised a 2 1/2% 
commission fee, as did Hudson, Donaldson & Dixon, while in 1837 Fairbairn 
stated a total fee of 5% for agency. (116) The 5% commission figure is 
confirmed by the disgruntled slave owner cited previously, Major Parlby, 
in a letter to the Advertiser, in which he presented the detailed account 
of his agent, Hamilton Ross. <117) In June 1837 Hamilton Ross & Co. ad-
vertised that it wished to purchase £300 worth of slave compensation 
. 
claims. Earlier that• year in the Advertiser R.A. Zeederberg, Home, Eager ~~ 
Co., and·J.A. le Sueur jointly advertis~d that they had received £10 000 
on account of the slave compensation fund. In other words, in that period 
the triad probably received the tidy sum of some £500, giving us an ex-
ample of the fair-sized cash amounts which must have accrued to agents at 
this time. <118) 
R~garding the outright selling of claims to merchants, Fairbairn wrote in 
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1837 that he had heard of claims sold at between a lOX and 20X discount 
and later that year he reported claims be~ng sold at ?X discount. <119) 
Major Parlby protested that slave owners in outlying, rural areas were 
particularly hard hit by unscrupulous agents travelling the country and 
interior districts. He stated: 
L •• many money-dealing traders, and others, seized the opportunity of 
purchasing up the compensation claims. British goods and British 
money were dispatched to the Colony, in anticipation of the Govern-
ment Payments, and forwarded in wagons with mercenary agents, into 
the Interior Districts where, the ignorant and the needy - imposed 
upon by false reports - snatching at the opportu~ity of obtaining a 
little ready money, or some alluring article of dress, and the timid 
- distrusting the honor of the British nation - yielded up their 
claims, in several instances which came to my knowledge, for very 
trifling sums, but in all cases with a certain gain to the buyer and 
loss to the seller. <120) 
No doubt the rate of discount varied according to how urgently the slave 
owner required ready cash. The offer of credit facilities under power of 
attorney arrangements, as was done by Ebden and Hudson, Donaldson & Dixon, 
may have further increased the merchants' profit rate. <121) 
Finally, besides activities as agents and purchasers of the slave com-
pensation money, several English merchants are mentioned as owners of 
slaves in the Lists of Awards of the Commissioners of Compensation. Names 
such as Hamilton Rbss <£476-5-8), C.S. Pillans (£143-13-2>, Ewan Christian 
<£192-14-6), A. Chiappini (£472-17-9), J.B. Ebden (£231-0-7) and G.W. 
Prince C£444-9-11 and £40-19-5) ~ crop up. <122) Such awards represented 
compensation to merchants as slave owner~ and a~so perhaps ownership as a 
result of mortgage transactions. It is quite apparent that owing both to 
agency and actual awards, English merchants emerged from the compensation 
period with substantial additiohs of liquid wealth. 
·2.5 Abolition, compensation and new layers of the commercial bourgeoisie 
So far this chapter has focused on the London-connected merchant houses as 
agents and beneficiaries of the compensation money. It remains to study 
the effects of emancipation and slave compensation money on the non-London 
connected layers of the commercial bourgeoisie. Abolition and the conse-
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quent influx of money resulted in a general boost to commerce, a stimulus 
to the development 6f new layers of the commercial bourgeoisie and the 
spreading and diversification of commercial power, which challenged the 
monopoly of trade enjoyed by the established British-connected Cape Town 
merchants. Such consequences will-partly account for the arrival on the 
scene of a more locally-based, increasingly vocal commercial bourgeoisie, 
whom Kirk and Warren have characterized as typical membership material of 
the Cape Town municipality <established in 1840). (123) UndoLlbtedly, the 
abolition of slavery and the arrival of the slave compensation money were 
not the sole causes of the growth and diversification of the commercial 
bourgeoisie. These were indicative of the general expansion of the Cape 
economy but, abolition, it will be shown, provided a st~ong contributory 
stimulus to that group's steady expansion. 
In September 1831 Fairbairn took up discussion of the need for the produc-
tion of e:-:portable goods, agitating for increased local "prodLlction and 
seeming to try to persuade merchants to integrate more fully into the 
local bourgeoisie, on the basis of local production. He stated: 
The offspring of Merchants and Traders, the enterprising and ingenious 
capitalists of this Colony, seem to have directed their attention too 
exclusively to trade. Wealth, after which all aspire, appeared more 
within their reach when engaged in the rapid movements of buying and 
selling, than when chained to a plough or waiting the slow increase of 
herds and flocks. This was natural for men who still looked to a 
retreat in their native country as the final object of their colonial 
labors and speculations. But the present generation is in very dif-
f_erent ci rcumsta.nces. This Colony is their birth-place, .their home, and 
here they must lay their bones [my emphasis]. They must and will of 
course devote themselves entirely to its Improvement to rendering it 
a fruitful sphere for every species of industry, and a fit abode for 
free men [Fairbair·n 's emphasis]. <124) 
Fairbairn can clearly be seen here as emerging spokesman for a more 
locally-based commercial bourgeoisie. 
The conflict between the merchant sector and representatives of more 
locally-based commerce was in existence from an early date. Arkin has in-
dlcated that on the.closure of the East India Company Agency in 1834 and 
the consequent need to dispose of the Agency's stocks, a group of shop-
keepers, with mainly Dutch names, appealed to the Company's Agent, Haw-
kins, not to allow the tea to fall into the hands of a group of larger, 
established merchants. ,<125> Evident in correspondence to the editors of 
the Zuid-Afrikaan and the Advertiser, was the anti-merchant position of 
the Zui d-Afri ka~n.· It played host to the idea of British-connected mer·-
chants, interests con·f l.i ct i ng with 1 ocal shopkeepers' for reasons' no 
doubt, of its own politicking in the inter~sts of the Dutch/Afrikaans 
propertied element in general. ( 126> 
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Abolition and compensation contributed to the broadening of the commercial 
bourgeoisie in various ways. Firstly, abolition prompted an extension of 
commodity relations in the town and countryside. Slaves in the towns and 
on the farms were the artisans, craftsmen and the working class. Emancipa-
tion and the final freeing of the apprentices in 1838, therefore, must 
have stimulated consumer demand from a newly-created class of wage earners 
and an increased artisan class. The boom in property in the poor areas of 
Cape Town in this period, which will be dealt with later, is evidence of 
the new presence of wage earners and artisans. Similarly, the rise in the 
number of brickfields is also indirect proof of the increased numbers of 
Lirban wage e.arners. < 127) While no direct evidence of the effect of freed 
slaves on consumption has been gathered, Worden's study of slavery in the 
Dutch period has given an earlier indication of the role of slave consumer 
demand. He quotes the example of a Stellenbosch miller who complained 
about the loss of trade e>(pel'"ienced dLiring the "slave mortality crisis" of 
the 1740s and subsequently reported a stimulus to corn p~oduction as a 
result of an increase of the slave population during the 1770s. (128) 
Secondly, slave owners occupied a variety of pr9fessions and hence slave 
labour was distributed throughout the economy. Wh~le farmers traditionally 
employed the majority of slaves, recent research has highlighted the con-
siderable numbers of slaves employed in the urban area, in the manufactur-
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ing and service sectors, particularly. Slaves worked in the docks, shops, 
warehouses, as coachmen, porters, domestic labourers, in ale houses, 
bakeries, butcher shops and as masons, brickbuilers, blacksmiths, car-
penters and tai 1 ors. ( 129) Evidence points to the considerable variety of 
functions slaves were farced to carry out. Thes~ may not have been their 
primary function and would not normally show up in records. A small ex-
ample comes from the Memariaal, kept by Joachim Nicolaas von Dessin, a 
member of Cape Town's most select urban gentry. Entries during the 1750s 
hated how he had put his slaves to work to knit stockings and make caps 
and shirts. (130) Shell made a similar point: 
The major manufacturing categories of slaves do not encompass all 
slaves used in a manufacturing capacity throughout the colony. The 
transfers of slaves to the large plantations do not disclose which 
slaves did what. The estate inventories which list all farm equip-
ment, down to the butter churns in the pantry, reveal that many of 
the wealthy plantation owners specialized in manufacturing sidelines, 
investing their capital laterally in building, transport and hand-
icrafts. (131> 
Maclear attested to these same circumstances in 1834: 
The expense of erecting any building here is enormous, excepting 
among Dutch Farmers - who employ their slaves & purchase timber and 
lime •. Each Farmer has among his slaves a Butcher- Baker, Shoemaker-
Stonemason- carpenter etc., and is thus independent of regular 
tradesmen. Society thence has no link in the grades of Farmer and 
tradesman, nothing of that self-interest from material dependente 
that cements these classes in England. An Englishman at the Cape by 
not possessing slaves has recourse to regular artizans who make a 
market of him because he cannot do without them. When time shall have 
further increased the population & the emancipation of the slaves 
shall have severed them from their former maste~s, an assimilation to 
the English system, must be the consequence. (132) 
Farmers and townsmen were therefore equipped with a variety of multi- · 
purpose labour to provide them with a ~iscellany of commodities and a 
means to satisfy diverse service needs. On abolition, they lost a 
permanent supply of labour and consequently were forced to rely on the 
market for the satisfaction of such wants as shoes, furniture, clothing 
and house-building. Presumably then, abolition in this respect also, pro-
~ided a stimulus to markets and the extension of commodity relations, par-
ticularly in the countryside, where there had previously been a much 
greater degree of self-sufficiency. 
Abolition improved the opportunities for the expansion of the locally-
based commsrcial bourgeoisie in a third way as well. Warren has poi~ted 
out that many of the municipal commissioners became extensive landowners 
of urban property, particularly in the poorer areas of Cape Town. He 
recounts that by the second quarter of the 19th century a number of the 
municipal commissioners had become landlords of rows of cheap houses in 
the densely populated 'steegs' and streets of Cape Town. the Waterfront, 
Constitution Hill and Lion's Rump, were three particular areas dominated 
by such men. Prominent commissioners' names attest to their considerable 
property power, e.g. Jarvis's Building, Mechau's Buildings, Watermeyer 
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Lane and Pentz Street. By 1865, for instance\ J.A.H. Wicht owned no fewer 
than 374 houses, housing some 4000 tenants. <133> 
By th€ late 1830s and 1840s these three areas contained significant sec-
tions of poor housing for workers and tradesmen. ''The Waterfront area 
<Districts One and Two), embracing the portion of the town on the shore 
side of Strand Street, contained a substantial fishing and labouring 
population, and a smaller group of artisans and tradesmen ..• Many of the 
habitations, especially in the 'rear' of Strand Street <where there was a 
row of 'steegs' or narrow lanes) were dirty, overcrowded 'Hire Houses', 
while the drains were 'filled with putrid masses of filth' and the neigh-
bourhood stank of dying fish.'' (134) According to Warren, the Lion's Rump 
area <Districts Four, Six, Seven and Eight>, the portion of Cape Town on 
the Signal Hill side of the Buitengracht and on the Table Mountain side of 
Wale Steet, contained a high concentration of artisans, craftsmen, 
domestics and labourers. A 'Malay Quarter' was already emerging there. 
C135) The Constitution Hill area <District Twelve> behind the Castle, 
likewise, contained a sizeable 'Coloured' population of workers and 
artisans. ''The growth of the Constitution Hill area Cthe heart of future 
District Six> during the mid-century period was phenomenal.'' (136) · 
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In the late 1830s many of the tenants in these poor areas were newly-freed 
slaves or apprentices. Most privately owned slaves in Cape Town had slept 
in the attic, kitchen or outhouses of the master's house. Even in the 
rural areas only large farms included separate slave quarters. Thus, ac-
cording to Ross, ''emancipation led to a definit~ shift within the spatial 
arrangements of the town [Cape Town]. Once they were fully free in 1838, 
the slaves were no longer prepared to live on their ex-master's premises. 
The memory of slavery was too fresh, so they moved out into the slums, 
alongsid~ their friends and kin who had bee~ free before 1838. They were 
joined by ~ large number of ex-slaves who had moved into Cape Town from 
the countryside, so that-overcrowding became worse.'' (137) In other words, 
the growing wealt~ of these local pr·operty-owning capitalists at this time 
can be seen as arising out of emancipation, based on a new form of ex-
ploitation of the former slaves, now in their capacities as tenant workers 
and artisans, and intensified by conditions in the period which witnessed 
a property boom. 
Fourthly, it was not only the results of abolition on increased commer-
cialization and property ownership which favoured the fortunes of locally-
based commerce. Actual compensation payment proved beneficial to the 
locally-based commercial bourgeoisie, as a result of the same mechanisms 
it had for the British-connected merchant sector. Despite the 
preponderance of English merchants listed as slave compensation agents in 
the Power of. Attorney Registry Book (138), several Dutch/Afrikaans names 
occur. In fact one of the most frequent to crop up, second perhaps to the 
English Phillips & Kin~, is a triad formed by R. Zeederberg Jr., J.A. le 
Sueur and Robert Eager. <139> Another very active agent was Johannes 
Smuts, together with the already-mentioned D.G. Guthrie and J.C. Cheape, 
and others, of London. Johannes Smuts advertised himself for agency, 
guaranteed by J.J.L. Smuts and Hamilton Ross & Co. (140) The group of Ser-
vaas de Kock Sr. and J.H. Hofmeyr, together with the English merchants 
Simpsons, are also frequently listed ~s power of attorney agents. <141> 
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Fifthly, there were also a significant number of merchants and traders 
who, like their English counterparts, were awarded substantial comp~nsa­
tion for slaves once owned by them or mortgaged to them. Thus, for ex-
ample, J.A.H. Wicht, ironmonger and linen draper, qualified for £46-8-4; 
Andries Brink C. son, wine merchant, £552-15-5; Petrus Michiel Brink, wine 
merchant, £680-11-9 and £484-5-1; J.A. Bam, corn chandler, £435-17-0 and 
together with J.G. Bam £81-18-10; and Gerhard Ewout Overbeek £300-11-2. 
J.J.L. Smuts, received particularly large amounts - £2523-9-10, £70-19-4, 
£280-15-6 and with a G.H. de Wet £35-9-8. (142> Finally, Rayner has 
stressed the patterns of intermarriage amongst Cape Dutth families evident 
in the early 19th century, particularly among farmers and officials. She 
has attributed this to ''the partible Roman-Dutch inheritance law requiring 
the distribution of property amongst all the children, whether male or 
female, at the death of one or other of the parents. Marriage alliances'', 
she postulates, ''helped consolidate valuable property withiM the hands of 
a small number of families.'' (143) Because of this family network, some 
ex-slave owners may have been ready to provide cash from their newly-
acquired stocks for family members to start off businesses in the town and 
country. 
Togethe~ all these factors contributed to the burgeoning of a local com-
mercial bourgeoisie, evident most vividly in the great increase of 
Dutch/Afrikaans businessmen and thei~ increasing presence in companies in 
the years around 1838. The names of men discussed above in connection with 
the compensation money, thus re-occur in the next section dealing with 
company expansion. <144) In other words, as Hengherr as remarked: ''Because 
compensation had brought relatively small amounts of money into the hands 
of many people, rather than very large sums among only a few capitalists, 
a type of establishment was needed which would provide small holders with 
an outlet for their money on a more profitable basis than merely banking 
it''. This was the essential explanation for the growth of Dutch/Afrikaans-
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speaking capitalists in joint-stock companies in Cape Town after 1838, 
something which Warren had remarked on without offering an explanation. 
(145) Emancipation and the money that came into the Cape in the form of 
compensation gave an injection to the economy which, as has been shown, 
stimulated a great spending spree, enriching old. and new layers of the 
commercial bourgeoisie and giving a boost to property-selling and specula-
tion. It is against this background that the commercial bourgeoisie both 
expanded and diversified in the years before 1840. 
2.6 Abolition, compensation and company formation 
In July 1837 Fairbairn reported that most of the compensation had reached 
Cape Town. <146) Until that point Cape Town (i.e. Cape> companies could 
almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. The 1837 Almanac listed six 
companies:- South African Fire and Life Assurance Company <established 
1831); Cape of Good Hope Sayings Bank <established by law 1831); South Af-
rican Association for the Administration and Settlement of Estates 
(established 1834, ratified by law 1836>; Cape of Good Hope Fire Assurance 
Company <established December 1835>; Cape of Good Hope Steam Navigation 
Company <established 1836>; and the Cape of Good Hope Bank <process of es-
tablishment 1836, began operations 1837). (147) The 1838 Almanac added the 
Committee of the Cape Town Joint Stock Company, while the 1839 Almanac in-
dicated the formation during the course of 1838 of five new companies, 
viz. South African B~nk (1838), Cape of Good Hope Marine Assurance Society 
<1838>, De Protecteur Fire and Life Assurance Company (1838), Board of Ex-
ecutors <1838) and the Rondebosch Joint Stock Company <1838). Omitted was 
the Commercial Wharf Company (previously the Shipping and Landing 
Company), whose formation was reported in the Advertiser towards the end 
of 1838. (148) ~n other words in the cou~se of 1838 six companies were 
formed, amounting to as many as ~ad existed in toto up to that point. 
The accelerated growth of companies in 1838 and the arrival during the 
previous year and 1838 of the cbmpensation money was not coincidental. 
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Certainly, both the editor of the Advertiser and the commercial community 
at large were aware of the correlation. lt is difficult to imagine the ex-
citement aroused by the increase of the commercial tempo, evident in the 
formation of these several companies. Indications of public interest were 
noti·fications placed in the Advgrti§.§.C in 18.36, using the novel eNperience 
C>f company development as an attraction. The first headed "New Joint Stock 
Company'', placed by Thomas Reid (a collector of natural curiosities), pro-
ceeded to advertise for 1/- (adult> and 6d (children) the opportunity to 
view'' ••. that GREAT WONDER of nature •.. the real Asiatic Orang-Outang, 
from the Interior of the Island of Java''. A week later another advert was 
placed, announcing a 50% dividend in the Joint Stock Boa Constrictor Com-
pany. (149) Fairbairn, discussing the latest addition to companies in Cape 
Town, the South African Bank, in August 1838 described the advantages that 
new companies offered and would continue to offer. A letter to the editor 
in the same issLte remarked: " The millenium has indeed dawned upon us as 
you may say ••• '' In July 1838 G.W. Silberbauer announced the start of his 
publication, Price-Current, which included amongst its commercial informa-
tion, dividends of the joint-stock companies. Shares were advertised for 
sale by private brokers, such as the same Silberbauer, or by public auc-
tion. A letter to the editor of the Advertiser in September 1838 remarked 
that Cape Town had become a vast stock exchange. <150) Cape Town was, un-
doubtedly, running a high commercial fever, despite the fact that con-
siderably less than £1 million had arrived in compehsation. 
Interestingly, of the six companies formed during 1838, three were 
dominated by Dutch/Afrikaans-speaking shareholders. Previously, the only 
one to have had primarily Dutch/Afrikaans names was the South African As-
sociation for the Administration and Settlement of Estates - which was 
formed in 1834 to fill the gap of the long-standing but recently disbanded 
Orphan Chamber. (151) Other companies, in which a limited number of such 
businessmen gained .experience, were the South African Fire & Life As-
surance Company in which F.S. Watermeyr, F.G. Watermeyr and S. Oliver fea-
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tured and the Cape of Good Hope Savings Bank, in which J.J.L. Smuts and 
F.S. Watermeyer were mentioned. <152) Presented below are leading members 
of the new companies established in 1838. (153) 
~-9-~Lth. _ _B.fri_c;_§I_Q_Bank directors (formed 1838) 







P. t1. Brink 
R.C. Hoets 
Cashier: G. Rawsthorne. Accountant: A.H. Hofmeyr. Clerk: M.L. Berrange. 
De Protecteur directors (formed 1838) 
Johan Hendrik Hofmeyr, Js LLD (President) 
Andries Brink, Cs <Vice-President) 
Johan Andries Heyse Wicht 
Kenneth N. van Breda 
Cornelis Mostert, Sen. 
Johannes Tromp 
Johannes Gysbs. Blanckenberg 
Seb. Val. van Renen Ss 
Johan Andries Bam 
Board of Excecutors directors (formed 1838) 
Hon. H. Cloete LLD <Chairman) 
G. H. Maasdorp 
A. Brink Cs 
J.A.H ~Jicht 
William Gadney 
Secretary: J.H. Hofmeyr, Js LLd. Bookkeeper and acting cashier: F~G. 
Watermeyer. 
A connection between emancipation, compensation money and the increasing 
presence of Dutch/Afrikaans-speaking capitalists was earlier tentatively 
proposed. <154) It now remains to explain these connections via a discus-
sion of the new layer of shareholders who appeared during 1838, and then 
to study the connection between these new shareholders and the Cape Town 
municipality. 
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Andries Brink, Cs, director of De Protecteur and the Board of Executors, 
was a wine merchant who received a sum of £552-15-5 as a compensation 
award. Petrus Michie! Brink of the South African Bank, also a wine mer-
chant, received £680-11-9 and £484-13-7. J.A. Bam of the South African 
Bank and De Proctecteur, corn chandler, received £435-17-0 and with J.G. 
Bam £81-18-10. J.A.H. Wicht of De Protecteur and the Board of Executors, 
linen draper and ironmonger, reteived £46-8-4. Servaas de Kock Sr. and the 
advocate/notary J.H. Hofmeyr were important compensation agents. <155) De 
Kock became secretary of De Protecteur and Hofmeyr director of the same 
firm and also secretary of the Board of Executors. J.H. Wicht of the South 
African Bank and De Protecteur, a linen draper and ironmonger, received 
£53-6-11, with P.J. Pentz. <156) 
P.M. Brink, J.A. Bam, J.H. Wicht and J.A.H. Wicht, mentioned above as com-
pensation claimants, all became members of the newly-established Cape Town 
municipality. Frederik Stephanus Watermeyer, chairman of the South African 
Bank, and J.H. Hofmeyr Js, of De Protecteur and the Board of Executors, 
successful slave compensation claimants, similarly became leading 
municipal figures. (157) In addition, many other municipal men who did not 
become company shareholders at this time, received compensation awards, 
which must likewise have increased their liquid assets and improved their 
business status, e.g. Hercules Cress Jarvis <merchant>, E. Landsberg 
·<merchant>, C.F. Juritz (chemist) and J.J.L. Smuts <money-lender), to name 
just a few. <158) Thus emancip~tion and the slave compensation money, in 
the process of stimulating the growth of local layers of the commercial 
bourgeoisie, improved the financial status of retailers, general traders 
and merchants. It also helped convert men of commerce, as well as non-
businessmen and professional men (such as Watermeyer and Hofmeyr>, into 
company shareholders. Finally, many names of future municipal commis-
ac 
sioners are listed in the compensation awards. The events o·f emancipation, 
therefore, can be seen as an important facet in the expansion of the local 
commercial bourgeoisie, who formed a significant power base of the· 
municipality, which in turn was exploited by them as a stepping stone for 
further expansion. 
In 1838 Fairbairn remarked on the difference between Cape Town company 
shareholders before and after 1838. He contrasted the capital of the men 
of the South African Bank (1838), which consisted of money and property, 
with that of the Cape of Good Hope Bank <1836), which was composed of mer-
chant capital and what he t~rmed 'merchant skills'. (159) Despite the fact 
that some of these later company shareholders were wine merchants, Fair-
bairn did not characterize their wealth as merchant-derived but instead as 
capital accrued via property and money. He was thereby pointing to a 
nouveau riche layer 6f the commercial bourgeoisie, which had not risen to 
a position of strength via established merchant channels. Fairbairn's dis-
tinction can best be understood in terms of the argument put forward thus 
far, viz. that property acquisitioh stimulated by the abolition of slavery 
and the enlarged liquid assets of the local retailers and professional 
men, as a result of abolition and the compensation money, contributed sig-
nificantly to the growth of this new shareholder and company. 
Initially, the group consisting of the South African Bank, De Protecteur 
and the Board of Executors aimed much of their advertising at agricultural 
landowners. On 1 September "1838 the South African Bank notified the public 
that it would be opening early in the morning in order to please the 
''Agricultural Interest'', who arrived for the morning market. Apparently, 
the South African Bank and the Board had shared offices for some time, 
pointing perhaps to some kind of collaboration. (160) Country agents were 
a regular feature of a company such as De Protecteur, for example, which 
almost immediately on establishment began advertising its agents in Mal-
mesbury, Koeberg, Tygerberg, Stellenbosch and George. <161) The rural con-
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nection of certain companies in Cape Town was a distinguishing charac-
teristic. In fact the links of these new shareholders to rural landowners, 
may be regarded as an important ·facet in the make-up of at 1 east so·me mem-
bers of the new commercial bourgeoisie and in turn of members of the 
municipality. This relatively closer link with the farmers is a feature 
which could distinguish the interests of the more locally-based commercial 
bourgeoisie from the merchant sector. (162) 
By the first quarter of 1839 the boom effects of the compensation money 
were already vanishing. In March, Fairbairn reported a tightness of money. 
Banks were refusihg to discount bills. He attributed this to (1) a reac-
tion to overspending, too much money having left the country in export 
payments and too much merchant credit having been advanced to finance ex-
ports (2) the greater demand for money within the colony because of wage 
labour and other small-scale transactions and <3> the rise in prices. 
Later in the year he blamed the shortsighted action of the Government 
Bank, which had immediately reduced the interest rate (instead of delaying 
that move, ·thereby e:-:erting a restraining influence on the rapid fall of 
the interest rate) and then had suddenly discontinued discounting. He also 
assigned some blame to the defeat of the Usury Bill, which entailed the 
maintenance of artificial restrictions on the.interest rate on promissory 
notes and bills of exchange contributing, he said, to an exodus of money 
·from the colony. <163) 
Many of the expansionary effects of th~ slave compensation money worked 
through the economy very quickly. A great deal of the money eventually 
found its way into the coffers of London export merchants and English 
manufacturers. Yet, amongst the lasting effects of emancipation was the 
spurt in growth it gave to both new and old layers of the commercial 
bourgeoisie and their formal business institutions, as well as the con-
fidence it must consequently have engendered, particularly in the new sec-
tors of the commercial bourgeoisie. Abolition and the compensation money, 
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in fact, set a changed tempo in commercial life, presenting new e>:-
periences and creating fresh opportunities for business at the Cape. 
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CAPITAL AND COMPANY GROWTH 1840-1859 
3.1 Introduction 
The basic question to be answered in a study of earl~ commercial growth in 
Cape Town, is what were the sources of capital in a colony with little or 
no manufacture and limited mining development, where much of the monetary 
wealth was thus concentrated in the hands of farmers and merchants? Com-
mercia! growth at the Cape was evident in the establishment and operation 
of various firms and their larger, corporate manifestation, joint-stock 
companies. Of a mainly finance nature - banks, trust and insurance com-
panies- these were to become an increasingly familiar phenomenon during 
and after the 18305. The problems posed include the e:-:tent to which 
agriculture and trade were the main source of such capital growth, the 
role overseas capital played in company formation and how adequate local 
capital sources were in a period in which production was generally so ill-
developed, despite a relatively rapid growth in agriculture? 
3.2 Economic outline of the Western Cape and John Fairbairn's Advertiser 
Chapter Two showed that in the late 1830s the Western Cape, specifically 
Cape Town and its suburbs, underwent a period of considerable expansion. 
Economic growth was primarily, though not exclusively, encouraged by the 
arrival of the slave compensation money. Culminating in an economic boom, 
the period marked the emergence on a significant scale of a local commer-
cial bourgeoisie, whose growth brok~ the traditional hold on commerce ex-
ercised by a few, mainly British-connected merchants. 
By the beginning of 1839, however, the economy had slumped, a development 
immediately commented upon by Fairbairn. <1> The recession persisted for 
some four years. Annual reports of the Cape of Good Hope Bank and the 
South African Bank commented on the great pressure on the money markets 
experienced during both 1839 and 1840. <2> Fairbairn described 1841 as a 
year of "dull" commerce and trade, though his review of 1842 struck a 
'somewhat more optimistic note. (3) He remarked a month later: "The reader 
ac: 
will find below the Annual Reports of the Banking Establishments in this 
Colony. They appea~ to b~ carrying on a safe and prosperous, if not very 
brilliant trade. The other Companies, such as there are for insurihg, etc. 
are we understand, in an equally secure and flourishing condition.'' (4) 
The depressed state of the econo~y at the time Was indicated by the cessa-
sion in the establishment of new banks between 1838 and the year 1844, 
~·Jhen the Colonial Bank was founded. (5). 
Fairbairn remained mildly optimistic about economic progress achieved 
during 1844. Then in February 1845 he began talking of the prospects of a 
second economic boom, as. a result of a great increase in government 
revenue, gained by the issue of guano licences. (6) By the beginning of 
1846 his opinion of the improving economy had definitely firmed. 
"Generally within the Colony the year 1845 has been one of increase" 
more extensive cultivation and a great extension of commerce - ''a popula-
tion better fed, better clothed and decidedly more wealthy'', he remarked. 
<7> And by late 1846/early 1847 Fairbairn was convinced of the advent of a 
boom, characterized by a fresh spurt of company formation. This he as-
cribed to military expenditure connected to the Frontier War of the Axe: 
"Already the e)·:penditure caLtsed by this war is filling the pockets and 
stopping the mouths of the trading and dealing portion of the community". 
A few months later he informed readers of the establishment of two new 
banks, heavy subscription of shares in the Natal Cotton Company and the 
ripeness of the mercantile community in Cape Town for this extension of 
bLtsiness. (8) 
In the years that follow till the end of Fairbairn's editorship in 1859, 
his customary annual reviews, which accompanied his Compliments of the 
Season published in early January, remained generally full of positive 
comment on the economy, the period witnessing continued and unprecedented 
growth.·While he referred to a minor mercantile crisis in mid-1854 and 
~poke of insolvencies in the wake of the copper-mining crash, it was, 
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ironically, in the last months of his editorship that there occurred the 
first severe economic crisis of the period. (9) The overall economic 
buoyancy was due largely to the rapidly expanding demand for raw wool by 
the world's leading industrial nation and textile giant, Britain. The 
colony, particularly the Eastern Cape, managed with a large measure of 
success to meet these market demands. However, expansion in the vJestern 
Cape during the period cannot simply be viewed as a function of the rapid 
expansion of colonial wool farming, as muc~ of the local profits were 
directed to the Eastern Cape. ( 10) 
Fairbairn had from early on outlined the potential wealth promised by 
merino sheep farming. In a March 1846 editorial he mentioned his early 
prognosis and recounted the progress achieved thus far: 
In 1835, the quantity of wool exported from the Cape, was lbs. 117,634. 
In 1845, it was lbs. 3,194,602. The increase in ten years has been 
about thirty-fold. And the quantity of wool shipped at Port Elizabeth 
since the beginning of this year <1846) makes it likely that the in-
crease will be greater than that of any preceding year. In the 
"Advertiser" for January 12, 1839, eight years ago, an estimate \o'Jas 
risked of the probable increase in Cape Wool, for eight years from 
1837, - in these words:- ''If the rate of increase be the same for the 
next eight years, from 1837, and everyone acquainted with the circum-
stances of the Colony must be satisfied that it will be much greater, -
the quantity of wool shipped in 1845 will be Three Millions, Five Hun-
~red and Eighteen Thousand, Two Hundred and Forty Poynds Weight.'' This 
is not very far from the mark. (11) 
A.J. Christopher has pinpointed 1846 <the year· of this editorial>, as the 
take-off point for merino wool farming in the Cape. According to 
Chr i st6pher: "Between 1846 and 1855 a spectacular transformation occur· red 
as merino flocks spread across the Colony." <12) By 1855 the colony was 
producing 8,2 million lbs of wool and exporting 12 million lbs. Annual 
average wool exports between 1855 and 1859 amounted to £984 000, testify-
ing to the rapid growth and singular importance of wool during the period 
covered by this study. Wool export revenue overtook wine, the Cape's first 
and long-standing export staple, between 1840 and 1844, when average wine 
and wool export figures totalled £58 000 and £73 000, respectively. (13) 
The severe recession which set in after 1859, again can largely be ex-
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plained by the wool sector- and was caused by both drought and the collapse 
of overseas wool prices, though other additional market and structural 
problems also contributed. (14> Wool farming's increasing importance by 
1860 was reflected by Port Elizabeth's overtaking of Cape Town, in rela-
tion to the volume of trade conducted through their respective ports. (15) 
By 1863 the Eastern Province's economic significance was expressed in the 
fact that head offices of the two Imperial banks, the London and South Af-
rican Bank and the Standard Bank, were both located in Port Elizabeth. 
(16) 
Yet, the growth in economic strength of the Eastern Province's local 
ruling class, composed of merchants and farmers, was not reflected in a 
proportionate increase in social and political influence. Its power was 
curtailed by the Western Province's superior influence, both in government 
and society, and by the Western Province's earlier established economic 
leadership, though later both regions were to suffer relative decline as a 
result of the mineral discoveries in Kimberley and on the Rand. Thus, 
despite all the auguries as to the growing commercial predominance of Port 
Elizabeth, Western Province merchant capital was generally able to 
maintain its superiority on the basis of its own economic production. C17) 
As Purkis has observed: 
The port wholesalers of Cape Town had their own London correspondents 
bound to them by links of credit that pre-dated those established be-
tween London and Port Elizabeth; they were agents for shipping and in-
surance companies; they exported wool, wine and other produce of the 
South Western Cape to Great Britain, and wine, fruit, tobacco, brandy 
and wheat to the Eastern Province. The victualling of ships with meat 
and fresh provisions continued. Supply and shipment of copper in-
creasingly significant fell to Cape Town merchants. Cape Town was the 
biggest single concentration of population. So there were great demands 
for imports, especially as Cape Town was the seat of government and 
there was a considerable amount of trade amongst local traders in the 
south west. Cape Town therefore remained a major financial centre. By 
1871 the assets of Cape Town banks amounted to £1 800 000 while those 
of Port Elizabeth totalled under £1 200 000. (18) 
It is to the elucidation of sources of capital in Cape Town and to an im-
portant manifest~tion of capital concentration, viz. joint-stoc~ com-
panies, that the remainder of this chapter'addresses itself. 
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3.3 Synopsis of compAny development over the period 
In February 1849 Fairbairn penned a laudatory editorial on joint-stock 
companies, providing a retrospective of developments to date: "The readers 
of the Adver:..:!;j ser:.. wi 11 recoil ect that for many years between 1830 and 
1840, much was written on the nature and value of JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 
for carrying on various kinds of business such as Banking, Assurance and 
similar undertakings, in which large capitals are required to secure pub-
lie confidence, and which can be effectively managed by Committees or 
Boards of Directors. The following list shows what has been accomplished 
in this department since 1830:-" <19) 
Table 3.1 COMPANY CAPITAL AT THE CAPE 1849 
Paid Present Value 
1831 .............. SA Assurance. Company .................... £ 2 000 ............... £ 26 000 
1834 .............. SA Asociation Estates ...................... £ 15 750 .............. £ 18 805.10. 
1835 .............. C G H Trust Company ....................... £ 17 100 .............. £ 20 700 
1837 .............. C G H Sank ................................ £ 60 000 .............. £105 000 
1838 .............. SA Bank .................................. £ 60 000 .......... : .. . £ 91 000 
1838 ............. . C G H Marine ............................... £ 15 000 .............. £ 24 700 
1838 .............. Board of Executors ......................... £ 10 000 .............. £ 11 500 
1838 .............. Protecteur ................................. £ 10 000 .............. £ 34 000 
1843 .............. Fishing Company ........................... £ 2 456 .............. £ 3 684 
1844 .............. Gas Light Company ......................... £ 9 000 .............. £ 11 100 
1844 .............. ColoniaiBank .............................. £ 60000 .............. £ 71900 
1844 .............. Equitable Assurance ........................ £ 5 000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . £ 9 000 · 
1847 .............. Union Bank ................................ £ 75 000 .............. £ 77 250 
1847 .............. Natal Cotton Company ...................... £ 8 000 .............. £ 9 000 
1847 .............. W P Bank ................................. £ 5 000 .............. £ 6 500 
1838 .............. E P Bank .................................. £ 26 670 .............. £ 60 000 
1839 .............. E .P Fire Company .......................... £ 2 000 .............. £ 8 000 
1845 .............. E P Trust .................................. £ 1 500 .............. £ 2 700 
1846 .............. Port Elizabeth Bank ......................... £ 16 000 .............. £ 23 200 
1847 .............. Frontier Comm. & Agr. Bank ................. £ 37 500 .............. £ 41 200 
£437 976 £655 239. 10 
(Source: SACA. 3 Feb. 1849) 
In 1849 the market value of these shares, £655 239-10, represented there-
fore an increase of c.50X on the original investment, leading Fairbairn to 
~emark in the 'Same editorial: ''In general, handsome dividends have been 
paid to the Sh.are-holders, annually, or half yearly". <20) The major part 
of the paid-up.capital of these companies, £346 306, derived from the 
Western Province. A Natal-based company accounted for only £8 000 and the 
Eastern Province some £83 670. Fairbairn's listing excluded the Savings 
Bank and the Mutual· <the latter of which he was chairman and director> 
because these companies' capitals were not divided into shares and were 
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unavailable for public sale. However, like the companies listed, the capi-
tal stock of the Savings Bank and the Mutual was available for loans and 
mortgage transactions, which helped to swell the local capital market. 
(21) 
At its peak the mid-50s copper-mining boom resulted in company formation 
worth some £70 000-&100 000 in paid-up capital, a significant proportion 
of which was lost in the .aftermath of the crash. <22) Besides this, the 
coLtrse of the 1850s also saw the founding of many new companies, in parti-
cular a number of country banks. By 1860 government statistics <see Table 
3.2 below> showed that the paid-up capital of the five Cape Town banks 
amounted to £374 608, Western Province banking capital <Cape Town 
included) to £496 104, and Eastern Province banking capital to £326 016. 
For the moment the capital of the overseas-floated London & South African 
Bank has been excluded. (23) 
Table 3.2 BANK CAPITAL AT. THE CAPE 1860 
Name Place Capital Shares Paid-up 
Cape of Good Hope Bank CT £ 75 300 1 506 £ 75 300 
South African Bank CT £100000 2000 £ 75 000 
Colonial Bank CT £100000 2000 £ 60000 
Union Bank CT £150000 15 000 £ 75 000 
Cape Commercial Bank CT £144000 12 000 £ 89308 
Stellenbosch Bank Stell. £ 20000 2000 £ 10 000 
W P Bank ( 1859) Paarl £ 40000 2000 £ 30000 
Paarl Bank ( 1859) Paarl £ 60000 4000 £ 20000 
Wellington Bank ( 1859) Well. £ 50000 5000 £ 19 871 
Worcester Commercial Bank Wore. £ 20000 2000 £ 14000 
Beaufort Bank .Beaut. £ 50000 2 525 £ 12 625 
· Swellendam Bank Swell. £ 15 000 3000 £ 15 000 
George Divis. Bank George only recently established 
P E Bank PE £ 40000 2400 £ 36000 
Commercial Bank PE £100 000 10000 £ 60000 
E P Bank G'sTown £100 000 3200 £100000 
Frontier Comm. & Agr. Bank G's Town £125 000 2 500 £ 62 500 
Fort Beaufort Bank F Beaut. •••• 0 ••• 0 2 500 • 0. 0 ••• 0 0 
Somerset Bank ( 1859) Somerset in course of establishment 
Cradock Union Bank Cradock £ 30000 1 500 £ 12 603 
Graaff-Reinet Bank G-Reinet £ 40000 1 600 £ 24000 
S A Central Bank G-Reinet £ 40000 4000 £ 20000 
Queen's Town Bank Q's Town £ 20000 2500 £ 10 913 
(Source: Colony of the Caf)(l of Good Hope [Blue Book} 1860) £1319 300 £822 120 
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A compilation from various sources is presented in Table 3.3 below, in-
dicating the approximate capitalisation of Joint-stock companies, other 
than banks. It then becomes possible to arrive at a total of Cape 
Town/Western Province company capital in the year 1860, a year beyond the 
terminal date of this study, but a convenient stopping point, before the 
arrival of the first Imperial bank. The year also marked the legal solu-
tion of the usury question, which was to have an significant impact on 
company development. (24) 
Table 3.3 CAPITAL OF CAPE TOWN NON-BANKING JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES 1860 
Name Capital Shares Share Paid-up Paid-up 
value per share capital 
SA Fire & life Ass. Co. ( 1831 ) £20000 200 £100 £ 10 £ 2000 
SA Assoc. for Admin. & £31 500 84 £375 £375 £ 31 500 
Settl. of Estates ( 1834) (perhaps£ 19 761) (perhaps £335-5) (perhaps£ 19 761) 
CGH Trust & Ass. Co. ( 1835) £22 500 900 £ 25 £ 19 £ 17 100 
CGH Marine Ass. Co. ( 1838) £75 000 1 500 £ 50 £ 10 £ 15 000 
Protecteur ( 1838) £40000 2000 £ 20 £ 5 £ 10000 
Board of Executors ( 1838) £16 500 60 £200 £275 £ 16 500 
(£200) 
Equitable Fire Ass. & £25 000 1000 £ 25 £ 5 £ 5000 
Trust Co. ( 1844) 
CGH Gas Light.Co. ( 1844) £ 9000 600 £ 15 £ 15 £ 9000 
Equitable Marine Ass. Co. £75 000 1 500 £ 50 £ 5 £ 7500 
( 1849) 
Commercial Marine & Fire £50000 2000 £ 25 £ 5 £ 10000 
Ass. Co. ( 1855) 
Colonial & Orphan Chamber £40000 200 £200 £200 £ 40000 
& Trust Co. ( 1856) 
General Estate & Oprhan £20000 100 £200 £200 £ 20000 
Chamber ( 1856) 
Simon's Bay Dock Co. ( 1859) £60 000 12000 £ 5 £ 5 £ 60000 
£243 600 
(Sources: SACA. 2 Oct. 1844; S4CA. 13 Feb. 1855; S4CA, 22 Oec. 1860: S4CA. 20 Nov. 1861; Alma,..c. 1848: Almanac, 1860. CGHAct No. 11. 1844; 
: CGHActNo. 9. 1855; CGHAct No. 13. 1859: CGHAct No. 17. 1859; CGHAct No. 31, 1861) 
In 1860, therefore, Western Cape non-banking Joint-stock capital equalled 
£243 600. Coupled with the £496 104 banking capital, the total of paid-up 
Western Cape company capital in 1860 amounted to £739 704. Of this sum 
Cape Town accounted for the major portion. Its capital alone totalled 
£618 208. The figures indicate that Western Province company eapital 
(mainly Cape Town> had more than doubled in the period between 1849 and 
1860. 
The year 1861 witne~sed further important developments in company forma-
tion. Besides the passing of local 'limited liability 1e9islation, a set of 
new companies, viz. the Sea Po~nt Waterworks Company, the Wynberg Railway 
Company and the Cape Town & Green Point Tramway ~ompany, were incorporated 
with limited liability, in terms of separate Acts. The year also saw the 
establishment of two more local banks in the Western Province - the 
Caledon Agricultural Bank and the Montagu Bank. <25) In 1861 the London & 
South African Bank, the first Imperial bank to be formed for business in 
South Africa, added its capital to the only other overseas-flo~ted com-
pany, the Cape Town Rai 1 w_ay t, Dock Company. Overseas company capital in 
1860-1861 is presented below. 
Table 3.4 CAPITAL OF OVERSEAS COMPANIES IN CAPE TOWN 1860~1861 
Name 
C T Railway & Dock Co. ( 1855) 




(Source: Cape of Good Hope [Slue Book} 1861; S4CA. 20 Nov. 1860) 
Share Paid-up 








While overseas companies appeared relatively late on the local scene, 
their larger size compared to local companies is immediately apparent. The 
only local institutions to rival the scale of operation of overseas con-
cerns are five banks, viz. the Eastern Province Bank (£100 000 paid-up>; 
Cape Commercial Bank (£89 308 paid-up>; and the Cape of Good Hope Bank, 
South African Bank and Union Bank (each more or less £75 000 paid-up). 
Clearly, the London & South African Bank's capital of £200 000 dwarfed the 
individual capitals of the Cape Town banks, alone representi~g about 53% 
of the combined capital of all the Cape Town banks. The Cape Town Railway 
& Dock Company's capital in 1860, £300 000, once again outstripped all 
local companies; on its own exceeding the sum of all non-banking joint-
stock companies in Cape Town, which amounted that year to only £243 600. 
Comparative British data for 1853, relating to provisionally listed com-
panies (i.e. not all of which went into operation>, in a period preceding 
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the major joint-stock company era, reveal a total of 339 company ventures. 
These consisted of 80 railway projects, 54 gas operations, 35 insurance 
schemes, various mining, shipping and trading projects and 30 
manufacturing-related operations. For the five years ending 1861, the an-
nual average was 381 companies with a total nominal capital of 
£21 000 000. By 1864 there were 975 registered companies with a nominal 
capital of £235 000 000 and a paid-up capital of £24 229 633. <26) In 1841 
there were 321 private banks and 115 joint-stock ~anks in England and 
Wales. <27> In 1844 the London Joint Stock Bank advertised a capital of £3 
million, as did the Union Bank of London, while the Union Bank of 
Australia boasted a capital of £800 000, the South Australian Banking Com-
pany £250 000 and the Bank of Australasia £1 200 000. In 1860 the National 
Bank of Australasia advertised its capital as £1 000 000 with a paid-up 
capital of roughly half - £540 000 - and the National Provincial Bank of 
England a subscribed capital of £2 100 000 and a paid-up capital of rough-
1 y half - £1 080 000. <28) It must be concluded from these figures that 
local capital concentration was on a relatively small scale. Nevertheless, 
company developments at the Cape i~ the first half of the century were 
significant and the changes, particularly after 1859, proved very crucial. 
3.4 Unsuccessful company ventures 
Ru~ours of the impending arrival of overseas companies were fairly freqent 
in the Adyerti ~er·. (29) There were also a nLtmber of Ltnsuccessful overseas 
attempts at floating companies for business in the colony. Interesting in 
this regard were Fairbairn's rather empty threats to invite overseas in-
vestors at times when local enthusiasm for such company ventures showed 
signs of flagging, although there was at that point little evidence of 
overseas capital materializing. (30) 
Early unsuccessful ventures devised in London included the 1836 Bank of 
South Africa scheme which, with largely Bank of Australasia shareholders, 
advertised a capital of £15 000 divided into 6 000 shares of £25 each. 
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(31) This emerged as a rival scheme to J.B. Ebden's proposed bank, the 
Cape of Good Hope Bank, backed by the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society. 
Despite much news of high share premiums in London and the bank's imminent 
arrival, including machinery, the overseas project failed, leaving the 
field open ·for Ebden 's bank. (32) 
The ambitious prospectus of the South African Company also appeared in 
1836. The company advertised a capital of £200 000, divided into 8 000 
shares of £25 each, of which 1 000 were initially to be reserved for the 
Cape. Its prosp~ctus ran: "The increase of commercial enterprise in all 
the British settlements throughout the southern hemisphere, and the open-
ing of trade with India, tend to show that the Cape of Good Hope and ad-
jacent districts, when the natural resources of the colony are developed 
by the introduction of capital under judicious management, will becom~, at 
no distant period, one of the most important colonies under the British 
Crown." Aims inclLtded the establishment of a whaling station, fishing sta-
tions, the emigration of seamen, mechanics and superior agriculturalists 
and the laying out of farms for purchase. It claimed to have the en-
couragement of ''influential persons connected to the agricultural and com-
mercial interests of the colony''. The involvement in the company of John 
Price Simpson of Simpson Brothers of London and Cape Town and Daniel Dixon 
of Hudson, Donaldson & Dixon of Cape Town/Donaldson & Dixon of London, 
both parties connected with the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society, thus 
comes as no suprise. Included among the London directors were Horace Twiss 
MP; John Chapman & Co., shipowners, ship and insurance brokers, 2 Leaden-
hall St.; Alexander Milne, ship and insurance broker, 20 New East India 
Chambers; and Richard Norman, merchant, 2 New Broad Street. (33> However, 
this scheme, like the Bank of South Africa, fizzled o~t quickly. 
The third overseas capital venture to die pre~aturely was the Cape of Good 
Hope Western Railway Company of 1845-1846. Its collapse was predicted by 
Cape's commercially-minded Attorney-General, William Porter, who refused 
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to h~ve his name ~ssociated with the Comp~ny. ·Like th~ So~th Afri~an Com-
' 
·pany, th~·schem~ incoiporated merchants wit~ ·t~in Cape·Town and London 
' 
connections amongst its directors, as for example J.R. Thomsori an~ ·Har-
rison Watson, both connected to Thomson, Watson & Co. The main impetus 
came,·however, from directors of such B~itish railway companies as the 
Leeds & Carlisle Railway, the Great Eastern & Western Railway, the 
G~ernsey Railway & Pier Company, the Wilts, So~erset & Southampton Railway 
and others. (34) The project likewise aborted and railway-building at the 
Cape was only to get off the ground during the 1850s. 
A certain amount of continuity between these failed overseas ventures and 
the later successful overseas companies is evident, for instance, in the 
appearance of a man such as Edward Barnard, Agent for the Crown Colonies 
as a proposed director of th~ failed South African Bank and late~ as 
director of the successful C~pe Town Railway & Dbck Company. (35) Also 
notewo~thy is the re-occurence of. directors of the former failed 1844 
railway company in the succ~ssful Cape Town Railway & Dock Company. An e v-" 
ample in this regard is the presence in both companies of partners of the 
London-connected firm of Thomson, Watson & Co., who were later also in-
valved in the Imperial London & South African Bank. (36) 
The failure 6f these early overseas schemes points partly to the limited 
scope f6r large-scale company develbpment at the Cape and partly to the 
lack of a legal investment structure, as will be examined later in the 
chapter. The aborted attempts may presumably also be viewed as part of a 
process of investigation, undertaken by·British investors in order toes-
tablish the potential and limits of the Cape market. 
3.3 Overseas shareholding in local companies 
London capital may nevertheless have reached the Cape in a more indirect 
manner, in the form of individual shareholding in locally founded com-
panies or through the ~~tension of credit facilities to local 
The steam~hip company was one of th~ two local companies where con-
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remarked: "Three hundred shares in the Cape of Good Hope Bank were 
reserved for London purchasers" ahd he concluded that "many of these 
I 
shares were held by London merchants with agents in Cape Town~" (46) The 
existence of overseas shareholders would seem confirmed by the bank's 
·founder Ebden, who, as a member of the Cape Legislative CoLincil, attempted 
to push through a private Bill for the bank's incorporation by special or-
dinance. In Council proceedings during 1836 he mentioned the need to ob-
tain.permission of overseas shareholders to effect an alteration in the 
bank's structure. (47> In. 1838 the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society's an~ 
nual report outlined its role in the establishment of the bank as (1) the 
unsuccessful attempt to gain British government sanction for the bank Or-
dinance (2) the sending out of books and banknotes and (3) sharetaking. 
(48) 
Despite these indications, however, the significance of overseas 
shareholding in the bank is less than the evidence suggests. In this case, 
as generally, it is difficult to distinguish neatly between overseas and 
local capital in situations of interconnected and family concerns. Though 
one can in fact confirm almost all the bank's shareholders as resident in 
Cape Town in 1838 (49>, this is also no conclusive counter-argument as to 
non-overseas participation. Firstly, there was a general perception, ob-
viously soundly based and reflected even by Fairbairn, that the English 
merchant was typically a temporary colonial resident, who tended to retire 
"home'', i.e. England. (50) Secondly, some of the London-based merchants 
with Cape connections spent short spells at the Cape, in order to acquire 
first-hand knowledge of commercial conditions in the colony as William 
Harrison, merchant of Manchester, recounted he had done in 1830-1831. (51) 
Thirdly, in one and the same firm, a father might be resident in London, 
while the son took up more permanent residence in Cape Town, as in the 
case of the Thomson, Watson & Co. (52) For such reasons it is difficult in 
this period to place overseas-connected merchants in watertight 
categories, as representatives of overseas capital, opposed to local capi-
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tal. 
Such ambiguities at the Cape form but part of a wider British and interna-
tional mercantile phenomenon. The period 1770-1860, according to Jones, 
saw the emergence of new patterns of trade, which were the result of trade 
dislocations experienced during the R~volutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the 
breakdown of the mercantilist order and the advance of manufacture. A con-
sequence of these new trends was the creation by the mid-19th century of a 
"truly cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, trading internationally under British 
naval protection." (53> In such a system "Sons of British and European 
manufacturers and merchants travelled the world in search of ~xport 
markets, and often settled in sbme trading port only to develop a business 
quite tangential'' - in a kind of mercantile diaspora. At that time a let-
ter of introduction and a clean record was enough for an aspiring merchant 
to make his way around the world. <54> 
UndoLtbtedl y, there ~ amongst the Cape of Good Hope Bank shareholders a 
significant contingent of merchants with a London family house or agency 
link. Some of these on individual investigation could prove to differing 
e>:tents, to be more London-based, others residents at the Cape for much, 
if not most, of their lives. The ambiguity of the situation is manifest in 
the presence amongst the bank's shareholders of typically London-connected 
~erchants, such as John King of Phillips & King of London and Cape Town, 
S.B. Venning of Venning, Busk & Co. of Cape Town/ William Venning & Co. of 
London and Harrison Watson of Thomson, Watson & Co. of Cape Town/J.R. 
Thomson of London, to name just a few. (55) 
3.3.3 Other shareholding and agency activity of London-connected merchants 
London-connected men were also represented individually in other com-
panies, though not as strongly as in the Cape of Good Hope Bank. The 
favoured companies were the already-mentioned Cape of Good Hope Steamship 
Co., Cap~ of Good Hope Marine Assurance Co. and Cape of Good Hope Trust & 
103 
Assurance Co. In 1845 Harrison Watson of Thomson, Watson & Co. was a 
.director of the Cape of Good Hope Trust &·Assurance Co. and C.S. Pillans 
of Borradaile, Thompson & Pillans a director of ·the Cape of Good Ho~e 
Marine Assurance Co. (56) In 1860 James King of Phillips & King and Thomas 
Hall of Borradaile, Thompson, Hall & Co. were directors of the Cape of 
Good Hope Trust & Assurance Co. and J.D. Thomson of Thomson, Watson & Co., 
as well as the previously mentioned Thomas Hall, directors of the Cape of 
Good Hope Marine Assurance Co. (57) In 1840 G. Hodgskin o~ Heideman, 
Hodgskin & Co., H. Sherman of Levicks & Sherman and Harrison Watson of 
Thomson, Watson & Co., all with London connections, featured as directors 
of the short-lived Cape of Good Hope Steam Navigation Co. (58) It is in-
teresting to note that the firm of Phillips & King, who began with wine 
export in characteristic English merchant tradition, became intimately in-
volved with the copper-mining discoveries of the 1850s. As early as 1846 
that firm was associated with the South African Mining Company, the first 
successful company formed to exploit Namaqualand's copper resources. Mem-
bers of the firm continued to ex~rcise influence in the important Cape 
Copper Mining Company, established in London in 1862. (59) 
Not surprisingly, the names of these very same London-connected merchants, 
as well as their London-based associates and family, appear again amongst 
shareholders of the two successful London companies, floated for business 
in South Africa during this period. Thus the early London-based directors 
of the Cape Town Railway & Dock Company included Harrison Watson of Thom-
son, Watson & Co. of Cape Town/J.R. Thomson & Co. of London and Charles J. 
Busk of Venning & Co. of London/McDonald, Busk & Co. of Cape Town, while 
local management incorporated Thomas Watson, son of Harrison Watson, also 
of the connected firm of Thomson, Watson 8( Co., George Thompson of Thomp-
son, Hall & Co., and John Barry of Swellendam's Barry and Nephews. (60) 
Similarly, the directors of the London & South African Bank in 1860 in-
cluded Joseph Levick of Levicks & Sherman, John Robert Thomson of Thomson, 
Watson & Co. , John Barry of Barry & Nephews and Adolphus Mosenthal of 
J 
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Mosenthal 8{ Co., all advertised as representing firms in London and Cape 
Town. (61> 
London-connected merchants featured most prominently, however, as agents 
of British shipping and insurance companies. Here their interstitial, even 
comprador, role, situated between the coloni~l power and the colony, is 
clearly demonstrated. A listing of agency networks was published by the 
French consul, Monsieur Ernest Blancheton in 1855 (62>, but such agency 
activities had been an early aspect of merchant growth, particularly in 
the period when very few local insurance and finance companies existed and 
before regular steamship services operated between Britain and the colony. 
(63> Illustrating this development are advertisements which appeared, for 
instance, in 1840. The firm of Thomson, Watson & Co. is named as agent of 
two insurance companies based in Calcutta, five in Le Havre and one in Am-
sterdam, as well as De Nederlandsche Scheeps-Redery of Amsterdam and the 
Bank of Australasia, of London, New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. 
Dickson, Burnie & Co. advertised themselves as representatives of the Al-
liance, British & Foreign Fire & Life Assurance Company of London, the 
South Australian Company, the East India Company, as well as Lloyds. (64) 
Interestingly, such agency activities were often linked to consular of-
fice. The Cape Almanacs customarily listed serving consuls. In 1859, for 
example, J.D. Thomson acted simultaneously as consul for Belgium, 
Portugal, Russia, Spain and Sardinia. (65> Diplomacy was unambiguously the 
domain of commerce. 
Overseas companies, then, were few and investment in local companies by 
foreign shareholders limited. Warren's contention that London firms sup-
pli~d Cape Town companies with large sums of business capital and placed 
their wealth at the disposal of Cape houses, cannot be substantiated. (66) 
In support of his argument, Warren claimed that a London mer~h•nt house 
with an affiliate at the Cape - McDonald, Busk & Co. - may have agreed to 
a permanent loan of capital to help set up the colonial side of the busi-
J 
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ness. With regard to another company, he concluded from th~ evidence of a 
partnership agr~ement between its local and overseas affiliates that, both 
in funding and operation, the Cape Town partners of Thomson, Watso~ & Cd. 
were entirely dependent on London. He cites as evidence for this the fact 
that J.R. Thomson & Co. of London was the local firm's sole agents in 
London, that true copies of the monthly books of account were to be sent 
to London and that restraints were placed on outside business activities. 
(67) While reflecting the relatively greater control by the London group, 
much of this was consistent with normal partnership agreements, which 
could restrain both parties with equal force or proportionately favour the 
partner who invested the larger sum of money into the firm. Thus, an 1829 
agreement between the well-known merchant Hamilton Ross and two other 
local merchants, William Hawkins and John van der Berg, trading together 
) 
under the name Hamilton Ross & Co. of Cape Town, placed mutual restraiht 
on external b~siness activities, though Ross was to reap a major share of 
the profits. The first condition stated: "The said parties hereby agree to 
and with each other, that they will not at any time during the continuance 
of the Copartnership exercise or carry on, or assist in exercising or car-
rying on, any trade or traffic on their own private account or benefit or 
on account or for the benefit of any other person or persons whomsovere, 
save the said Copartnership ••. '', though the partners were individually 
entitled to purchase fixed property, such as land, houses and slaves. 
Profits and costs were to be divided in the following ratio:- Ross 6/12 
Hawkins 4/12 and Van der Berg 2/12.· While nothing, unfortunately, is 
stated about total capital stock, or about individual contribution, it 
would be logical to deduce that the proportions reflected the dominant 
capital input pf the wealthiest partner, Hamilton Ross. (68> 
Another partnership agreement dated 1830 between Benjamin and Daniel Phil-
lips, connected to the house of Phillips & King in London, with similar 
overseas links to Thomson, Watson & Co., allowed Benjamin resident at the 
time in Cape Town to trade under the firm's name as a wine exporter, in 
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addition to the partners' combined business, allowing the profits from the 
wine trade to be taken solely by him. Daniel, situated in London, was at 
liberty to trade as much as he liked both in the UK and elsewhere. ·<69> 
Terms of restraint therefore varied from agreement to agreement. Looking 
at the Thomson, Watson & Co. deed, referred to by Warren, the propor-
tionately greater profits obtained by the London partners <one of whom, 
John Robert Thomson, anyway, was, as Warren. admits, the father of the Cape 
Town partner, James Duncan Thomson>, reflected their greater capital in-
vestments. To deduce from this contract .that the Cape Town firm was 
entirely dependent on London as regards funding and operation is an over-
simplification. Foreign and local interests in such oversea~-connected 
firms were all too often inextricably merged: 
While some of the London-connected merchants were birds of passage, 
others, though retiring to England, left family and material possessions 
at the Cape. This was certainly the case with Thomas Watson and John 
Robert Thomson, both of Thomson, Watson & Co., a company with very sig-
nificant overseas links. (70) Rather than always a case of London mer-
chants with agents in Cape Town, it was often the case of Cape Town mer-
chants with important, perhaps even crucial, London connections. 
3.6 Reasons for lack of overseas capital 
The infrequent appearance of British companies and shareholders at the 
Cape in the period under review is not suprising when seen within the con-
text of tontemporary capital export patterns from the industrializing 
world. The first 60 years of the 19th century were distinguished from the 
later decades by free competition and the export of goods. The period 
preceded that of the tremendous export of capital at the end of the 
century, the precise characteristic of which had led Lenin to define that 
period as "imperialism - the highest stage of capitalism". <71> 
Europe and North America still received about half of British investment 
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during the second part of the 19th century, though an increasing propor-
tion of 'new' investment was directed to the 'regions of recent settle-
ment', such as Australia and South Africa. C72) Most British capital in-
vestment in the Cape during the 19th century was carried out via the 
Colonial Government, which up until the end of the century raised some £30 
million for public works. The bulk of non-government mediated capital, 
still of an indirect/portfolio hature, was raised by London-floated mining 
companies in the wake of diamond and gold discoveries, a~counting for an 
influx of some £6 million up to the mid-1880s alone. Non-diamond mining 
companies (merchants, banks and other companies>, up to the mid-1880s, 
c6ntributed to a capital inflow of some £4-5 million. (73) The chief in-
flux of British capital to the Cape thus arrived via rail~ays and 
minerals, mainly after 1885. C74> Whereas government investment guaranteed 
some security to overseas investors and miner~ls the prospects of high 
profits, most other enterprises were increasingly at a disadvantage in at-
tracting overseas capital investment. The absence of British capital at 
the Cape before 1885 therefore reflected overseas capital export patterns, 
as well as the lack of local opportunities in the period - one of the in-
fancy of railways and the beginnings of copper-mining. 
The Cape's singular lack of success in attracting British capital, espe-
cially in contrast to Australia, was lamented upon by Fairbairn in an 
editorial of 1853. (75) Realizatinn was apparently increasing that without 
British capital, economic developmeht would be greatly impaired. (76> 
Mabin has mentioned that declining profit and interest rates in Britain 
and Europe in the 1870s and 1880s were possible, though not exclusive, 
reasons for the export of capital. When the relatively favourable rate of 
interest on .overseas sec .ties vis a vis domestic securities altered, a 
compensating factor, viz. increasing confidence in overseas issues, may 
have played a role. <77) Even if the interest rate is only a partial ex-
planation for capital export, it is interesting to pick up from local con-
temper~_,.,,.· wr _ings an awareness of these very concerns. 
J 
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H~gh Lynar who worked in the Attorney-General's offi~e in Cape Town, was a 
' 
housemate of William Porter, the Cape's Attorney-General. (78) Writing in 
1844 to William's half-brother, Francis Porter still resident in Ireland, 
Lynar explained that money upon the best securtiy at the Cape.brought at 
least 6%, while it produced only 3% or 4% in Britain. He added ''When I 
speak of six per cent I speak of Money lent on the best security - first 
mortgage upon landed property.'' (79) On many occasions the Advertiser's 
editor and correspondents commented that investment in the 'new' areas or 
colonies being generally less secure, yields higher interest, compared to 
rates prevailing in the 'old', stable areas, viz. the metropolitan 
countries. In 1854 Fairbairn spoke of the 6% interest obtainable at the 
Cape on railway investment, compared to some 4% payable el·sewhere- in-
eluding London - explainable by the riskier nature of colonial investment. 
(80) Yet, despite this tendBncy for a higher interest rate, overseas in--
vestment remained small; other already-mentioned factors (including the 
lack of suitable investment avenues) and the limit of 6% interest charged 
on bills of exchange and promissory notes, specifically, probably 
counteracted the attraction. 
Ernest discussion of the 6% interest limit was raised at the start of the 
long battle against the so-called Usury Law, when merchanfs such as Ebden, 
aided by the newly-arrived Irish Attorney-General, William Porter, and 
John Fairbairn, sought to have legislation on the subject introduced. In 
November 1839 Porter remarked on the necessity for the lifting of this 
limit, i.e. the repeal of the so-called Usury Law. In Van Dieman's Land 
and the United States, he said, rates of interest on promissory notes were 
around 12%. (81) Fairbairn also intervened in the debate, informing 
readers that other parts of the British empire offered an interest double 
that of the Cape. (82) While in practice more than 6% was.often obtained 
by merchants - Ly~ar remarked ''Men who deal in money making advances upon 
bills, get double that" [i.e. 12%] - to do so, he indicated, had a 
J 
definite stigma attached. Lynar mentioned the "vulgar prejudice" at the 
Cape which renders a higher than 6/. i nter.est "disreputable". (83) 
109 
The struggle that was initiated in 1839 by the commercial community, sup-
ported by Porter and Fairbairn, continued in parliament till 1860, despite 
the fact that as early as 1839 the Governor had concluded that no actual 
law existed at the Cape and therefore could not be repealed. (84) Finally, 
in 1860 an historic Supreme Court test case was conducted, Dva~on vs 
Ruthven, which finally settled in favour of the plaintiff, the merchant 
Dyason, who had demanded 12/. interest on a promissory note for £65, an in-
terest rate Ruthven refused to pay. Interestingly, during this trial it 
was Porter, the Attorney-General, who appeared for the plaintiff. (85) 
The significance of the rulin~ was highlighted a few months later by the 
editor who took over the Advertiser on Fairbairn's retirement at the end 
of December 1859. (86) He declared: "The cry from the colony for banking 
accomodation has often been repeated, but a response from home has 
hitherto been prevented by the apprehension of the effect of an absurd 
state of the law, which was suppose to fix the maximum legal rate of in-
terest at 6/.. By a rec~nt unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the 
colony, this point has definitely been solved~ in a sense in consonance 
with the principles of free trade." <87) In September that year the editor 
went to the defence of remarks he had made relating to the arrival of the 
new Imperial bank, the London & South African Bank. He addressed himself 
on that occasion to J.C. Silberbauer, who was then campaigning to prohibit 
the new bank, in order to protect local banking establishments, of which 
he <Silberbauer> was one such shareholder. " •.• will Mr Silberbauer", the 
editor rhetorically enquired, "assert that he had not then heard of a 
proposal to establish an English Bank here, so soon as the decision of the 
Supreme CoLtrt, touching • usury· should be made known." (88) 
An important advance towards protection of risk-bearing investments, was 
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the successful implementation of joint-stock company limited liability 
legislation at 'the Cape. Introduced during the mid-century in Britain and 
soon afterwards at the Cape (1861>, ,this legislation basically entitled 
shareholders' liability to be limited to the amount of their shares. (89) 
The importance of such legislation was reflected in the fact that the 
first successful company floated overseas for business at the Cape was one 
which was incorporated with limited liability in Britain, viz, the Cape 
Town Railway ~ Dock Company. In 1853 the company had announced its inten-
tion of obtaining incorporation by Act of (British) Parliament and by 1855 
had obtained its own legislation, with the express advantage of limited 
1 i ab i 1 it y. ( 90 > 
These two measures, the usury ruling and the joint-stock company limited 
liability legislation, were significant advances in terms of securing the 
basic framework in which overseas capital could operate at the Cape in fu-
ture decades. <91 > 
3.7 The importance of the London connection 
Despite its limited scope, overseas capital at the Cape nevertheless did 
play a role in the Cape economy in the era before the arrival of overseas 
banks and railway and mineral development. Its precise modus operandi, 
remains to be examined. The British connection was an important factor in 
the success of local firms. Its technical and st~ategic usefulness has al-
ready been pointed out in the obtaining of slave compensation money. Kirk 
has estimated that during the 1840s sbme 50 London firms with interests at 
the Cape can be identified. (92) The facilities provided by this connec-
tion cannot be underestimated. With a London partner, purchases from. 
British manufacturers and wholeialers could be mad~ on favourable terms 
and, abGve all, short-term commercial credit arranged. Lynar, writing to 
Francis Porter in 1841 about the latter's plans to emigrate to the Cape, 
explained the hardships of a merchant's/merchant clerk's life in Cape Town 
and asked Francis rhetorically '' ••. where the capital to enable a young man 
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like you to import, or where the connection through which consignment 
might b£·~ had?" (r;:::;;) This; t1->1in concer-n for either "c:api tal or connecti ems" 
clearly, was viewed at the time as the basic pre-conditions fo~ successful 
merchant activity at the Cape. It was again emphasized by the editor of 
the Advertiser in 1860. Referring to a group of unstable credit-laden 
tradE~rs, he r·emarkE~d: "They are not merchants, for they do not impol~t 
their own goods, havi ng __ JJ.§_lt.!"ler.:_ .... ttu~_.s;,,ap i tal nor the qmne>: i_QJ.l§. to enab 1 e 
them to do :,•o .•• " [authol~ 's empt·1asi s] (94) 
Both Purkis, detailing commercial activities in the Eastern Province and 
Dubow, discussing wool merchants in Graaff-Reinet, have emphasised wool 
merchant credit which spread web~like from farmer to country.shop-
keeper, to port merchant and on to British merchant. (95) The time delay 
between shearing and the realization of wool sales at the periodic London 
auctions necessitated credit, particularly for farmers with little capital 
reserves. As long as wool was auctioned in London, this short-term credit 
netwo~k was an essential feature of the wool trade, arising out of its 
very n.~tw-e. (96) A simi 1 ar si tu,-ati on in the \.!Jestern Cape is revealed in 
the &!=!vert i.2£C dud n~~ the 184·0s, thE~ ped od of the wool far-ming tc:\~::£::----o·H. 
Cape Town merchants ad~ertised that they were wiiling to advance credit 
when purchasing wool, but on condition it was consigned to their London 
house. Thus J.B. Ebden offered to make advances on wool if consigned to 
his London correspondent, A.A. Gower, NepheWs & Co. Venning, Busk & Co. 
established a similar London pre-condition, adding that if clean wool was 
received, they would make advances without charging interest. (97) While 
the adverts point only to the local side of credit, i.e. within the 
colony, it is reasonable to expect that Cape Town port merchant credit ex-
tended back to London, just as the situat.ion in the Eastern Province. 
Confirmation of this importance.of overseas sho~t-term credit and the 
London "connt:?>:ions" ·fo;~ the Westr::?rn Cape, ha',:; ind~:;.ed bef?n established. The 
example is a letter of 1847 written by D.G. Guthrie & Co., well-known mer-
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chants and bankers of London, who were London correspondents of Hamilton 
Ross, Richard Paxton, Dobie L Co. and other Cape Town merchants. (98> It 
is clear from this letter that Hamilton Ross had previously writteM to 
Guthrie, vouching for the sound financial standing of the partnership of 
Van der Byl and -none other -Francis Porter and requesting, on the two 
partners' behalf, an extension of credit to them by Guthrie. Guthrie 
replied that on the basis of Ross's recommendations he would ''enter upon 
the execution of their (Porter and Van der Byll orders without hesitation 
and they may expect their goods accordingly.'' Then, explaining his unwill-
ingness to accede to certain other details of the arrangement, Guthrie 
reveals what must have been a quite general pattern of credit between 
London and Cape Town correspondents. The latter could enjoy credit not 
only for goods purchased overseas but also for local goods purchased for 
overseas consignment. Guthrie was willing to allow Van der Byl and Porter 
a· limit of £1 000 credit for English goods on open account at 2 1/2% in-
'· 
terest, to be paid off after six months, on condition that the turn-over 
proved large enough. Regarding cash advances for the purchase of local 
goods, Guthrie's conditions were: "!IJe shall however impose a condition in 
respect to interest on our cash advances that after the expiration of 6 
MCtls on their Invoices they shall pay us your colonial Interest which we 
believe to be 6 p ct which will only be putting us on the footing of Mr 
Van der Byl 's father as to the interest and it will I hope serve to induce 
early remittances whereas if we charge less than the Colonial Interest it 
is an inducement to defer remitting.'' (99) The London connection was 
therefore immensely valuable to Cape.Town merchants in the sphere of 
short-term commercial credit, direct ordering of overseas goods and, no 
doubt, in providing advice in assorted financial matters. 
Hugh Lynar's correspondencewith Francis Porter further underlined the 
need for connections, albeit local in the case discussed below. It also 
indicates the capital investment required for entering a well-established 
partnership -at the Cape and the orientation by Cape Town merchants to the 
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wool trade. Lynar, writing to Francis Porter in Ireland about fresh career 
prospects for him in Cape Town, stated: 
William CPorterJ has lately had conversations with Mr Ross and Mr Stein 
(principals perhaps in the first mercantile house here) as to the 
chances of doing anything for you, by investing from £1,000 to £2,000 
in a mercantile business here. In Cape Town, it seems that little or no 
good could be done. But at one of the outports, Mossel Bay, for in-
stance, they are satisfied that all reasonable expectations of a young 
man would be answered, provided he be really such as I described you to 
be - an intelligent, active, high-principled fellow, who would not be 
ashamed to help with his own hand in all the rough work of a country 
store, and was equal to rough living as well as rough work in the 
r beginning of his career. It is to be hereafter determined whether you 
shall start on your own account Cwith the aid of William's loan], Ross 
giving you all the aid they can for the advantage to be expected from 
your dealings with them no less than through esteem for your long C?J 
brother; or whether you be made a partner in a branch of the house at 
Mossel Bay. The latter, I think, is the more. desirable thing, because 
the name of Ross' house would be worth much, and the authoritative ad-
vice thereof perhaps worth more. 
Lynar then went on to explain that ''Mr Ross considers that the wool trade 
be th~ chief object'' and that he <Ross> suggests that Francis bring out 
with him a wool-stapler from London, Liverpool or Manchester to act as 
store assistant, who "should be provided with a wife, to act as 
·Housekeeper. " ! ( 100) 
3.8 Local sources of capital 
In the established absence of significant injections of overseas capital 
into the Cape, Hamilton Ross's advice to the prospective young merchant, 
regarding a wool trade orientation, serves as an introduction to the dis-
cussion of the source of Cape Town corporate capital. Agriculture, local 
trade and import/export, remained the chief sources of locally-generated 
capital during a period of almost negligible manufacturing and limited 
copper-mining. (101). Commercial and money-lending capital similarly arose 
chiefly from the sale of local agricultural goods, both at home and over-
seas, as well as the import of British manufactures and machinery. 
Imports through Cape Town in the period 1838 to 1861 were slow to overtake 
the peak levels of 1838-1840, though they still apparently managed to keep 
slightly ahead of Port Elizabeth. Exports through Cape Town, increasing 
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over the period, were overtaken by Port Elizabeth as early as 1854. In 
terms of the total value of its trade -(i.e. imports and exports combined) , 
Port Elizabeth had clearly overtaken Cape Town by 1860. (102) Visiting 
shipping also increased, with Cape Town outstripping Port Elizabeth during 
the entire period. (103) These aspects are tabulated below. 





£ 52 412 
1840 
£1 371 582 
£1011916 
£ 88 665 
£ 70 376 
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Imports Cape Town 
1845 1850 
£783 059 £912 343 
Exports Cape Town 
£331 142 £339 942 
Imports Port Elizabeth 
£201 485 £354 749 
Exports Port Elizabeth 






£1 450 322 £1 506 638 
£ 704 243 £ 692 954 
£1 043 575 £1 147 342 
£ 947 419 £1 309 389 
749 607 610? 
757 582 617? 
141 155 149? 
133 146 148 
(Sources: Cepe of Good Hope[Stue8ooks)1838- 1855; A/meMes 1858and 1861; CA. Chamber of Commerce records. Minutes 1861-. CCJ/1/1/1/1) 
The general economic expansion, outlined here, steadily increased the 
scope of commercial activity. And it was largely on the basis of the amal-
gam of this commercial w~alth, their joint stock, literally speaking, that 
Cape Town companies and banks were formed. As Fairbairn had remarked ear-
lier on joint-stock companies: 
They are called into being chiefly where the attainment of the object 
in view requir~s mare capital than any Individual is able to command, 
or willing to apply to the same purpose. This method of combining the 
capital and enterprise of large numbers of persons, and directing 
them to one object, is peculiarly requisite in countries where the 
whole MONEY CAPITAL of the Community is small compared with the means 
of profitable employment;~ or where it so equally diffused that there 
are few large holders of such capital; or where the large holders, 
from habit, or from hatred of trouble and risk, limit their opera-
tions exclusively to loans on first class securities. (104> 
Here Fairbairn was echoing an opinion of one of his European con-
temporaries, Karl Marx, who described the formation of joint-stock com-
panies as involving a "tremendOLIS e:-:pansion in the scale of prod.uction, 
and enterprises which would be impossible for individual capitals." (105) 
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That joint merchant wealth lay behind company formation in Cape Town is 
illustrated by the predominance of merchants' names (and their assOciates) 
as directors and shareholders in the various local companies established 
in Cape Town and by the appearance of the same names at different times in 
more than one company. This was revealed time and time again in the course 
of discussion of this and previous chapters. <106) 
A new factor in the Cape's capital gro~th during the period under con-
sideration was the stimulatory effect of the companies themselves, arising 
out of the very nature of their -business. Being chiefly. credit and finance 
houses banks, trust and insurance companies - their business was to 
lend out their accumulated funds on mortgage to the urban and rural 
<mainly white> propertied classes, situated chiefly in Cape Town, but ~x­
tending also to the rural areas and including even the Eastern Province. 
Such institutions lent money, inter alia, to the commercial bourgeoisie, 
directly promoting trade, or they lent money to the farmers, promoting the 
growth of agriculture and indirectly stimulating trade. However, the very 
limited scale of operation of Cape banks and companies, when compared to' 
the British-floated companies, has already been indicated. and serves to 
underline the fact that econcimic growth and resultant capital concentra-
tion, though rapid and unprecedented in this period, was still relatively 
restricted. 
The credit infrastructure at the Cape had not only grown by the middle 
decades of the century, but had become more evenly dispersed, extending 
into the rural areas. Country banking rapidly increased and Cape Town com-
panies' agents proliferated in the rural areas, in both the Western and 
the Eastern Cape. From a single district bank in the Western Province in 
the year 1849, viz. Paarl 's Western Province Bank, the number had in-
creased to eight by 1860. In the Eastern Province over the same period the 
number of banks had multiplied from three to ten, spreading away from 
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Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth to include such towns such as Graaff-
Reinet, Cradock and Queenstown. (107) From 1860 the establishment of 
branch institutions began, as for example the Board of Executors. (108> 
Cape Town companies had early on employed country agents. In 1845 De Pro-
tecteur advertised its'agents in areas including Koeberg, Paarl, Stellen-
bosch, Swellendam, George, and stretching as far as Graaff-Reinet and 
Uitenhage. The South African Fire & Life Assurance Co. in the same year 
had agents in Malmesbury, George and elsewhere, in a similar pattern to 
Protecteur. In 1860 the Equitable Fire Assurance & Trust Co., the Mutual 
and the Commercial Marine & Fire Assurance Co. also advertised their 
agents throughout the Western and Eastern Province. (109) A few of these 
agents were employed by more than one company. An interesting illustration 
is the already-mentioned Swellendam house of Barry & Nephews, which served 
as agents f.or at 1 east three companies. ( 110) 
3.8.1 Wool as a source of merchant wealth 
By focusing here on wool farming and its associated trade, it is hoped not 
to create the impression that wool was the sole agricultural commodity 
handled by Cape Town merchants, though it soon became the most valuable 
single item. In 1838 "cn·dinary" !•Jinc was still Cape Tol>'m':.;; most import,:mt 
export, worth £98 550. Wool ranked second, well below wine at £16 555. But 
after 1842 the roles reversed. In 1845 wool totalled £59 688 and wine, 
ranking second, £50 345. In 1855 the value of wool e:·:ports stood at 
£125 847 and "ordinary" wine at £60 207. Blue Books in this period also 
list other commodities exported through Cape Town, the more valuable (i.e. 
totalling over £10 000) including goats, hides, horns, flour, sheep, 
horses, copper ore and guano. (111> That wool was seen by the commercial 
bourgeoisie as the most important commodity, has already been illustrated 
by Fairbairn's treatment of the question in the Advertiser, as well as 
Hamilton Ross's advice to Francis Porter. (112) A discussion of the wool 
t~ade should help to throw light on general mechanisms operating between 
agriculture and trade: 
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Cape Town merchants and traders involved themselves from early on in 
several facets of the wool business from early on. Examples of such ac-
tivities are instructive. During 1835 the London-connected house of Dick-
son, Burnie ~ Co. advertised imported sheep for sale, as did the merchants 
J.B. Ebden, Hamilton Ross and Borradailes, Thompson ~ Pillans in 1835 and 
1836. (113) In 1844, for example, Dickson, Burnie ~ Co. advertised wool 
farms for sale and, rather from the sublime to the ridicL~ous, Hamilton 
Ross advertised on that same day the sale of wool bags. In 1845 Bor-
radaile, Thompson ~ Pillans notified the public of their stock of sheep 
shears and wool bags and two years later A. Chiappini ~ Co. was advertis-
ing the sale of merino ewes at six months credit. <114) 
The purchase of wool by various Cape Town ~eneral merchants, offering 
liberal advances often on condition that the product be cohsigned to their 
correspondents in London, has already been mentioned. Advertisements along 
these lines were placed by Dunell ~ Stanbridge, Burnie ~ Dickson, Venning, 
Bu~k ~Co., J.B. Ebden, Vander Byl ~Co. and several others. (115) The 
export of wool from Cape Town was handled by general merchants. In 1838 
the Price-Current reported the following cargo exported to London by the 
general merchants/agents, Thomson, Watson~ Co.:- colonial produce con-
sisting of ''165 pipes, 115 half-pipes, 68 quarter pipes and 8 half-aums 
Wine, 7 boxes Dried Fruit, 11 bales Wool, 16,300 Horns, 1725 Hides, 86 
cases Aloes, 51 cases Gum, 8 bags A~gol, 120 bundles Sheepskins, 51 
bundles Goatskins, 1 case ostrich feathers, 17 Elephant teeth and 1 case 
and 2.bags ivory." <116> Besides the early involvement in wool export, the 
notification reveals the enormous variety of local merchandise handled by 
.such exporters. The significance of this wide spread of commodities traded 
and exported by Cape merchants such as Thomsons ~ Watson, and their conse-
quent non-specialization, will be examined later. (117) Some big Cape Town 
merchants also became proprietors of farms. Thus, in 1841 both Fairbairn 
and one of his correspondents reported that, by means of a modern and sue-
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cessful auction sale method, G.W. Prince, the ubiquitous J.R. Thomson and 
H. Watson, inter alia, had purchased considerable property in the Beaufort 
(Beaufort-West] district, in what Fairbairn described as ''the most exten-
sive sale of Land ever effected in this Colony in one day." (118) 
However, of all the Western Cape merchants whose fortunes can almost be 
entirely attributed to wool farming, none stand out as clearly as Barry & 
Nephews. The Barrys' success in establishing a commercial empire in the 
Overberg district has already been discussed. Despite a number of vicis-
situdes, Joseph Barry ensconced himself in the region with the help, no 
doubt, of his wife's Van Reenen family and farming connections, where he 
became advisor and financier to many farmers, winning their confidence, 
handling their estates and even issuing Barry & Nephews pri~ate banknotes. 
The family business promoted superior merino sheep farming by offering 
favourable terms of trade and providing prizes for good quality wool. 
Joseph took shares in sheep farms. For a brief and u~ique period in the 
life of that river, he built up an entrepot on the Breede River. One of 
his ships, the Kadie, became the first steamship to sail up the river. The 
volume of wool sales handled by the Barrys was staggering. Between the 
years 1847 and 1850 the firm purchased more than a million pounds of wool 
and during the ~our~e of 1860 or 1861, in one year, they again purchased 
over one million pounds. <119) It was on the basis of their successful 
wool trade in the Overberg that the Barrys became influential agents of 
Cape Town companies. In 1840, for example, the Barrys were Swellendam rep-
resentatives of the Equitable Fire Assurance & Trust Co. and the Mutual. 
By 1860 they had become Protecteur's agent in Mossel Bay; the Bredasdorp, 
Robertson, Montagu, Riversdale, Ladysmith and Swellendam representatives 
of the Equitable; and the Robertson and Swellendam agents of the Mutual. 
The well-known house of Mosenthal was similarly employed as agents 
primarily in centres, it would seem, of wool farming, just as the case 
with the Barrys. <120> On the basis of their agricultural trading wealth, 
the Barrys became local shareholders in the only two successfully 
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overseas-floated companies of the period - the Cape Town Railway & Do~k 
Co. and the London & South African Bank -.as well as directors of ths Cape 
of Good Hope branch of the British Colonial Life Assurance Co. <121) 
Another aspect of the relationship between Cape Town companies and the 
rural, wool-farming hinterland, in this case the Eastern Cape, was the 
profitable loan of Western Province money to Eastern Province residents on 
first mortgage. This was commented on in 1845 by Fairbairn and by a cor-
respondent to the paper on the same day. From the remarks it is clear that 
the Eastern Province at this time offered favourable markets for surplus 
Western capital funds, such as those of the Mutual, several insuran~e com-
panies and the Savings Bank, funds which in the Western Cape could find 
little unmortgaged property. Three-quarters of the Mutual~s funds, Fair-
bairn admitted, was invested in Eastern Province first mortgages at this 
time. (122) Interesting is the discussion in the Advertiser around 1860, 
during a renewed tightness of money in Cape Town, which revealed that a 
rate of 6/. on fixed deposits was being offered by Eastern Cape banks, 
whereas only 5/. was offered by banks in the Western Province. <123) The 
higher interest rate prevailing in the Eastern Cape, it was believed, con-
tributed to the flow of Western Cape capital to the Eastern Cape region. 
(124) Western Cape capital, therefore, played an important role in the 
Eastern Province in the period before the arrival of the Imperial banks 
and Cape Town merchants provided a variety o·f financial and other ser-
vices. In view of such developments; Kirk has concludSd that Western Cape 
merchants "became financiers and bankers to the first generation of east-
ern Cape sheep farmers." <125) 
3.8.2 Local companies' mortgage capital 
The following section attempts to explore the way in which locally accumu-
lated company funds were lent out via mortgage transactions. C126) The 
records of the Cape of Good Hope Savings Bank, incorporated by special Or-
dinance in 1831 and the first local company to be so incorporated 
. 
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(Ordinance of 8 June 1831), provide interesting data with regard to mer-
chant credit. The bank ca,tered for the small depositor, as the savings 
bank movement overseas generally did. Accordingly, it had at various times 
to cut down on the number and size of deposits because of the limited 
scale. of its operation. <127> The bank's early depositors included 
children of the white middle class; labourers, servants an~ artisans, men 
and women, whb till 1834 were largely slaves or freed slaves; tradesmen 
and craftsmen, many of them slaves and freed men and women before 1834, 
and white apprentices; as well as soldiers. (128) However, the humble sums 
of money accumulated in the coffers of the bank were subsequently lent out 
on mortgage to the propertied citizens of Cap~ Town, who were often mer-
chants. The bank had early set out its preference as regards suitable 
mortgagees. These were listed as follows. Firstly, no loans other than 
those secured on fixed property were to be advanced. Secondly, mortgages 
were to be granted in a precise order of preference: (a) unencumbered 
property secured by a policy of insurance with personal securities; (b) 
ditto without personal securities; (c) ditto without insurance but with 
personal securities; and (d) second or subsequent mortgages in the above 
order. Thirdly, no mortgage exceeding 2/3 of the value of property was to 
be granted. ( 129) 
The mortgage books of the bank makes fascinating reading as merchant upon 
merchant is granted a loan secured on his insured store and premises in 
Cape Town. Between 1831 and 1835, as a sample period, James Hutton, J.C. 
Fleck, T. le Breton ~ E.J. Jerram's brewery business, Willliam Robertson, 
J.T. Buck, William Billingsley, A. Chiappini, G. Twycross, Borradaile, 
Thompson & Pillans, F. Mabille, Maximilian Thalwitzer, Thomas Tennant, 
John Blore, G.W. Prince and Wiilliam"Henry Herron, were granted-mortgages, 
based primarily on their insured store and premises. <130> The emerging 
role of insurance companies is in passing revealed here. 
The source of the capital of the South African Association, another very 
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early Cape Town company, is instructive. <131> .As the name implies, its 
business was mainly.the handling of estates and various trust and agency 
activities connected with this. The Association's origins lay in the dis-
banding in 1833 of the Weeskamer <Orphan Chamber>, whfch in the preceding 
centuries had traditionally handled intestate a~d other estate transac-
tions. As one of the Association's directors stated in th~ first annual 
report, the abolition of the Weeskamer had left a feeling of alienation 
and loss at least ih one section of the population. No doubt the reference 
here was to the Dutch/Afrikaans sector, particularly the rural in-
habitants. < 132) 
The directors, as mentioned earlier, were mainly Dutch/Afrikaans and thus 
suitably placed to attract the custom of the local propertied classes, 
both in town and country. <133) It was accordingly able to collect funds 
which it then offered out on mortgage and it frequently advertised sums 
available in the local newspapers. For instance, in October 1845 it of-
fered £4 500 on loan at interest. <134) Despite copious estate records, 
unfortunately, no mortgage book has as yet been located. However, already 
by 1859 it seems the Association's ability to offer loan captital had 
diminished, for in that year William Porter implied in a passing remark 
that the South African Fire and Life Assurance Co. and the Association 
were unable to be of substantial assistance in providing much needed 
credit. (135) That local banks and finance houses by 1860, had proved 
generally inadequate as a source of credit is confirmed in the following 
section. 
3.9 Credit and lack of local capital 
It would be logical to presume that banks at the Cape became an important 
~ource of local credit, though no re~ords of these earlY banks survive. 
But, if local merchant and banking capital dependent on agriculture and 
trade, was a sou~ce of merchant credit, it was clearly insufficient by 
1860. <136) In 1862 the London Standard remarked: "The local banks though 
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enjoying large connections cannot afford a due proportion of the required 
facilities ••• the trade of the Colonies in South Africa and its steady in-
crease warrants the Directors [of the Standard Bank] in assuming that 
their project will receive a fair amount of support ••• '' (137) 
A related issue, concerni~g the dangers of too great and too lengthy 
credit, in the form of bills of exchange and promissory notes, was 
presented early on in the 'Advertiser, as a problem endemic to the Cape. 
(138) Dubow declares that ''No single factor accounting for the the 1860~ 
depression was touted around more by the Graaff-Reinet Herald, than the 
'evils of long credit'." (139) An editorial in the Advertiser in late 1860 
confirmed the evils of indiscriminate credit, during a period which, since 
Apri 1 1859, had been characterized in fact by a tightness of money. ( 140) 
It stated: "There are nevertheless, one or two evils attending our commer-
cial system here which may seriously affect our progress if they be not 
checked. One of these is the length of credit given in point of time; and 
another is the indiscriminate extent of the credit. The experience of all 
large trading communities has shown that the shorter the terms of credit 
the more prosperous the bu~iness ••. Long credits tend to overtrading ••• 
Country customers, in a colony like this where intercommunication is so 
slow and goods take so long to reach their destination, naturally need 
longer accomodation ••• The:extent of credit- the amount- is a still more 
serious evil." For this evil, the editor went on to blame a certain group 
of speculative semi-merchants/semi-traders, resident in provincial towns. 
( 141> 
That such opinions were often a reflection of specific cas•s of unsound, 
speculative credit, rather than a concern with a generally prevailing 
credit excess, was confirm~d by the same editor. He echoed the clamour for 
a solution to the tightnes~ of money being experienced in Cape Town during 
1859/1860, at the very same time as he was lamenting indiscriminate 
credit. "But the question really at issue is this - is there a sufficient 
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supply of money to accomodate men engaged in legitimate trade? •.• For an 
answer to the question we have propounded we may safely appeal to the mer-
cantile community at large, and we know their almost unanimous answer 
would be that the Cape Town Banks cannot, at this moment afford nearly the 
e>: ten'!: of accommodati oil r·equi red by their customers, and their customers, 
from the legitimacy of their transactions and soundness of their credit, 
have a right to e:·:pect." <142> 
With Cape Town banks faced by a shortage of loan funds, unwilling to bor-
row by offering a higher than 6% interest on fixed deposits, like the 
Eastern Province banks, and unprepared to iss~e fresh shares to raise cap-
ital, the Advertiser's editor looked hopefully to the impending arrival of 
the new imperial bank. "A bank, too, thus connected with the mother COLtn-
try will have greater facilities for keeping up an adequate supply of 
specie than a merely 1 ocal one." The sentiment was echoed by the Commer--
cial E>:change. (143} This 1-'lelcome given the new banking accommodationin 
Cape Town as late as 1862 <144>, contrasts with the claimed surfeit of 
~apital in the wake of the arrival of the Imperial banks, as a reason for 
the recession culminating in the mid-1860s. This, however, may be due to 
the fact that the ~urfeit was a later development experienced in the cycle 
of commercial crisis. (145) 
While an in-depth examination of the 1860s recession is beyond the scope 
of this study, it is important to assess the role of credit which features 
largely in any discussion of commercial crisis and which proved a struc-
tural requisite of the wool trade, particularly, as well as a general 
basis for the colony's trade. <146) Neither the frequent extension of 
credit of a mostly short-term technical nature within the commercial 
system, nor the speculative advance of credit, both described above, can 
be equated with an oversupply of capital. Increased credit is not neces-
sarily a re·fle.ction of an actual increase of prodLtctive capital. Yet, the 
two seem to have been conflated by Dubow in his explanation for the reces-
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sion in the GraaH··-F~einet, district in the e<::~rly 1860s. In so doing the key 
issue, the basic problem of the Cape's undercapitalized economy, has been 
sacrificed for the sake of applying the theory of unequal development and 
the ascribed reactionary role cif merchant capital. Dubow has stated of 
merchant capital: '' But its failure to stimulate sufficient production by 
radically transforming the forces and relation~ of production, resulted in 
a surfeit of capital, in the form of a plethora of (sometimes under-
capitalized) banks, merchants and middlemen.'' (147) The excess of capital 
according to this analysis·led to ove~~o~petition, overextension of credit 
in order to attract custom, and the acceptance of poor wool by the Graaff-
Reinet merchants. (148) A plethora of undercapitalized merchants, mid-
dlemen and banks should not be confused with an excess of real, productive 
capital. And it is above all to an undercapitalization, a lack of produc-
tive capital, that the discussion of company growth up to this point has 
led. More important than blaming one class or sector for the recession is 
coming to grips with the basic underdevelopment of the Cape economy during 
the 19th century, its lack of capital, its inability to enter the world 
market and its own restricted local markets. 
The low level of expdrting and lack of capital discussed by Barnard in re-
lation to the early Australian wool economy during the 20s, 30s and 40s, 
is instructive in an understanding of conditions prevailing at the Cape: 
During the twenties and thirties its [wool marketing] organization in 
the [Australian] colonies had been, by later standards at least, a 
haphazard~ disordered affair. Mbst growers sold their wool to general 
colonial traders who shipped it to business acquaintances in England 
for ~;aJ. e em thf.~i r .. ot-m .:1cc:c1tmt. This me~thgf!. c1f ch sposal was cl ear··J. y 
enough defined. Yet the insignificance of the colonial contribution 
to total raw wool suppli~sl available in England and the consequently 
small interest taken in it by English wool dealers and consumers, and 
thE· E?:-:tE;:nt to t.•'!hi ch it clt?pto::·ndE~c:l on a c;;..:.J.1.onj. al mE;:n:antil e c:c.~fll..m.uni t.y 
t-J h i.f..!::L!:..!.!~.E-. .2 m '" 1 l._,__jJJ..§.2~.J:? .. ~:~!:Jl~.ll!.;;.(:? d ... _ .. 9_0 d _ . ...f..C am g_~g ___ Q:L.. .... l ... SI .. ~.t __ QL .. l..s'L.c;..i ... li.t. i r? .. :i, 
[author's emphasis] together meant that the disposal itself was in-
su·f·ficient and undt?pendable. (149) 
The backward nature of the situation described for Australia during the 
1820s and 1830s finds a resonance at the Cape way beyond those decades, in 
a way that Dubow himself has described for the 1860s. (150) 
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The continuing features of inexperienced, non-specialized exporting and 
marketing at the Cape, where general merchants continued to handle the 
sale of wool~ and the lack of overseas capital directed towards improving 
agr i cul tun:::, ar·e thr·own into r·eJ. i E:.'f by compar~i son with the i mpl~ovemtmts 
that took place in Australia during the second part of the 19th cen~ury. 
Barnard's study of the Australian ~ool industry examines the issue of 
overseas capital and the growth of the Australian wool industry. He 
divides 19th century developments into three phases. Phase One during the 
20s and 30s, already indicated, saw consignment to England by both growers 
and general i mporter:s in 1r1hat Barna1·-d ter·ms a ,·-athE.'I'.. "haphazard" ar--rangE~--· 
ment. Whereas the number of these merchants had grown impressively and the 
beginnings of specialization can be traced to the 1840s, wool exporters 
remained unspecialized, general importers/exporters. Phase Two, from the 
1850s to 1900, saw the growth of specialization. Specialist wool houses 
-ft-om di\tet-se ol~igins were established. <151> "There vJere ·fit-stly those 
which developed, either entirely or as specialized departments, from 
general colonial importing concerns. Others were formed in the colonies 
) 
specifically to engage in some aspect of the wool trade and to them con-
signing was the main, or one o-f the mainl activities. Finally, some com~ 
panies, incorporated in Gr~at Britain, combined wool exporting from the 
colonies with large-scale investment of British capital in the pastoral 
industry as financiers.'' (152) Companies, such as the London & Australian 
Agency Corporation, were formed in the period to provide channels for in-
vestment in Australia of capital raised in England. By the end of the 
1860s local banks too entered as large-scale specialist wool consignment 
age-:~nts and financie,~·s. (15:::;;) Phasr:! Thl~ee, beyond the limits of this 
discussion, was marked by the shi-fting of the locus of wool auctions from 
London to Aus:.tJ-·.:,,lia. (1::'54) 
The striking characteri~tic of the Cape's economy when compar~d to the 
Aus~ralian during the period, outlined above, is (a) the lack of merchant 
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specialization at the Cape (b) the absence till 1861 and the continued in-
significance thereafter, at the Cape, of British capital in forms en-
countered in Australia, viz. mortgage and loan companies established with 
British capital to finance colonial agriculture in the longer term. Thus, 
e>:porters at the Cape r·emai ned general merchants and the main source of 
British capital for Cape agriculture continued to be the Imperial banks, 
rather than agricultural companies. < 155) 
While the crisis at the Cape in the 1860s was prompted by a number of con~ 
junctura! factors, such as d~ought, the collapse of wool prices, etc., the 
structural fact of the economy remained its poor development. Based on a 
developing agriculture, orientated mainly towards the export of raw wool, 
with no manufacture, limited mining, lacking supplies of both locally-
generated capital and imported capital, the prospects for a well-balanced 
economic ~evelopment wera not great. This problem was begun to be ad-
dress§d only during the next century, decades after the mining booms of 
the later'19th century. 
Despite economic and company growth remaining relatively small-scale in 
the period discussed, capitalist ideology and a legislative framewOrk for 
future economic developments were developed and set in operation. The 
emergence of a more politically demanding local bourgeoisie, both 
agricultural and commercial, and the consequent crystallization of a move-
ment for representative government, outlined in ·the the following ehapter, 
can ultimately only be understood against the background of economic 
growth sketched so far. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMMERCE, POLITICAL POWER AND THE ROLE OF JOHN FAIRBAIRN 1840-1839 
4.1 Introduction 
Representative government, introduced in 1854, was a crucial date in the 
growth of local white rule at the Cape. For the first time -various groups 
scattered throughout the colony, were brought together into a central 
arena of parliamentary debate. At this point the commercial bourgeoisie, 
as an already leading sector of the local bourgeoisie, could be expected 
to increase its influence and exert power in ways unavailable up till 
then. In the light of these events, it remains to examine the extent of 
the political role of John Fairbairn in shaping the growth of Cape Town's 
commercial bourgeoisie. 
4.2 Fairbairn as unifier of the colonial bourgeoisie 
Fairbairn's role as reconciler of the English and Dutch/Afrikaans groups 
was evident from the start of the Advertiser. His aspirations for united 
<white) rule during the period of slave emancipation were sketched in 
Chapter Two. Kilpin, historian of the old Cape parliament, has described 
Fairbairn's ~ole in this regard ''as the awakening of ~national conscious-
ness". ''To a faint heart, the prospect of drawing the white races together 
with a view to hastening the introduction of a representative government 
would now have seemed hopelessiy dark, but. by refusing to acknowledge 
defeat, and by striving to further interests which were common to all, he 
managed to secUre a certain amount of unanimity. Patiently feeling his 
way ••• he carefully conducted his great experiment in national evolution.'' 
[author's emphasis] (1) 
It was an orientation constantly discernible in the Advertiser, becoming 
increasingly_ evident in the years preceding the new parliament. Thus in 
1824, befor·e Fairbairn's sole editorial responsibility, the Advertiser had 
made the appeal ''Whatever we are, whether born in the Northern or the 
r 
Southern hemisphere, in England, or in Africa, if we have mad~ Africa our 
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home, and feel a common interest in the prosperity of the Colony, we are 
all Africans.'' (2) In presenting his customary compliments of the season 
at the beginning of 1841, Fairbairn spoke approvingly of what he con-
sidered signs of this growing unity: 
Reconciliation among all classes of the inhabitants to each other, 
and of each class to its particular sphere and duties, has silently 
removed almost the very appearance of disunion; and even class 
complaints, which often remain long after their causes have ceased to 
exist, are now seldom uttered and never listened to. The Master and 
the Servant, the Merchant and the Agriculturalist, the Government and 
the Governed, have become more lenient in their mutual judgements of 
each other's merits, more disposed to bear and forebear, to overlook 
or make allowance for huaman infirmity, and to co-operate sincerely 
in promoting the general welfare. (3) 
In an editorial of 1848, having asserted with utmost honesty that the 
people of European descent, as opposed to the Africans, were ''in the 
widest sense, the ruling class", and that under a representative govern-
ment, it was perfectly clear that both the elettors and the elected would 
be of their body", Fairbairn contrasted this difference with the af-
finities between the English and the Dutch. 
It is certain that the Dutch are considerably the most numerous. By 
far the greatest part of the land and fi>:ed property are in their 
hands, together with the greater part of the moveable property on the 
land. Of the Commerce and active Capital the greater part is in the 
hands of the English. But there is no difference between these two 
classes, in rank, place, or consideration in society. They are all 
engaged in the same pursuits, and meet each other everywhere on a 
footing of perfect equality. They do not stand apart, like the 
European and African, in the characters of rich and poor, capitalists 
and laborers, employers and employed. Their interests are identical, 
and cannot be sep~rated, or opposed to each other, without equal in-
jury to both. By loc•l intermixture, by intermarriages, and by con-
nexions in business, these two classes have, to a great extent, lost 
their original distinctions, and the educated, well-informed and 
well-disposed sink them entirely, without an effort, in the ordinary 
affairs of life. (4) 
In the midst of the constitutional struggle and the growing practical 
unity of action by the colonists that form the subject of this chapter, 
Fairbairn again drew attention to the complementary nature of the two sec-
tions of the ~hite ruling class. He pointed to the unity in contrast of 
the Dutch, who lU~e "their Belgic sires of old" are not easily moved, 
"they seem to move slowly, but they never recede" and "their British 
brethren who infuse enterp~ise and audacity into strength, and hold noth-
ing impossible that does not imply a contradiction in its terms." (5) 
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It was the role of reconciler that prepared Fairbairn for the leading 
position he was to occupy during the prolonged struggle for representative 
government. While his preaching of reconciliation was conducted mainly on 
the level of Engli~h and Dutch unity, objectively, what this amounted to 
was advocacy of middle class white unity, as the most important prerequi-
site for ·fur·tht.•r c:nlnnic:il ('national') pl~og,-·ess. 
4.3 Fairbairn's leading role in the 'popular' fight for self-government 
In the period prec&ding 1854 a small number of represehtatives of a sec-
tion of the commercial bourgeoisie, the merchant elite, as well as leading 
landowners, had been present in the Legislative Council established in 
1834. But these were nominated men and at any one time there were, at the 
most, six unofficial members, the rest nf the Legislative Council and the 
entire Executive Council all being government officials. (6) Though an im-
provement on the 1825 Government Advisory Council, the new Legislative 
Counc i 1 1-'Jas almost instantly viewed by Fairbairn as inadequate and, 1 arge-
ly, the prel'-ogative of an elite. <7> 
The struggle by the colony's middle class to win representative government 
has been documented by sev~ral authors. (8) Fairbairn's biographer, Botha, 
has tt·-aced this histcwy through his subject's singular)y important role in 
the eventual granting of a representative colonial legislature. The com-
bined efforts of Pringle, Fairbairn and Greig in the struggle to establish 
a free press were, in fact, an important stimulus in prompting the arrival 
and course of the Commission of Inquiry in 1823 and in the consequent es-
tablishment of a Council of Advice. ·Fairbairn, himself, continued to 
regard the freedom of the press as the most powerful weapon in the fight 
against colonial gover-nment "dE:•spot.isrn". It hlas:.;! .ho~<'Jever·, in 1826 and the 
period succeeding ~hat his clarion call for self-government became an al-
most constant feature of his editorials. A colonial legislature was there-
Cl.f ter presented in th(e B_gv§ct..i ser a·::; a cure-all ·f o·r most problems, \1\lhether 
135 
economic, social or political. (9) Requests for self-rule by the 
colonists, in the form of petitions and meetings, also began in earnest 
after 1826~ Key events in the unfolding of this struggle included the Com-
mission of Inquiry sent out from Britain (1823); the battle for the 
freedom of the press; the abolition of the Burgher Senate <1828); the 
Charter of Justice with its provision of trial by Jury and a Supreme Court 
(1828>; events leading to the emancipation of the slaves <1834); estab-
lishment of a municipality in Cape Town (1840); and, finally, the crisis 
over the Anti-Convict Agitation <1848-1849). <10) 
In 1841 Fairbairn himself accorded the achievement of trial by jury in 
1828 and a municipality for Cape Town in 1840, as particularly significant 
victories in the process of struggle for self-government. The discipline 
and ~rgariizational experience gained~ he believed, .would be invaluable 
once popular government was granted. (11) These remarks were certainly 
prophetic, for the municipality became the core body and leading institu-
tional force in the fight by the colony's middle class for representative 
government. <12) Indeed, after 1848 Fairbairn merged his own struggles 
with the strivings of this group and, in fact, became one of its leading 
spokesmen. The municipality, composed of local businessmen, urban land-
lofds and professional strata of the middle class, with certain social and 
political connections with agriculture C13), was symbol of Cape Town's 
politically ambitious middle class. The period after 1848 was thus marked 
by an alliance between Fairbairn, wh6 had fought for political self-
expression for the colonial bourgeoisie almost from the day of his ar-
rival, and ambitious represent~tives of the colonial bourgeoisie. 
Representative government developed into the most important issue, if not 
the exclusive one, after the Anti-Convict Agitation of 1848-1849 drew to a 
close. These latter events centred on opposition to the British govern-
ment's shipping in of ticket~of-leave convicts to the Cape. <14) The 
agitation and boycott measures surrounding the arrival of the prison ship, 
Neptune, set the scenario for the first full-scale battle for political 
representation by the colonists. 
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While members of the Cape Town municipality threw their energies into as-
sisting the Anti-Convict Association, the body formed in Cape Town to 
fight the issue, commerce represented a leading organizational force in 
the campaign. (15) The latter's key role was an indication of that sec-
tor's influence in the municipality and, generally, within the increasing-
ly commercial setting of Cape Town. Actions initiated by the commercial 
group took the form of closing of firms on particular days, as well as a 
determined prosecution of boycott policies. Thus, in the Advertiser of 
June 1849, many of the most important local companies advertised their in-
tention not to conduct business with people taking convicts into their 
employ. Included here were the Cape of Good Hope Trust & Assurance Co., 
Mutual, South African Fire & Life Assurance Co., Equitable Assurance & 
Trust Co., Protecteur, Cape of Good Hope Savings Bank, Cape of Good Hope 
Bank, South African Bank, Colonial Bank, Union Bank and the South African 
Association. <16) The pledge not to take into service or do business with 
those who employed convicts was placed in the Commercial Exchange, the 
Town House, banks, insurance offices and other places of business. Com-
panies and firms notified the public of their intention to shut on 4 July 
1849, the day of the very large public meeting attended by over 7 000. 
people and held in front of the Commercial Exchange. (17> As the leading 
organizationa~ figure within the Anti-Convict Association, Fairbairn used 
the pages of his newspaper as a fighting tool to advance the cause of the 
Association. ( 18) 
Support for the efforts of the Anti-Convict As~ociation poured in from 
areas throughout the colony including, significantly, the rural districts. 
The trend of events was reflected in editorials of the Zuid-Afrikaan, the 
traditional champion of the Dutch/Afrikaans middle class with a strong 
orientation to (rural> landed interests in the Western Cape. (19) It 
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r·eported in August 1849: "The laudable e;.,ample set by the capital has been 
speedily followed up, and ere long there will be no town or village in the 
colony, which, besides expressing strong abhorrence of the convict scheme, 
will not also establish its Association for the better enforcement of the 
Pledge, and for the purpose of securely and effectually averting the 
threatened c:al amity." <20) 
The strength of <white) opposition in Cape Town, supported by local 
municipal bodies throughout the colony, finally resulted in the turning 
away of the convict ship, after a protracted and bitter struggle. <21) If 
the Anti-Convict agitation was not actively used by leading middle cl~ss 
representatives, such as the municipality and its champion, John Fair-
bairn, as an issue to exploit the campaign for self-government (22), its 
successful outcome certainly heightened expectations of local par-
liamentary rule. Coupled with the fact of not only inadequate, but in-
c:reasingly unpopular political representation (23>, the period that fol-
lowed was marked by fundamental discontent amongst the colonists. Dis-
satisfaction was. directed firmly ag<:\inst colonial government "despotism" 
and ended.only'with the grant-of representative government. Thus, early in 
1850 Fairbairn announced: 
Yesterday the Anti-Convict Association resolved to wind up its af-
fairs, its job done .•. The inhabitants of Cape Town now return to 
their normal course of thought and action. But do they feel as if 
they were the same men? Has nothing been gained beyond the removal of 
the Npptun§ and the revocation of the Order in Council? These are but 
the visible signs of a spiritual revolution, which enables them 
without anger or fear, with loyalty and self-respect, calmly to take 
their place as equals amongst, and as fellow heirs of Freedom with 
the proudest, mbst enlightened, and the most powerful people on 
earth. So far from injuring their Sovereign, they have added a jewel 
to her crown... Having 1 ean1t the char·actel~ of he1~ South African 
people, Her Majesty will now, it is expected, proceed to bestow upon 
them those i nsti tuti ons which an·= the 1 i fe and str·ength o-f the mother· 
country ..• Her Majesty will 7 therefore, be advised with as little 
delay as possible, to intitute a Representative form of Government in 
this Colony ... The people have demonstrated their ripeness and readi-
ness to discharge all the duties of that generous system of Liberty. 
They have done more. They have shown that nothing less will content 
them, and that against their opinions it is no longer possible to 
govern them at all. <24> 
Fairbairn's overconfidence in an imminent constitutional solution was 
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reflected in the Advertiser some days later when he stated: »If not 
decided already, the Imperial Parliament will most probably in the course 
of the present month, return a satisfactory answer to the question.· The 
people of the Cape must govern the Cape in all departments that are 
strictly colonial. Competent or incompetent they must now enter on the 
serious duty of managing their own affairs - the incompetency and incon-
sistency of the distant and ever-changing dynasties of Downing-street, 
being placed out of the line of argument." <25> 
An immediate result of Fairbairn's leadership of the campaign was his 
growing popularity in the rural areas. This emerged in the columns of the 
Zuid-Afrikaan around the time of the successful conclusion to the strug-
gle. Districts which in the early 1830s had been his most implacable enemy 
when legislation aimed at amelioration of slave conditions was introduced, 
now evinced warm support for him. In 1832 when aM Order-in-Council assign-
ing slave protectors further powers arrived at the Cape, Fairbairn had 
been so disgusted by the illiberal reaction of local farmers <what he 
termed the "Despotism of 50 J<oeberg Boers">, that he for a time withdrew 
support for the campaign for a representative legislature, an issue he had 
in fact from early on committed himself to. (26) He feared for the in-
terests of both the English and the 'coloureds'. (27) Yet 18 years later, 
in February 1850, his former implacable enemies, now in the guise of the 
Malmesbury Anti-Convict Association, were able to address him thus: 
"Language fails us adequately to e>:presss our ·feelings. Suffice it that 
your valuable services will never be forgotten by us. Be it enough that 
the name of John Fairbairn is engrafted in the heart of the simple in-
habitant of Zwartland. Enough! that should our native land and ourselves 
be threatened with degradation <which may God forbid), we will look upon 
you as our faithful Champion with whom we will dare to enter into the con-
test." (28> 
Fairbairn in turn e>:pressed his gratitude to Malmesbury residents in words 
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that confirm the growing friendly relationship between former enemies. He 
replied in a letter likewise published in.the Zuid-Afrikaan: 
With unfeigned humility I beg to return my sincere thanks for the 
kind words in which as Chairman of the Anti-Convict Association you 
are pleased to ex~ress your approbation of my conduct, in the recent 
struggle for the moral, religious and political rights of the people 
of the Cape of Good Hope, now so happily concluded ••. Be pleased to 
accept my most cordial congratulations not only on the victory but on 
the noble spirit evinced by the people qf Malmesbury, to whom along 
with their generous countrymen in every district, under Divine Pro-
vidence that victory is most justly to be ascribed. (29> 
It was at this time too that the residents of Prince Albert acknowledged 
their gratitude to Fairbairn by naming one of the town's streets after 
hi~. (30) 
The period in the wake of the successful conclusion of the Anti-Convict 
campaign gave political expression to the growing 'popular' movement. In 
May 1850, faced with increasing colonial dissatisfaction over the Legisla-
tive Council, the Governor agreed to take 'popular' opinion into account 
in filling the vacant, non-official seats of the Legislative Council. Un-
official 0le• tions were permitted, under the auspices of the 
municipalities and road boards throughout the colony, and nominations for-
warded to the Governor. The Cape Town municipality, which appears to have 
enjoyed considerable support in the rural municipalities, therupbn set out 
to win support for their choice of candidates. The success of their 
campaign was reflected in their choice of men being placed at the head of 
the list of nominations. These were John Fairbairn, F.W. Reitz, C.J. 
Brand, Andries Stockenstr6m and J.H. Wicht. Arising from the nature of 
their election, despite municipal manoeuvring, the group thus elected came 
to be known as the Popul~r members or the Popular Party. However, in se-
lecting from amongst the five top vote scorers, the Executive Council 
chose to replace the popular nomination of Wicht by their own choice of 
Robert Godlonton, Grahamstown newspaper editor. <31> 
The participation of the Popular members in the Legislative Council was 
shortlived. Two weeks after Joining, on 20 September 1850, the new members 
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resigned over the issue of matters to be debated by the Council. They had 
insisted that debates be restricted to the vital discussion of the impend-
ing constitution, along the lines of a constituent assembly; other·matters 
could await the future elected government. However, their position in the 
Counc i 1 had been untenable from. the start as the two nominated unoff i.ci al 
Eastern Province members, Cock and Godlonton, sided consistently with the 
officials, resulting in an almost constant division of 7:4 in favour of 
the government. <32) In vew of such tensions, the Popular Party's resigna-
tion was inevitable. 
SLtpport for the actions of the Popular Party by ratepayers and property 
owners flowed in from all parts of the country. The Zuid-Afrikaan 
reported: "It is not without some satisfaction that we perceive the promp-
titude with which some of the country townships have already followed the 
example which has been set them by the Municipal body of this Metropolis, 
in recording their cordial approbation of the steps taken by the late un-
official members of the Legislative Council.'' (33) And in the next m6nth: 
"The arrival o·f each post increases the number of Country Municipalities, 
who have approved the conduct of the four unofficial Members of the late 
Council and recorded their entire concurrence in the Draft Constitution 
framed by .thes~ Gentlemen, as the only one which they consider adapted for 
the future Government of this Colony." (34> 
In October, Fairbairn, later joined by Stockenstr~m, proceeded to London, 
armed with the Popular Party's draft constitutional recommendations, 
entitled the Sixteen Articles. (35> On Fairbairn's departure, a great 
groundswell of support for him was again evident in the Zuid-Afrikaan, 
which described the event as "Such a display of pLtbl i c feeling and 
sympathy we have never witnessed before." <36) Yet, despite being warmly 
welcomed by the Colonial Reform Society <British MP Sir Charles AQderley 
in particular> and gaining some access to the British parliament, the 
Fairbairn/Stockenstr~m deputation was generally cold shouldered by the 
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Colonial Office. (37> On Fairbairn's return to Cape Town, therefore, his 
pivotal role in the fight for constitutional reform continued in the form 
of editorials, meetings and discussions, during the much delayed progress 
~f the constitutional issue. 
The constitution eventually granted to the Cape by the Imperial 
authorities in 1853 differed from the Sixteen Articles, particularly in 
respect of the lower qualification for Legislative Council members recom-
mended in the Popular Party document. Yet, they were similar enough in 
terms of the low franchise - both versions ultimately o~ing mUch to the 
spirit of William Porter's original draft of 1848, as well as to debates 
generated during 1850 in the Legislative Council when the Popular Party 
was briefly present - for Fairbairn, on first learning the details of the 
new constitution, to grab the honours on behalf of his group and state· 
triumphantly: '' ••• the petition of the Colonists in favour of the 'SIXTEEN 
ARTICLES of 1850' have been very graciously fulfilled.'' (38) 
Summing up his role in the achievement of parliamentary government, Fair-
bairn's biographer has thus justifiably declared: ''On the constitutional 
front Fairbairn was the leading champion of attaining representative 
government .•• '' (39) He was until 1854 kingpin in almost every issue con-
nected with the reform of colonial government and, according to a con-
temporary of Fairbairn, R. W. Murray, '' ••• he had done a work of a 
lifetime before the first parliament was convened ••• '' (40) Though sub-
sequently he failed by a narrow margin to be elected Speaker in the new 
parliament, he was initially regarded as unofficial leader of the House, 
making his most important contribution ther~after in the field of par-
liamentary procedures and serving on numerous select committees. (41) 
But Fairbairn's role as 'popular' leader after 1848 marked a change in his 
relationships which was to stamp its character on his future political 
role. The alteration first became apparent in the wake of the Anti~Convict 
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Agitation in his growing reconciliation and co-operation with Western Cape 
country residents, mainly farmers. His subjective wish to reconcile and 
unify the Engli~h and Dutch/Afrikaans sectors of the colonial bourgeoisie 
was only a partial factor in explaining the reasons for such an altera-
tion. The change was symptomatic also of a wider phenomenon in the Western 
Cape, an immediate result of the demands of a united struggle for local 
autonomy, in which traditional antagonisms between the English and Dutch 
in the Western Cape were temporarily broken down. Yet, in the process of 
achievement of representative government, new class alignments were gener-
ated. On the one hand, divisions within the commercial bourgeoisie were 
thrown up, in which one sector attempted to place obstacles in the way of 
'popular' fight for self-government. On the other hand, an alignment be-
tween the commercial and farming bourgeoisie was created which, while a 
refl~ction of the demands of a united struggle, was in turM to mould the 
course of the new parliament. 
4.4 Class alignment and the franchise issue 
Merchant capital in this study is understood to cover a variety of strict-
ly commercial (exchange) interests - including wholesaling and 
wholesa~ing-retailing - as well as money-dealing, whose objectives cannot 
be simply reduced to mirroring or neatly interlocking with those of 
British imperialism and/or an import-export capital ~etwork. The local 
base of such a commercial bourgeoiSie, as mirrored by Fairbairn, has been 
explored in earlier chapters and will be further examined in this chapter. 
(42) 
Significant sections of the Cape commercial bourgeoisis were locally 
based, i.e~ their livelihood arose out of trade, based on local produc-
tion, particularly with the progressive blurring between the wholesale and 
retail trade during the course of the century. (43) Precisely because of 
this, their position cannot be reduced to an external group exploiting all 
classes in the colony, including the farmers, as suggested by an analysis 
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of Graaff-Reinet wool farmers and merchants during this period. <44> When 
Mar>: said: "Commercial capital, when it holds a dominant position, is thus 
in all cases a system of plunder'', he was asserting this within the con~ 
text of overseas colonial trade, and within the context of the exploita-
tion by commerce of societies whose production was orientated towards sub-
sistence. (45) Kay has also stated the distinction quite clearly. He says: 
"Or to put it in another way: in capitalist society no fundamental con-
tradiction exists between the sphere of circulation and the sphere of pro-
duction because both are under the control of the same class. In non-
capitalist societies, however, where capital exists in the one sphere but 
not in the other, a contradiction does arise between the spheres and can 
develop into the decisive aspect of their. history." C46) The contradiction 
betw~en a white agricultural sector with no capital and a white commercial 
sector with capital does not hold in the period under di SCLissi on at the 
Cape. Though agriculture even in the Western Cape cannot be regarded as 
fully capitalist, but instead as undergoing a process of capitalization, 
capital nevertheless existed in both sectors of the economy. 
Merchants/traders and farmers, therefore, formed a common dominant ruling 
class, vis a vis the rural proletariat and conquered tribespeople, though 
with obvious areas of conflicting interests and undeniably differing at-
titudes to methods of exploitation. The 1854 constitution formalized, 
precisely, the nature of local colonial rule, viz. the colonial government 
ai~ed by a partnership of the commercial bourgeoisie and the farmers. Yet, 
having said this, in the period pre~eding the grant of self-government, 
conflict within the commercial bourgeoisie was very much in evidence and 
temporarily assumed significant political proportions, while, 
simultaneously, farming and commer~ial interests enjoyed an exceptional 
period of co-operation. 
During the 1820s and 1830s new sections of the commercial bourgeoisie 
deepened and strengthened its local base, in the process revealing 
antagonisms between the old-established, British-connected merchant elite 
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and new local layers. These antagonisms became especially marked after 
1848 when the Anti-Convict Agitation and in its wake, the Popular Party 
brought the more locally-based sectors to the political fore. (47) Sec~ 
tional conflict was evident during the events of the Anti-Convict Agita-
tion in the split which occurred in the ranks of the Anti-Convict Associa-
tion, between the so-called Moderates and Ultras. Among the former, who 
resigned in protest against the decision for total boycott of government 
officials and bodies, were a number of established merchants. These in-
cluded J.D. Ebden, H.E. Rutherfoord, A. McDonald, w. Gadney, T. Ansdell, 
G.W. Prince, and E.J. Jerram, etc., all prominent import-export merchants. 
(48) The further prosecution of boycott policies obviously suited the 
strategy of an aspirant newly-rising sector better than an already estab-
lished group with acknowledged status and existing official ties. 
In the period succeeding the Anti-Convict Agitation when the struggle for 
a representative government became the main and fixed objective of the 
leading represeritatives of the colonists, an opposition conservative 
grouping·emerged, prominently headed by Robert Godlonton, editor of the 
Grat1e:1m 's Town J_ournal. This pro--governmemt gr~oup, str~ongl y Eastern Pro-
vince in character, formed an alliance with officials, in parti~ular 
Montagu, the Colonial Secretary, to fight for a higher franchise. A small 
band of influential Cape Town merchants was also associated with them. The 
group's members were willing to pa~ticipate in such rump Legislative Coun-
cils as the Governor could muster, in the wake of the Popular Party's 
resignation, and placed themsslves in clear opposition to Fairbairn and 
the supporters of the Popular Party. Separatist claims, tu~ninQ largely on 
economic jealousy of the Western Cape and inequalities of administration 
and finance, were highest on the agenda, as f~r as the Eastern Province 
members of the group were concerned. (49) But common to both was the self-
interest of the English element which, being the wealthiest section and a 
minority, obviously felt threatr,med at the enfranchisement of the poorer·-
majority (Outch/Afrikaans) and the decrease of the official element. The 
latter was regarded as a form of protection in view of the balance of 
forces existing between the English and DLitch/Afri kaans. (50) 
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In May 1850 a Cape Town petition was submitted to the municipality re-
questing postponement of the ballot for members of the Legislative Coun-
cil, claiming indecent haste in the whole affair. It was signed by anum-
ber of prominent merchants, including E. Christian, T. Ansdell, the Chiap-
pini brothers, G.W. Prince, J. King, R.W. Eaton, G. Thomp~on and W. Bil-
lingsley. (51) Late in 1850 several merchants again petitioned the 
Governor, this time to raise the electoral franchise for the Legislative 
Council from £25 to £500. Signatories on the occassion were, inter alia, 
J. Stein, J.D. Thomson, E. Christian, A. McDonald, T. Ansdell, E.J. Jer-
ram;.J. King, G.W. Prince and the Chiappini brothers. (52) After the 
resignation of the Popular Party, participants in the rump <nominated) 
Legislative Council in 1851 had amongst their number the Cape Town mer-
chants, C. Arckoll, E. Christian and retired businessman, William Hawkins; 
while R.W. Eaton, a leading Cape Town merchant, has been mentioned as 
sponsor for the Conservative group's newspaper, the Cape Monitor. (53) 
Clearly, then, as Warr~n has indicated, this same conservative grouping of 
Cape Town merchants appear throughout the period of constitutional strug-
gle. Their fight to make the vote less democratic can only be seen as a 
reflection of their interests which they saw as best protected by the rule 
of the rich, in the strong presence ~f the colonial government. They felt 
nd need to establish support among the majority of poorer white settlers 
engaged mainly in agriculture. They represented in an exclusive way the 
interests of an English-run, overseas-linked commerce. However, the com-
position of the respective groups of merchants at the time of the Anti-
Convict Agitation and the constitutional struggle, does not appear wholly 
identical. (54> It would be difficult to believe that ·men like Ebden and 
Rutherfoord, while certainly objecting to the further boycott measures 
decided on by the Ultras during the Anti-Convict campaign (55>, would be 
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associated with a fight against a low franchise, bearing in mind that just 
a couple of years later they were both successfully elected to the new 
parliament, proudly based on that wide suffrage. The absence of both Ebden 
I 
and Rutherfoord's names as merchant petitioners for a higher franchise is 
there·fore not surprising. (56) 
In the second Parliament of 1859, however, two Cape Town merchants who had 
indeed formed part of the earlier conservative grouping were elected. 
These were J. Stein of Hamilton Ross & Co.~ MLC 1859-1863, 1865-1868 and 
J.D. Thomson of Thomson, Watson & Co., MLA 1859-1861. (57) A group ini-
tially committed to an elitist franchise was absent ~mongst Cape Town MPs 
of the first ,parliament. :The subsequent su~cessful election of men such as 
Stein and Thomson to ·the second Parliament, therefore, represented a 
greater integration of the conservative merchant element into Parliament. 
Their willingness to join was a result perhaps of their softening in at-
titude during the intervening four years. They had recognized what little 
threat the new constitution posed and also experienced the mate~ial fruits 
of self-government, in spite of the low franchise. As Kirk bluntly states: 
"Th~':! me1··chant s, the 'comme1~ci al mi -c:ld 1 e cl a=>~''· , the Grahi::tmstown trad€':!r·s -· 
all received the slice of public credit they hungered for'' from the new 
pe:u'·l iament. (58) 
Warren has attributed the disappearance of sectional antagonisms within 
the commercial bourgeoisie to a d~feat of the m~rchant elite, symbolized 
by the triumph of the law franchise and a so-called healing process begun 
in the wake of the new constitution. (59) Yet, a reporter during those 
years 1 R.W. Murray, placed a quite different emphasis on developments in 
the new parliament. Murray indicated that the electidn of 1859 of the con-
servative merchant sector, in the form of Stein and Thomson, represented a 
defeat for the Popular Party at the hands of. the conservative g~aup. 
Clearly conservative and English-orientated, Murray carefully underlined a 
change in charact.~:?r beh-veen the pari i aments o·f 1f:35·4 and 1859. He noted 
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that the first parliament was dominated by leaders of the Popular Party. 
The merchant elite 
••• had not the shadow of a chance of getting a candidate returned for 
four years, nor ~ould they at the end of that time, but that in 1858 
it was discovered that the Constitution Ordinance had no bribery 
clause, and the merchants on the discovery of that, to them, cheering 
fact, resolved to make a push for it. They had the weal~h, and as 
Cape Town votes were as purchaseable as snoek or rice they in 1858 
succeeded in getting Hr. John Stein, of Hamilton Ross & Co., returned 
to the Legislative Council at the head of the poll, although he was 
reduced to second place by the scrutineers, who were of the Barry 
party. This was followed by the return of Hr. J.D. Thomson, of the 
firm, Thomson, Watson & Co. to the House of Assembly ••• The popular 
party was nowhere from that time. The return of members for Cape Town 
and the Western Province fell completely into the hands of what was 
called the Conservative party, and this was the case in the Eastern 
Province, as the motto of the Easterns had been from the arrival of 
the 1820 Settlers 'Conservative yet Progressive·. <60) 
Murray in fact clarified the issue in his opinion signalling the defeat of 
the Popular Party and the triumph of conservatism, viz. the failure to 
gain responsible government. He stated the ''pith of conservatism from 1854 
was opposition to Responsible Government." (61) A motion for responsible 
government had been fought for by Fairbairn, Molteno and a few others 
during the second year of the first parliament but it had enjoyed little 
support. Even Saul Solomon, a later advocate, was at that time only will-
ing to move for some transitional form of responsible administration. (62) 
Responsible government was ultimately to be introduced only in 1872. Mur-
ray thus traced the beginning of the demise of the Popular Party to its 
defeat on the motion of responsible government, during the early years of 
the Cape parliament. The disappearance of the party in any case shoul~ 
come as no surprise, when one takes into account its formation mainly 
around the single issue of self-government and the franchise. Developments 
in the longer term were therefore more complicated than a mere victory for 
the popular movement and a defeat for the conservatives. The new constitu-
tion was in itself a victory for the Popular Party, as more radical local 
~ower group. It symbolized~ defeat for the conservative merchant elite 
and Eastern Province gentry. But the period almost immediately thereafter 
saw a reversal of fortune. The following years in fact witnessed the dis-
appearance of the Popular Party, the Conservatives' most vocal political 
enemy. Simultaneously, as will be shown, the political alliance between 
commerce and agriculture, represented in the support enjoyed by the 
Popular Party, was replaced by an even looser, unstated electoral truce 
between commerce and agriculture, though with little hint of the former 
popular rhetoric and practice. 
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The reason for the conflict between the group of conservative, narrowly 
British in orientation merchants and the rest of the commercial 
bourgeoisie, concerning the nature of the franchise, was the latter's 
local base within colonial society, its close connections with commerce-
dependent professions (e.g. law and journalism> and its links with the 
other major local ruling class force, viz. the farmers. Such farming con-
tacts took the shape of new political links such as the Popular Party, 
family connections and co-operation in institutions, such as the Cape Town 
municipality where, for instance, th~ farmer Michiel van Breda was 
chairman between 1840 and 1843. (63) 
Growing local politi~al strengths were also the reason for the unity of 
action that emerged ~t this time between commerce and agriculture. The 
shift of the political balance in favour of local commerce and agriculture 
was in turn a reflection of the colony's economic expansion, traced in the 
previous chapter. Economic growth encouraged the commercial bourgeoisie's 
new degree of confidence and fLtrther stimulated its economic ·and politica~ 
ambitions. The importance of a government with a very marked degree of 
local control in both houses of parliament, ensuring local access to 
colonial revenue, lay in the sphere of capital guarantee. Business and 
propertied interests hoped that capital could be secured for public works 
and a local economic infrastructure, if they could gain significant con-
trol of government. (64) Above all, a low franchise was vieWed as a sure 
way of achieving the relative dimunition in power of the English wealthy 
and official element, by the inclusion of larger numbers of the 
Dutch/Afrikaner electorate, urban and especially rural. The aim of many 
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supporters of the low franchise, therefore, was not the liberal incorpora-
tion of 'coloured' voters, though certainly some individuals, like Fair-
bairn, held the non-racial franchise to be an important aspect. There was 
more than a subtle nuance of difference between the campaign for a low 
franchise and a non-racial one. While both amounted in the final analysis 
to the same thing, the emphasis of a man like Fairbairn fell on the more 
liberal aspects of the non-racial element, inherent in a low property 
qualification. (65) He was committed over the years to including the 
'coloured' people, in some form into the parliamentary system. While his 
earlier quoted remarks of 1848 clearly revealed his knowledge of how few 
'coloured' people would be included, he remained p~otective of their in-
terests. (66) He believed the new constitution would secure the rights of 
the 'coloured' classes. In August 1853, against a background of a continu-
ing alarm amongst the 'coloured' people at the impending new parliament, 
rightly seen as marking a more pronounced degree of local landowners' 
power, at the expense of the Queen's protection, Fairbairn tried to soothe 
such fears, declaring; 
The common people, therefore, or, as they are sometimes called here, 
the colored classes, have nothing to fear, but everything to hope 
from the Constitution. The upper classes are not so ignorant of the 
principles of society, as they were in former times. They know that 
their own prosp~cts, their property, wealth, and happiness, are in~ 
separably bound up with the freedom and contentment of.the common 
people ••. In some places, it is said, attempts have been made to 
alarm the colored population, by t~lling the~ that the Constitution 
will remove them from under the Government of the Queen, and subject 
them to a Local Parliament exclusively filled with white men and men 
of property. Let them be assured by those who, they know, were never 
indifferent to their rights, that all who tell them so, are deceivers 
or deceived. 
The Queen, Fairbairn said, would continue to remain sovereign and should 
the white people [be] so blind to their own interests, so foolish, or 
so wicked, as to seek the degradation of their fellow-subjects, the 
Queen would check them in a moment. She retains this power by the 
Constitution; and by granting a Frahchise which includes the colored 
people of every name and origin, She has sufficiently proved her 
determination to exercise it, should it ever be required for their 
protection. That franchise also places in their own hands, the power 
to protect themselves, by giving their votes to men whom they know 
they can trust, and there is no scarcity of such in this Colony. (67) 
Opposed to Fairbairn's viewpoint were thus many supporters of a low fran-
chise, for whom the key question was a franchise low enough to reverse the 
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position of strength of the mainly British elite, in favour of the 
majority of white colonists, the generally less wealthy, mainly Dut~h­
speaki ng sections spread through01..1t the rural areas. ( 68) In this conte:·: t, 
the ,?ui d-Afr!..t.§_~n. sE~em::; to have 1 aid its cards em the table, typifying no 
doubt a more generally held position. It declared that the low franchise 
was a demand of the British government which h~d to be accepted and that,,. 
anyway, it presented little threat from non-white voters. The editor 
stated '' ••• the low qualification has originated with the Gove~nment,-. 
corresponds with the spirit of the Report of the Privy Council, and has 
been copied in the draft of the popul~r members, both from a conviction of 
its being th~? best, MfL.th,g_ ... ?ures:l; ~"'!JQ onlY. way of obviating serious ..QQQ.Q.:: 
§_i tion at home." [authot- 's emphasis] By way of r·ea.s::;urance to r·eade,..·s, hE·~ 
went on to recount how a Javanese had recently been returned as a 
municipal commissioner but being out of his depth and unable to cope, he 
was forced to retire. There would be a similar result, he predicted, if 
such a man was returned as an MP, and this would continue to be the case 
"unt i 1· many years of progressi Vf.·? ci vi 1 i zat i em shall have prepared the 
lower classes of this colony to aspire to the abovementioned distinc-
tions. 11 (69) The lo~\1 fr-anchise, tllere·for·e, was regarded in certain 
quat"·te?n::; as .::1 kind of <:I "bargain 11 ent.::d. 1 i ng CE:~t~ta.i n r"i sks, but ne.~cessar·y 
for· the achieve?mE:mt o·f certain "ot;m affairs" objectives. This.t-Jas 'con-·· 
·firmed by comments in the ZL!i . .9. .. ::::._0..:f._r: .. tL~ill a ·f e~<J Yf-~a.rs later. Di scussi n(~ the 
achievements of the new parliament, tt1e editt..JI~ remad~ed: "A·fteJ~ a little 
jarring and jolting it is to be hoped that all things will fall into their 
right place, and that our Constitution after all will not turn out 'a bad 
bar-q<:lin' ". (70) 
This cynicism was not total and among a number of propertied 
Dutch/Afrikaners there existed a genuine form of liberal sentiment. The 
popular agitation of the period since 1848 had infused the spirits of many 
who for years had seen their privileges and ri~hts eroded in favour oi the 
British element. (71) The overt, arrogant racism of the English Eastern 
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Province gentry and officials towards the Dutch/Afrikaners was particu-
larly evident during the franchise struggle and such attitudes may have 
contributed to the latter's sympathy for some form of liberal solution to 
the colony's problems. <72) Trade and agriculture had been subject to con-
siderable commercializat~on and, with the improvement of education, there 
had been a marked degree of liberalization among middle class 
Dutch/Afrikaners. <73> Du Toit has in fact referred to this period of his-
tory as the Afrikaners' failed liberal moment. <74) F.W. Reitz was there-
fore not alone, in his warm and deeply~felt expression of gratitude 
towards Fairbairn, for having ''prepared the minds of our countrymen for 
the voluntary admission of all classes and races of our mixed community to 
the fullest share in the privileges of freemen.'' (75) For a short while in 
the late 1840s and 1850s there had thus existed a limited 'popular' move-
~ent amongst Dutch/Afrikaners which could both accommodate Fairbairn and 
with which he, in turn, could associate himself, in terms of his objec-
tives of 'national· unity and self-rule. 
Ultimately, however, the grant of the franchise was the result of the Im-
perial authorities' acceptance of the need for such a franchise. In 1853 
the Aberdeen coalition of Whigs and the followers of Peel came to power 
with Newcastle, clearly associated with the Colonial Reformers, appointed 
as Colonial Secretary. After the heightened period of resistance by white, 
'coloured' and Xhosa in the colony, the first step by the new ministry was 
to align the Imperial government with-a new and wider set of col-
laborators, the rising middle class, in order to restore British authority 
at the Cape and inspire or re-inspire loyalty to Her Majesty's government. 
(76) Further outright co-ercion as far as the whites in the colony were 
concerned was impossible and a system of genuine co-option had to be im-
plemented. Possibly, the granting of a low franchise was also recognition 
of the need to win the support of a significant majority of the colonists, 
in order to avert further resistance on two fronts, i.e. both from 
colonists and colonized. 
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The willingness of the British government. to accommodate the demand for 
self-government by the colonists can itself only be understood in the 
light of forces operating in Britain in a period in which the ''industrial 
bourgeoisie forced its entry into the political system with the Reform 
Bill of 1832, and middle-class radicalism achieved a number of significant 
goals in its wake.'' These successes included the implementation of free 
trade, the abolition of mercantilist state controls and colonial reform. 
<77> Kirk has indicated that the men who subscribed to or supported 
colonial reform formed a distinct school with adherents from different 
parties. They adopted differing opinions as to the recommended strength of 
British military forces in the colonies and to the protection afforded 
Britain by ties of commerce alone. (78) But they understood that the 
demand for self-government was not a threat to imperial ties. ''Experiehce 
in Canada taught them that the leaders of the 'commercial middle class' 
need not be feared, that their clamour for a voice in government sprung 
not from democratic republicanism but from anxiety to share in the finan-
cial spoils from running the colony, and that the London money market was 
the only citadel they wished to storm.'' <79> Like the old colonial system 
based on the Navigation Acts and colonial preference, the new one was also 
''designed to provide a framework in which Britain could profit from its 
Empire to greatest advantage." The argument was over the best way to 
maintain the Empire. (80) Thus, fro~ earlier theories of political economy 
"were formed conceptions of empire-building which were both a spur and a 
weapon, and were to serve as an accepted justification of an Empire of 
Free Trade at whose core was the dream that England would be the Workshop 
of the World, the center of a cosmopolitan international economy which 
would constitute the basis of a Pax Britannica.'' <81) It was in the light 
of these developments at home that the Aberdeen coalition could accom-
modate, finalize and sanction the Cape's first constitution and repre-
sentative government. 
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The humanitarian aim of a non-racial franchise to incorporate the small 
nLtmber of propertied 'coloured' voters was not, therefore, the Colonial 
Government's main purpose in a low franchise. As Trapido has stated·: "On 
the contrary, had the interests of the Coloured population been primary, 
then the granting of a legislative assembly wou(d have been delayed." 
"Porter knew", Trapido states, "that the Coloured population would have 
preferred the political institutions to remain unaltered, but if the con-
stitutional changes had to come, then it would support the maintenance of 
the imperial connexion." (82) Moreover, despite the comparatively low 
franchise, the poverty of most 'coloured' voters resulted in a small num-
ber only being eligible tu vote. (83) The British government's primary 
<though not exclusive> aim, therefore, was to win the allegiance of the 
maJority of the white colonists. Porter, the Attorney-General and a key 
figure in the drafting of the Cape constitution, said at that time: either 
the popular element had to be excluded from participation in government or 
they had to be made ''its essential principle, for no middle course will 
work with either comfort to the Government or contentment to the people". 
(84) Nevertheless, the inclusion of 'coloured' voters, arising out of the 
low franchise, had also been given careful thought. The British government 
certainly wished to avoid any constitutional clause which smacked of ra-
cial discrimination. (85) It furthermore calculated on the SLtpport o·f a' 
loyal 'coloured' vote, as is evident from Porter's statement above. Final-
ly, and by no means a negligible consideration in calculations made.by 
colonial government officials, was Khoisan/'coloured' resistance over the 
years, both on the frontier and as recently as 1851 in the Western Cape, 
when an attempt was made at the introduction of a squatters' Ordinance. 
Limited 'coloured' incorporation provided an additional mechanism for 
mending what Trapido has characterized as the breakdown of political con-
sent which had occurred in the preceding period. <86) A complex of factors 
interacting upon each other thus accounted for the structure of the low 
franchise adopted in the Cape's first constitution. <87> 
4.5 Commerce and agriculture in the new parliament: 
~proletarian".crinttol as' the task of. the day 
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The new government inst~lled in 1854 consisted of a Governor and a parlia-
ment of two elected chambers, the Upper House or Legislative Council and 
the Lower House or legislative Assembly. For Legislative Council purposes, 
the colony was divided into two electoral districts, the Western and the 
Eastern Province, returning eight and seven representatives, respectively. 
The Legislative Assembly consisted of 46 members representing constituen-
cies in both provinces. Importantly, a uniform low, adult male franchise 
qualification was adopted for both houses, viz. an occupier of property 
worth £25 and/or annual earnings of £50. Qualification for membership of 
the Assembly was the same as the general electoral franchise qualifica-
tion. Qualification for the Council was set at £2 000 immoveable property, 
unmortgaged or, if mortgaged, a minimum of £4 000 moveable and unmoveable 
proper·ty (over .:md above all just debts). ((3(:3) 
l~is was a representative form of parliamentary gbvernment and not 
responsible government. Under the representative system at the Cape the 
prinicipal officers of the Crown <the Executive) were appointed in Britain 
and not locally elected. They sat in both houses of parliament, spoke, and 
were entitled to move motions and participated in select committees. 
Responsible government introduced at the Cape iM 1872 was different in 
that the principal officers of the Crown were replaced by ministers~ 
elected as MPs and responsible to parliament. C89) 
The House of Assembly of the fir~t parliament was dominated by commerce 
and agriculture. With final results still incomplete, Fairbairn listed the 
members of the Assembly in the following way: ~ercha~ts 9:- Jarvis, Wat-
. son, Wi~gins, Barry, Cock, Thackwray, Meintjes, Molteno, Vorster; 
Capitc:~}._;Lst§. 3 (90):-· Mayna,~c:J, L.nedc.d.'f 7 Ziervogel; fl_gr.:._i_cqJ.tw.:.i~:t..!2. 13:-· 
Duckitt, Darnell, Laws, White, Krog 1 Hartman, Bowker, Stretch, Painter, 
Stf.:~\i~art, Bowker-, CollE•tt, Muller·; b-..:.l~~L§. ::::::-- Dr·.::\nd, Watf=nneyet·-, Hofmey1·-; 
. . 
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Atto1::.:,nies an.Q __ F'ublic; __ N_i,2_!"=-Sl.Cit~s 2:- Fairbr-idgt-:? and De Villiers; Qegui;y 
Sherif f.2. 2:- Gi 1 f i ll.:m ~ Swemmer-; e_uc_t: !_gnee_1:_2 and_Ge~_!._A._qg_[lt§. 3: -·· Bos--
man, Steytler, Pate; E:.hx:~ic_i_§.QS 2:·- Abercrombie, Biccard; Editors a_Q.Q. 
Propri,etors o-f _Nt~W:.~p~per§. ~:;:-··· Fairbairn~ Franklin, Rat.erson; Printer 9nd 
Publi_sher 1:··- Solomon. (91) In this provisional listing, 
merchants/capitalists/auctioneers totalled 15, as opposed to 13 farmers. 
In -addition, amongst the urban professional men, such as lawyers, at-
tornies, editors and publishers were men like Fairbairn with close af-
-filiations to commerce. In numerical terms commerce may just have had the 
edge over agriculture in the Assembly of the first parliament • 
Elected to the legislative Council, Western Division, were H.E. Ruther-
foord, J.B. Ebden~ Joseph Barry and Johan Hendrik Wicht, all four promi-
nent mer-chant~,;. (92) Besides the merch<:mts, the commercial farmers, Fran-
cis William Reitz and Dirk Gy5bert van Breda and the advocate, J. de Wet 
LLD were returned. (93) The eighth member, Henry Thbmas Vigne, has been 
called a Cape Town merchant and elsewhere described as a gentleman farmer 
of the Caledon district. (94) In the Eastern Division, out of the seven 
members, four were merchants from Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth - G. 
Wood, H. Blaine, W.S.G. Metelerkamp and w. Fleming, one a newspaper pub-
lisher - R. Godlonton and two represented landed interests - Sir A. Stock-
enstr8m and G.D. Joubert. (95) According to Marincowitz, commarce was also 
extremely influential in the succeeding parliament. In 1859 the Legisla-
tive Council consisted of eight merchants, five agriculturalists and one 
retired civil servant. In the House of Assembly of the 46 members, 20 were 
merchants/traders/general agents, four newspaper editors and owners, two 
barristers, two physicians, four retired civil servants or private gent-
le~en and 14 agriculturalists. (96) 
Commercial interests were clearly well represented in the first two Cape 
parliaments. The years 1854 to 1859 can arguably be viewed ~s part of the 
period of the heyday of the commercial bourgeiosie's political powe~, in 
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contrast to subsequent developments, nationally and inte~nationally, which 
had led by the 1870s and 1880s to the relative erosion of the merchant 
capital componeht, both within the ruling alliance and in the economy 
generally. (97) Yet, as indicated later, this political power was operable 
only on the basis of an informal agreement with agriculture and dependent 
on the particular circumstances of· the economy and the general political 
climate. (98> Thus, in the run-up to the ·first elections, the Zuid-
Afrikaan's editor found himself able to defend, express conciliatory over-
tures towards, and even praise the merchants, a group to which the paper 
was customarily virulently hostile. In 1854, the editor set about refLiting 
the generalization that very few merchants had an interest in the 
"permanent welfare" of the colony as "Linfair and impolitic", citing the 
crucially su~portive .role played during the earlier period by the body of 
Cape-connected men resident in London and arguing for the necessity in the 
new parliament of men with financial knowledge: "We would think a Legisla-
tive Assembly very incomplete without a few merchants~ because by the na-
ture of their pursuits they are the most competent judges of financial 
questions ••• When a tax is to be imposed, who is more likely to know how 
it will affect the revenue than th~ merchant? ••• Thus it appears that in 
many instances the legislator, though he may be a lawyer and a.politician 
to boot, may be all the better for having a merchant at his elbow.'' (99) 
The reaso~s for this mainly unstated, de facto understanding, were partly 
a heritage of the period of popular agitation during the Anti-Convict 
Agitation and the united struggle by various groups of the colonists in 
their bid for self-government. It can also be understood against the 
scenario of optimism and economic boom which characterized the 1850s. In 
1854 elements of the commercial and agricultural middle class stood with a 
mixture of naive enthusiasm and euphoria on the threshhold of partial 
self-rule. Their actions were infused by an enthusiastic commitment to the 
workings of electoral democracy and the new parliament. At that precise 
moment the need to pull together in order to establish a united, politi-
1~7 
cally strengthened and locally-administered colony, appeared highest on 
the agenda. After years of bitter conflict - signalled by the arrival of 
the British occupationary forces in 1795 - long-held and long-supp~essed 
ambitions for self-rule were about to be realized. The general expansion-
ary nature of the period, traced in earlier chapters, limited endemic ten-
sions between commerce and agriculture around issues such as farmers' pro-
tection and made for reduced competition on scarce sources such as labour 
and credit. 
The situation of the different farming sectors during the period of the 
fi~st parliament each contributed to the spirit of co-operation. During 
the later 1850s Cape wine was presented, albeit temporarily, with very 
favourable market conditio~s because of disease which had struck European 
vineyards. The years 1854 to 1857 marked an especially flourishing period 
in the Cape wine export trade. From 1853 to 1859 wine exports in fact in-
creased tenfold. During that same period export to Britain represented 
some 82% of total wine exports, rising to 91% in 1859. <100) After years 
of struggle to re-establish the wine industry, in the wake of the distress 
caused by the reduction of preferential wine tariffs in 1825 and other 
subsequent difficulties, free trade may not, at that point, have appeared 
the threat and danger it had earlier. In such an economic and political 
climate, therefore, parliamentary manifestos by country MPs, proclaiming 
free trade, could be presented without appearing traitorous of farmers' 
interests. ( 101) 
The period from the 1820s to 1840s had also seen Cape wine merchants and 
producers engaged in a bitter battle over the import of overseas, espe-
cially French, brandy used in the fortification of wines. Whe~eas Cape 
producers wished to foster the expansion of local brandy by restrictions 
on the import of French brandy, wine merchants opposed such measures on 
the grounds of overseas preference for imported French brandy. The attempt 
at a compromise tariff system to satisfy both parties, empowered by an 
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Order-in-Council of 1848, left the merchants relatively disgruntled but, 
for the time being at least, ended the conflict between merchants and 
producers over the issue. (102> Settlement of the dispute and the ihcreas-
ing use of Cape brandy in wine fortification during the later 1850s (103), 
may have further cemented Cape wine farmers' satisfaction during the 
period of the first parliament. 
Wool markets were primarily situated overseas. Wool farm~rs in the Western 
and the Eastern Provinces had no grounds for wishing to curtail free 
trade, as British industry's appetite for raw wool could not be satisfied 
·at this time. (104) The situation of wheat farmers was different but 
nevertheless contribut~d to the situation of relative harmony. Wheat was 
an agricultural staple at the Cape and has been described as the most im-
portant commodity in terms of overall value on the local market. <105> It . . 
was not an export crop. The period 1854 to 1861 was characterized by in-
creasing but uneven growth. (106) Yet, despite the smallness of the local 
market and the apparent significant importations of relatively cheaper 
Australian and USA wheat, which resulted in rapid local price fluctua-
tions, there was little protest by wheat farmers in the period under ex-
amination. (107) 
The circumstances of relative peace between producers and merchants were 
enhanced by the organizational immaturity of farming interests. Farming 
organizations were established only during the 1870s and even then were 
slow to incorporate wheat farmers' demands, continuing to promote the 
well-being of the more influential wine and wool farmers. (108) Nor did 
the Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society, established as far back as 
1831, represent an organization geared towards the exclusive interests of 
farmers. Despite its name and its many activities associated with the 
promotion of wine production, it was not a genuinely farmed-based 
organization. In 1837-1838 a nLtmber of big merchants were in fact commit-
tee members, including C.S. Pillans, A. Chiappini, J.B. Ebden, H. Ross and 
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G. Thompson. Even later on in 1857 the merchants E. Landsberg, c. Manuel, 
J.H. Munnik and E.J. Jerram served on the committee and the only farmer 
that can be identified with any confidence is S.V. van Reenen, a wine 
farmer of Constantia. <109> With such a membership, the society did not 
represent a forum for the e}·:clusi ve interests of· producers. ( 110) "The 
class interests and conflicts of the various types of farmers [which] all 
worked towards the politicization of latent (Afrikaner] ethnic tie~'' in 
the subsequent period (111>, were nowhere apparent during the period ex-
amined here and, if thought of, were probably swept away in the euphoria 
of the mid-1850s. 
Economic factors, together with political enthusiasm for the new constitu-
tion, produced an opti~ism and euphoria which was evident in Fairbairn's 
editorials, as well as the manifestos of candidates standing for the first 
parliament. Thus, in an editorial of May 1853 with news of the constitu-
tion safely arrived in the Cape and preparations for the celebration of 
the Queen's birthday also well under way, Fairbairn launched forth, 
movingly, wi.th an outpouring of joy and relief: 
Thus happily will end a struggle for Liberty, personal, national, and 
civil, which has occupied the thoughts, and tested the sincerity of 
men for the full period usu~lly allotted to a generation. In 1623, 
the full rights of British subjects were for the first time openly 
and formally claimed by and for all British subjects in this Colony. 
< 112> At that ·time it was found that the 1 aw denied them these 
rights. The struggle, therefore, was not agains~ persons,- not 
against Governors, or Magistrates, as such,-not even against abuse of 
authority. The men who began, continued, and some of whom remain to 
see the glorious end of this 'THIRTY YEARS' WAR', had wider views and 
nobler aims. Their purpose was to elevate all classes of the com-
munity to the rank, the dignity, and the responsible position of 
Freedom~ A country may be cultivated; its physical capabilities may 
be wrought up to a high degree of perfection; its outward prosperity 
may appear boundless; but if the people are not free, if all is done 
for them and nothing by them - God does not look down from Heaven on 
a scene more deplorable. In the midst of luxuriant nature, man is the 
only growth that dwindles. Man who was made only a little lower than 
the angels, speaks through life scarcely a little higher than the 
brutes. It was to en~ble the people of this Colony to reali~e their 
natural destiny, that the struggle for freedom was begun in 1823, and 
unflinchingly maintained to its consummation in 'THE CONSTITUTION OF 
1853.. ( 113) 
A declared universal commitment to issues such as the new franchise, free 
trade,· equality and democracy thus was evident in manifestos and state-
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ments of principles by nominated MPs in town and country, during the first 
elections. 
J.B. Ebden was described by his election committee as "a most anxious 
reformer" with a long connection to commerce of the Colony <114>; and How-
son E. Rutherfoord as a merchant of strictest integrity - ''constant defen-
der of public rights and liberties'' who believed in loyalty, reverence 
for the laws, liberty for the people, justice to all irresp~ctive of race, 
class or origin, and in free trade as natural and right. (115) The connec-
tion of Dr Johannes Rudolph Zeederberg with agriculture was stressed by 
his electoral committees in Paarl and Cape Town. His commitment to ''equal 
protection to all, without distinction of Class, Colour or Race as the 
'sine qua non' of a well-ordered state of Society" was underlined, as was 
his support fo~ an ending of monopolies and the freedom of trade, the lat~ 
ter, according to the committees, sanctioned by the most enlightened 
statesmen and financiers of the day. ''In a word Dr. Zeederberg's prin-
ciples are most decidedly liberal", voters were told• <116) The committee 
for the election of O.J. Truter described their candidate as closely con-
nected to agriculture, a supporter of liberal institutions, who believed 
that the rights of every individual and every class of individuals should 
be protected. <117> Fairbairn, in his manifesto to the electors of Swel-
lendam, proclaimed his track record regarding freedom of the press, the 
new constitution and free trade. He blurred the division of interest be-
tween merchants and farmers, stating: ''As some of you are merchants and 
traders, and all of you dealers, buyers and sellers of goods or produce, I 
need not add that we must agree in placing COMMERCE in a state of perfect 
Freedom, - that the Colonist may produce or make what he pleases, carry it 
where he pleases, and sell it to whom he pleases." <118) 
With this kind of unanimity of electoral principles, it is not surprising 
to find the Attorney-General, William Porter and Fairbairn remarking on 
this precise point. Porter commented on the paucity of election speeches 
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at the Cape, which lasted a mere fifteen minutes compared to what he had 
experienced elsewhefe, where a four to five hour speech was the practice. 
(119) Fairbairn stated that the parliamentary candidates tended to· dis-
cuss the same issues, viz. equality, education and public works, etc. He 
explained that debate was necessary to convey candidates' ideas, but its 
absence at that time was perhaps due to the colonists temporarily resting. 
He eNplained that "a·fter every victory there has been a pause; and our 
recent victory being a crowning one, the present stillness is naturally 
most profuound.'' He hoped that the situation would improve during the next 
election when there would be more intelligent debate, the ultimate result 
of self-government. <120). 
This alignment of commerce and agriculture continued in the years after 
1854. Based on this co-operation, parliament, it will be shown, witnessed 
the introduction of reforms and measures in the interest of trade, finance 
and general economic expansion. Yet, co-operation was largely made pos-
sible by the willingess of commerce to amend legislation in favour of 
agriculture, in a sphere acknowleged as most crucial to the latter's in-
terests, viz. the issue of master and servant. The question of farm labour 
was therefore a key factor in the success of the agreement. 
While claiming that commercial interests dominated th~ Cape parliament at 
least up to the 1880s and remained strong thereafter, Marincowitz was 
careful to distinguish between the extent of commerce's commitment to free 
trade on the one hand and free labour on the other. He says: " mer-
chants and traders proved far less resolute in their defence of a 'free 
trade' in labour than in other commodities in which they had more direct 
trading interests.'' <121> And it was precisely the question of increased 
control over farm labour that was seen by agricultural interests, the 
majority of white voters, as the greatest task confronting the new parlia-
ment o·f 1854. 
162 
Ever since the slave emancipation in 1834 there had been attempts to in-
troduce legislation aimed at re-creating harsher control of the rural 
proletariat. Despite the British government's initial hesitation and its 
refusal to sanction the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1839, a more 
draconian form of a Master and Servant Ordinance was finally made part of 
the statute book in 1846. (122) This, however, still did not meet the 
wishes of farmers and dissatisfaction was constantly expressed on that 
count. 
The Zuid-AfrikaaQ continued to act largely as spokesman for the farmers on 
the question of labour, as it had formerly done during emancipation. 
Recognition of its role in this regard was acknowledged in correspondence 
to the editoJ~ whr::m, in 1848, 'An old wine f<:H·mer' de·:Er.:l~ibed the paper "co.s 
an important household article~ ·fc"Jr· evE~J·-y agJ··icuJ.tuJ~aJ.ist". <12:::0 In terms 
of this role an editorial on the subject of farm labour stat~d ex-
C:\sper-atedl y in 1849: "The complaints and gr- i evanc:es ccmti nuaJ.l y el·:pl~essecl 
on that head, are almost innumerable, but redress has hitherto been sought 
in vain ••. All the Council here can do is to call infor-mation, and to 
make proposals and recommendations .•• '' (124) A few days later the editor 
remarked that complaints were coming in from all parts of the country 
about the shortage of labour and that this would continue until some ef-
fort we:1:;; m<:H.1f:? by the ~}OVE'J-nme:·nt. c.w mis~'<icmr.~riE'S to "~:;tem the evil whic::h 
threatens destruction to Agriculture- the mainspring of we~lth.'' (125) On 
the E•Vt::' of thE· nelo'; pal"·J.iarnent. 5 i:Hl ec:litm·ic:IJ. in the l..!:...\j_£1.::~Af..r .. t!:;2l.c:l.f.l reminclt-:~c:l 
its r·eade;·-s of the task of th~= day: "Nm· can 11-H? pretend to c:~nnounce a ne~·l 
tr-uth when we assert that the want of hands is the most urgent want of 
this Colony." (126) 
Not surprisingly, then, pressure for a new Master and Servant law was 
reflected in parliament already in 1854, though legislation was not final-
ized for another two years. During debates in the House of Assembly, in 
July 1854 J.C. Molteno,MLA for Beaufort, expressed disappointment that the 
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government had not brought forward any draft legislation on the subJect: 
"I think if there i·s any one sLtbject which the government ought to have 
been prepared with, it is this. If there is one subject upon which·the 
country generally is looking to Parliament to legislate upon, it is this; 
at least I can speak for my constituents, and I think the other country 
members will answer to the same effect for theirs. <Hear, hear)" <127) 
In 1855, when a law still had not been passed, an editorial in the Zuid-
Afrikaan fumed against the unsatisfactory state of the master and servant 
relationship. There would continue to be ''chafing and bickering between 
the two classe~ for many_a long year to come ••• From the day of emancipa-
tion the colored people have been government pets, and instead of keeping 
the emancipated race in that condition which belongs to it, instead of 
maintaining that subordination, in which a servant must stand to his 
employer, in a well organized society, the interests of the master have 
uniformly been sacrificed to those of the servant ••• '' (128) 
As will be discussed, limited and unsuccessful resistance to some of the 
terms of the Master and Servant Bill by Fairbairn and others contributed 
to its delay till 1856, but its eventual success was beyond doubt. (129> 
With the draf~ of the Master and Servant Bill finally available, the Zuid-
Afrikaan pronounced its satisfaction with the legislation. This success 
was possible, it analysed, only as a result of the grant of self-
government. The editor declared that while "Considerable delays in promul-
gation of improved legislation had been experienced under the nominee 
government", "Bring such reports to a representative Assembly, and they 
are sure to create a sensation~ felt alike in the East and in the West." 
( 130) In 1857 the Zuid-Afrikaan's editor therefore happily summed up his 
view of the achievements of the new parliament: "Making all fair al-
lowances, we have far more reason to be satisfied with our young parlia-
ment .• " <131> 
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In summary, within the context of general optimism and the experience of a 
popular alliance, the farmers' chief demand for increased legislative con-
trol over farm workers was satisfied by the Master and Servant Law of 
1856. Both because farmers as yet faced no big threat of competing labour 
demands from othe~ sectors of the economy (132) and because the 1850s was 
distinctly a period of general economic expansion in the colony, there ex-
isted a material basis for what amounted to an informal pact or temporary 
electoral truce between farming and commerce. 
4.5.1 Company legislation passed by the new parliament 
The parliamentary measures introduced after 1854 in the interest of 
general economic growth and of commerce, in particular, were many and 
varied. Act No. 1 of 1855 passed in the second ~ear of the Cape parliament 
finally removed the last vestiges of mercantilism, putting an end to the 
privileged entry of British goods by the introduction of a uniform rate of 
custom tariffs. (133) Between 1855 and 1859 Acts were passed to improve 
harbours, and roads and establish the first railway, to regulate merchant 
·shipping, payment of bills of exchange, the conduct of sales by auction, 
weights and measures and insolvency rehabilitation. (134) 
The general import of these measures with regard to commerce and indeed 
all aspects of capitalist endeavour is self-evident and, for purposes of 
this study, the details will not be examined. Howeve~, there is a group of 
legislative measures particularly significant for commerce and company 
growth which, being an unexplored topic of considerable interest, will be 
discussed. Important developments took place in the sphere of legally 
defining and improving the structure of joint-stock companies, which by 
then had grown into so regular a feature of commercial life in the colony. 
Advances in legislation, initiated in the period, were to find a 
signficant conclusion in the year 1861. 
Fairbairn had from ea~ly on aired various aspects in regard to the concept 
of a joint-stock company. <135) But, little by way of legislation covering 
the general nature of companies was introduced. Some legislative measures 
indirectly affecting joint-stock companies had, however, been· passed at 
the Cape. In 1843 claims on insolvent par~nership estates had formed a 
special section of Ordinance No. 6 of 1843, For Regulating-the Due Collec-
tion, Administration, and Distributuion of Insolvent Estates within this 
Colony, and in 1846 Ordinance No. 13, For Facilitating Loans to be Raised 
on the Basis of Shares in Joint Stock Companies, was passed. (136) 
In the early period at the Cape most partnership firms, companies and 
banks continued to be formed under simple deeds of settlement drawn up by 
notaries <137), though after 1830 a few joint-stock companies after 1830, 
L 
in an effort to establish a legal corporate character, were constituted at 
the time of formation or subsequently in terms of special Ordinances 
and/or Acts. <138) Such legislation allowed the companies some privileges 
associated with a corporate character, mainly in the form of empowering 
the secretary of the company to sue and be sued in the name of the com-
pany. This obviated the need, for instance, for an outside party to sue 
each shareholder individually in order to obtain redress and, vice versa, 
for each and every shareholder of a company to sue an outside party, both 
of which could be long and impossibly complicated processes, if there were 
several or more shareholders. Among the companies formed by special Or-
dinance were the South African Association for the Administration and 
Settlement of Estates, the Board of Executors and the Cape of Good Hope 
Trust & Assurance Co., all with their headquarters in Cape Town. (139) 
In the period succeeding the first parliament a number of Acts were passed 
in and just after 1859, each again governing individual companies. These 
defined the nature of the company more specifically and often included a 
new provision, that of incorporation with limited liability. Examples are 
Act No. 13 o·f 1859, To Incorporate the Simon's Bay Dock or Patent Slip 
Company; Act No. 31 of 1861, For the Regulation of the Affairs of the 
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General Estate & Orphan Chamber; Act No. 32 o~ 1861, For Incorporating the 
Union Fire & Marine Insurance & Trust Company, and Enabling Them to Sue 
and Be Sued in the Name of Their Secretary; Act No. 33 of 1861, To Incor-
porate the Cape Town and Green Point Tramway Company; Act No. 34 of 1861, 
To Incorporate the Sea Point Water Works Company; and Act No. 35 of 1861, 
To Incorporate the Wynberg Railway Company. Of these Acts No. 31 and 32 
did not include the provision of limited liability. (140> 
Stemming from the provision of limited liability for shareholders was a 
strengthening of the legal, corporate personality, distinct from the in-
dividual partners who in the real world made up the company. The growth of 
legal, corporate identity had a long and troubled history in Britain, 
where severe prejudice against joint-stock comp~nies had set in after the 
company failures following the South Sea Bubble Collapse of 1720. Accor-
dingly, obstacles were placed in the way of joint-stock company formation, 
resulting in ingenious attempts by companies to convert ordinary deeds of 
partnership into documents of incorporation, in an effort to avoid the 
costly and time-consuming business of incorporation by charter .or special 
Act of Parliament. (141) After the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825, slow 
progress was made in the next two decades towards improving the legal 
situation regarding joint-stock companies. (142) It was in the context of 
the Industrial Revolution, in the wake of considerable manufacturing ad-
vance, particularly in the light of the railway mania of the 1840s and 
against the experience of boom and slump in the period, that pressure 
began to build up inexorably f~r legislation to regulate the operation of 
joint-stock companies and govern the related problem of limiting the 
liability of shareholders. (143) 
This was achieved for the first time in the form. of the Joint Stock Com-
panies Act of 1844, which laid down the main principles for the successive 
development of company law. ''The first great requirement, the corporate 
suing capacity of a trading association, had at last been met. The first 
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great modification in the law of partnership had been made." (144> It con-
tained a clear definition of a joint-stock company as opposed to a private 
partnership, as one having more than 25 members or shares transferable 
without the co~sent of all the members. It provided for incorporation 
(with the attendant advantage of to sue and to be sued in fhe name of the 
comp~ny>, by mere registr~tion of the company's deed of association and 
not, as previously, by the time-consuming and expensive resort to charter, 
special Act of Parliament or Letters Patent. <145) The Limited Liability 
Act which followed in 1855, extended the privilege of limited liability to 
registered joint-stock companies, provided certain criteria were ful-
filled. Shareholders' liability was limited to the value of the shares 
bwned. Their personal property was thereby shielded from seizure. (146) 
The 1844 Act was subsequently consolidated in the form of the Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 and these Acts were then repealed by the 
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856, which has been described as the first 
of the modern companies Acts. The latter was subsequently amended and con-
solidated in the Companies Act of 1862. (147) 
At the Cape the process of replacing Roman-Dutch law with English law un-
folded slowly, but nowhere in a more pronounced manner than in the field 
of mercantile and company law, areas left largely untouched by Roman-Dutch 
law, primarily because of the backward nature of commerce and finance in 
the VOC period. Historians of law in South Africa have argued that: 
The process by which English doctrines and principles infiltrated 
into the law of the Cape resembles in many respects the reception of 
Roman law on the continent during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. Some English institutions marched· into our law openly 
along the highway of legislative enactment, to the sound of brass 
bands, of royal commissions and public discussion. Others slipped 
into it quietly and unobtrusively along side-roads and by-paths ••• 
Legislative changes with an orientatation towards English law were 
numerous ••• But it was not, unnaturally, in mercantile law, company 
law and insolvency law that the influence of English law was the 
strongest. Whole statutes were taken over, by reference or by promul-
gation as Cape statutes, from the law of England. (148) 
A precise reflection of this English influence was the passing by the Cape 
parliament in 1861 of the Joint Stock Companies Limited Liabilty Act <Act 
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No. 23 of 1861> and the Special Partnerships Limited Liability Act <Act 
No. 24 of 1861>, based on the English Acts of 1844 and 1855. These were 
the first attempts at the Cape to regulate and define in general terms the 
nature and operation of a Joint-stock company and, by implication rather 
than expressed clearly, to tackle the problem of a legal corporate per-
sonality. (149) The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1861 thus contained a 
definition of a Joint-stock company according to that laid down in the 
English Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and, likewise, provided for a 
mechanism for the registration of companies, thereby alleviating the need 
for incorporation by special Act of parliament. In addition, it guaranteed 
to companies so registered the privilege of limited liability, as in the 
English Act of 1855, to the extent of shares owned. The Special Part-
nerships Limited Liability Act, similarly, extended the privilege of 
limited liability to partnerships as defined under the Act. 
The need for these measures at the Cape was probably first underlined in 
1855 during the aftermath of the Namaqualand copper-mining crash. The boom 
of that same year had seen a mining company mania, with rich and poor from 
all walks of life <traders and merchants included) pooling thei~ resources 
in the hopes of winning overnight riches. Numerous small companies were 
floated and vehicles of all descriptions, packed with passengers, set out 
from Cape Town for the Namaqualand mines. <150) 
In the subsequent crash several important and reputable merchants, as well 
as many private citizens, were declared insolvent. Among the merchants 
were Maximilian Thalwitzer and Home, Eager & Co., while others, such as 
Chiappini & Co., S. Bushell and Broadway and Herman were earlier mentioned 
as being under threat of declaration of insolvency. (151) J.B. Ebden and 
the publisher Saul Solomon, were involved in court cases <152), while a 
number of other trials were conducted in the Supreme Court and Resident 
Magistrat~·s Court. (153) In 1858 E.B. Watermeyer published a collection 
of Supreme Court case rulings, which included some relating to the company 
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issue and which was prominently advertised in the columns of the 
Adv<·?l~ti_ser. ( 154) Indeed, one of UH:~ mining company shareholders involved 
in such a Supreme Court case, Saul Solomon, as MLAfor Cape Town, piloted 
through the Assembly the company legislation of 1861 based on the English 
pattet-n. ( 155) 
The need for limited liability legislation at the Cape was expressed in 
correspondence in 1858. The Cape Town Railway & Dock Company, floated and 
r·egistt"~l~ed in Bl-·itain in 1D~:;~:;, indicated in n lF!ttt.?l' .. to thE' (.)dVt:'r·ti, .. !ii.Q.t:.'s:, 
editor· that doubts t-H?I~e being e>:pr·essed as to whethr?r its Cape 
shareholders, like its English ones, were protected in terms of limited 
liability. The uncertainity was due to the company's Act of incorporation 
being British. No similar protection in law exi~ted locally. Though the 
AttCll~ney····Gene;~al's Clpinion ~·Ji:'!S re"".ssurin(J, undpubtedly, the need to ·fill 
the gap in local legislation was underlined by such fears. (156) 
Promoter of the legislation ih the Assembly was Saul Solomon. One of the 
reasons he gave for introducing the Bill was that companies requesting in-
corporation with limited liability had to go before the British parlia-
ment. ThE· result t-Jas "the:1t the del c.<.y in the r~stc:•.bl i shment o·f the company 
was frequently so great that proposed companies dropped through and noth-
ing ce:1me of them." With the C:tdded secUI'"ity o·f limited liability, thE·~ 
editor of the f!.!::9.~·ts hoped to encourage OV!21~s,:.?as shareholders to 1~ i sk their 
capital in the Cape's poorly developed economy. He declared rather 
optimistically: ''In this country men make money and connections, they 
leave the latter behind them and go home to spend the former; but great 
numbers would leave portions of their wealth to fructify if the risk they 
ran attached only to that wealth. In like m6nner, capitalists at home 
1-'JOUld invest here i·f a limit could be set to their liability." (157) Here 
thr.:~ Arqu§. t-Ja~:; £'~choi n~J C:\ common cnntE~mpori:l.r·y compl c:d nt. It hc:\s been shown 
that against a background of scarce money and recession, the need to at-
tract foreign capital was becoming a frequent lament in contemporary news-
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papers. (158) The Cape's company legislation of 1861 was instrumental in 
the development of South African company law. It is to this early law that 
the creation of the term 'Ltd' <Limited) in company names is owed. (159) 
4.6 Fairbairn·~ change of role as Swellendam MLA 
Developments in the first Cape parliament with regard to a rapprochement 
between commerce and agriculture were reflected in the parliamentary and 
political career of John Fairbairn. The logical outcome of Fairbairn's 
standpoint on reconciliation and unification of the colonial bourgeoisie 
partially mirrored, but was also strengthened by the circumstances of a 
growing alliance between commerce and agricultwre outlined above. Together 
these contributed to an alteration in Fairbairn's relationships. By virtue 
of hi~ identification with the Ultras and his l~adership later of the 
Popular Party in the years preceding and during the first parliament, 
Fai~bairn clearly gained wide support in the Western Cape, including the 
rural, traditionally Dutch/Afrikaans areas. (160) This process found a 
\ 
final for~ of expression in his election in 1854 as MLA for Swellendam. In 
the course of linking his fortunes to such an alliance of town/country and 
English/Dutch, Fairbairn further alienated the support of the English con-
servatives, as well as making enemies of a group of previous supporters, 
viz. members of the merchant elite in Cape Town. (161) Having stepped into 
the areha of 'popular· politics, he alienated ths support. of those groups 
which had campaigned for a high franchise. Murray talks of the falling off 
o~ his support ~t this time (162) but, like the commercial bourgeoisie it-
self, Fairbairn had in fact gained a new ally in Dutch/Afrikaans farming 
interests. 
The year 1854, the cut-off point ~f Fairbairn's biographer, and only ten 
years before his death, was to prove an important juncture in his life and 
political car~er, when a modification of his social and political rela-
tionships became clear. Despite some 30 years of political, constitutipnal 
and economic struggle centred in Cape Town, Fairbairn now aged 60, was 
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elected a representative, not of his metropolitan home seat of Cape Town, 
but of the rural constituency of Swellendam. While the seat, admittedly, 
contained a number of Anglicised Dutch/Afrikaans commercial farmers, in-
cluding the commercial and agricultural empire of the Barry family, Swel-
lendam was not a constituency comparable to Cape Town where enlightened 
Llrban interests dominated. < 163) 
The immediate events surrounding Fairbairn's representation of Swellendam 
and not Cape Town, lay in the latter constitLiency's relative tardiness in 
approaching him. While the Cape Town committee had decided to wait for the 
results of the Upper ~ous~ (Legislative Council) elections, which preceded 
those of the Lower House (Assembly>, before approaching Fairbairn, Swel-
lendam requisitioned him directly. Fairbairn, in expressing gratitude for 
Swellendam's prompt approach, in fact cautioned that the wisest procedure 
would have been to await the results of the Upper House elections, in 
order for possibly defeated candidates, such as Barry and Reitz, to then 
be nominated for the Lower House. (164) Yet, when a Cape Town committee, 
on learning of the Swellendam requisition, approached Fairbairn he refused 
them, pointing out his duty towards Swellendam. Acknowledging the cause 
for Cape Town's delay, Fairbairn explained, perhaps in a somewhat peeved 
and self-righteous tone, his reason for refusing: ''But, naturally, ~nxious 
to secure the services of persons known to them in their public character 
[was Cape Town not anxious enough?J, some of the country constituencies 
presented requisitions at an earlier date, and, amongst the rest, a number 
of the most respectable Electors in the great and important Division of 
Swellendam addressed one to myself, which, being the first, and coming 
from such a quarter, I thought it my duty, as it was my pride and 
pleasure, to accept." ( 165) 
By agreeing to stand for a rural constituency whose electors were 
predomina~tly farmers and who would to an extent expect him to represent 
their specific interests, Fairbairn, cast still in the mould of 'popular' 
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leader, was forced into a new and awkward situation. He had to balance 
both commercial and agricultural interests, in a manner distinct from his 
earlier role and was no longer able to feature as so pure a spokesman for 
commerce, as in the pre-Popular Party era. <166) 
It is important, however, to emphasize that Fairbairn, while promoting the 
general and historic requirements of commerce (as distinct from the land -
including f~ee trade, slave emancipation and company formation), had never 
shown himself representative of the narrow, selfish interests of the com-
mercia! bourgeoisie, particularly not those of the merchant elite. (167) 
Thus in 1826, when wine farmers were considering independent action from 
the wine merchants by themselves taking on the export of wine, Fairbairn 
had SLip ported the farmers, saying: "The objects we have in view are the 
interests of the Colony at large, not that of any class to the. exclusion 
of others." (168) Again, a few years later, while at the same time as 
praising the public spirit of the Commercial Exchange, their efforts in 
the past having been guided by the most liberal sentiments towards the 
Colony at large, Fairbairn cautioned that the Exchange represented only 
one class of the inhabitants and, in the absence of a representative form 
of government, they caul d canst i tLtte some kind of "pernicious" danger -
'' ••• who does not see in so small a body of Merchants & Dealers, a weapon 
and a shield, under which a skilful Governor might defy the disjointed and 
feeble remonstrances o·f the whole population. (169) 
4.6.1 Swellendam·s pressure on Fairbairn re the usury question 
In 1839 Fairbairn had featured as a leading spokesman in the fight against 
restrictions imposed on the rate of interest on bills of exchange and 
promissory notes, known as the Usury 'Law·. (170) He had said in an 
editorial of that year: "As the rate of profit in every country is con-
stantly varying, nothing can be more unjust than to fix the rate of In-
terest by an unvarying law. It deprives the citizen who possesses money, 
of his share in the general prosperity. It treats the man, who by industry 
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and ~conomt_ has accumulated capital , as i-f he ~rJer-e an a.l i en and an enemy 
or a suspected and daMgerous member of the state.'' (171) Ebden, a member 
of the Legislative Council and promoter of the legislation to lift the 
restrictions on the interest rate, described Fairbairn's achievement 
dLuo-i ng that period: 11 The tal en ted editor has 1 aid aside all -fears and e;-:·-
ha.us;ted the s:;ubject. 11 <1.72) 
During 1839 Fairbairn had echoed the call for a transitional period of a 
-few years before implementing the li-fting of the interest restrictions but 
there was no cause for any further delay when, in the late 1850s, the mat-
ter still had not been resolved and the very advent of imperial bank capi-
tal was being postponed because of the int~rest restrictions. <173) Yet, 
when the topic came up for discussion in the Cape parliament during 1856, 
a hint of the sort of new influence on Fairbairn, as MLA for Swellendam, 
was already apparent. In April of that year, during debates in the House 
of Assembly, he remarked on the ''strong feeling in some quarters against 
the repeal of what is called the Usury law'', including the district he 
repn:~sented. (l.7i.J.) 
In 1858 during another attempt to solve the matter in Parliament, he con-
tinued to reflect the pressure of his rural constituency. When Saul 
Solomon, MLA for Cape Town and keen supporter of such a Bill in the new 
parliament, moved the second reading of the Usury Bill Fairbairn agreed 
there should be free trade in money, but, he cautioned: '' ••• a great por-
tion of the country people take a different view of the matter, I have oc-
casion to know, for a great body of my constituency, at Swellendam, I am 
given to understand, say, 'Don't touch that particular thing at present; 
we don't altogether understand it, and we don't want any alteration at 
present. ' 11 F;:d rbai rn therefo;~e e;.:p;~essed thE~ hope that the Bi 11 ~t-JOLil d be 
dropped during that session and taken up by the next parliament, as he 
wished to study the fears and wishes of the country people. (175) In May 
o·f that yea;~ he madE~ an editc•ri.::tl plec::\ for· "considE~I'"C:\tion of past e~rrors", 
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"respect fot- opinions \-'Jhich our la~·Js h<'!lve fosten~d", and tha.t a clause be 
. 
added to the Bill .so that the Act should take effect only two years after 
its promulgation. <176) 
Various Usury Bills on the subject therefore continued to meet with rural 
opposition in the new pa~liament, a reflection of the power wielded by 
agricultural interests in the Assembly and it was only a Supreme Court 
ruling, outside of parliament, on the subject in 1860 which finally 
reversal in Fairbairn's position was not absolute and in 1859 when the 
usury question again came up before the Assembly and the motion was once 
more defeated, Fairbairn introduced a second motion for a modified form bf 
the Bill in the hope of getting partial relief. The lifting of the in-
terest rate restrictions, he admitted, was highly desired by merchants. 
( 178) 
4.6.2 Fairbairn's conflict with Saul Solomon and Cape liberalism 
Did this modification of po~ition on the usury question substantiate the 
accusation made against Fairbairn by Saul Solomon during a heated debate 
in the House of Assembly in 1858? "I am happy to sa.y", decl .=n-ed Saul 
Sol omcm on that occasion, "that thc:1t' hem. gentleman· [Fai ,~bai l'·nJ has 
sufficiently long to recant evey opinion and every principle he has 
1 i ved !1 
em ~ 
held.'' (179) Had Fairbairn repudiated his past convictions and, if so, of 
what relevance was this to Fairbairn's shift of alignment after 1848 and 
to the conflicting interests of commerce and agriculture? 
The events ~hich lay behind Solomon's remark had been unfolding in the 
Orange Free State where the Boer President J.N. Boshof had invaded and oc-
cupied Sotho lands. Solomon's objections to Fairbairn's conduct were two-
fold. In the first instance, two years earlier, when this land dispute was 
already revealed and Solomon had introduced a motion calling on the 
Governor to mediate, Fairbairn had proved to be his chief opponent. Fair-
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bairn now had changed his mind, yet was still against the House taking ac-
tive responsibility-in firmly recommending that the Governor mediate in 
the disput~. Moshesh <Mosheshwe>, Sotho chief and the faithful ally of the 
British government, was refused the supply of gunpowder by Britain and was 
left vulnerable. "Thus", declared Solomon, "we show our -friendly disposi-
tion towards the natives of this continent, who have never done us any 
harm; and~ in fact, have done nothing, except that they have a black face, 
and a country which we want to possess." He gave further indication of his 
differences with Fairbairn in his reference to a statement made earlier by 
Fairbairn, to the effect that the sea coast of a country was the natural 
inheritance of a commerci~l people. He exposed the inherent danger of such 
an argument. If for instance the Boers of the Free State were similarly to 
argue that the agricultural interior was the natural inheritance of an 
agricultural people where, enquired Saul Solomon pertinently, were the 
natives to go? (180) At this time too Fairbairn had come into conflict 
with Saul Solomon over the so-called Kreli expedition, with Fairbairn op-
posing the suggestion of censure against the Governor, Sir George Grey, 
which was evident in Solomon's motion. <181) 
The conflict between Fairbairn and Solomon leads to the relatively unex-
plored question of Fairbairn's liberalism and the related issue of Cape 
liberalism. It has been stated that Cape liberalism is best known for the 
franchise it helped create. According to Trapido, it is viewed by 
apologists as a continuum with all inconsistencies ironed out, while its 
critics, in laying bare its characteristic inconsistencies and contradic-
tions, have ignored the social relationships that underlie it. (182> 
Trapido has described a great and small tradition bf liberalism, largely 
though not exclusively evident at the level of parliamentary politics. He 
has located the great tradition amongst businessmen, missionaries, 
lawyers, newspapermen and administrators. Its constituency base was not an 
overt class-based alliance of merchant and peasant, as developed later in 
the case of the small tradition in the Eastern Province. The forces that 
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underlay the great tradition included, therefore, the influence of 
humanitarianism, commerce, enlightened intellectuals (lawyers and editors, 
etc.), British ideas and methods (i.e. incorporation and adaptation from 
above) on colonial political perceptions, and the practical demands of 
parliamentary alliances at different Junctures, which enabled the further 
propagation of liberal policies. However, that the two were interdependent 
and sometimes reflections o·f one anotht.er·, is also acknotrlledged. <183) 
Bundy's work on the rise and fall of the South African peasantry has 
developed an analysis of the class basis of a liberal tradition in the 
Eastern Cape, situated amongst merchants involved in trade with the 
burgeoning African peasantry during the period 1870-1890. Their opposition 
to peasant expropriation was a material reflection of both their supply of 
consumer goods to, and their purchase of agricultural surpluses from the 
pea::;antry. ( l.BLJ·) The:~ E'!>:pa.nsion o·f the Ee:1e.ten1 Ce:lpe pease:mtry was. in c:on--
trast to the impoverishment of whatever remained of a 'coloured' peasantry 
\ 
in the Western Cape, as mission stations in the second half of the 19th 
century became increasingly unable to ~upport any form of propertied 
peas.::mts;, ( 185) This has. 1 e~d Tr-e:lpi do to state: 
The advanced stage of proletarianization, with the very meagre sur-
pluses produced, meant in addition, that not only was there no group 
of merchants who had an interest in the survival of the peasants, but 
that local traders were contributing to their impoverishment. In ad-
dition to economic conditions being unfavourable to the creation of a 
liberal alliance, there was also the crucial absence of any group 
committed to a liberal ideology. Rather, the dominant, mainly 
Afrikaner, groups in the western part of the Colony were committed to 
a defensive reaction to liberalism in all forms .•• In this context, 
therefore, Afrikaner notables led a movement for the revival and 
creation of those ties which ultimately led to the establishment o{ 
Afrikaner nationalist organisations. (186) 
Remnants of parliamentary liberalism in the Western Cape were therefore 
limited to the rejection of white farmers'candidat~s, in favour of 
missionary-favoured candidates, merchants or sometimes carpetbaggers from 
Cape Town, in those seats where missionary stations still provided sub-
stantial numbers n·f 'coloun?d' voters. (18'7) "Liberalism", Trapido con .. -
eludes, "failed to make:• a b1~idgc::•head in thr::• Cape outside of thE• eastern 
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districts of the colony and the port towns and Kimberley.'' (188) 
Yet, despite the early disappearance of a peasantry in the Western Pro-
vince, it could be argued that it was around the reverse side of the coin 
of a peasantry, viz. the issue of master and servant (and harsh 
proletarianization), that a liberal-merchant nexus, opposed to agricul-
ture, could reveal itself if it emerged at all. In grouping men such as 
Fairbairn and S;:~ul Sol oman ( ~!1§:. MLA for Capt.:? Tov-1n) and sevet-al others as 
part of the great tradition, the important regional contribution to 
liberal politics by the Western Cape, particularly its capital city, Cape 
Town, remains somewhat disguised. (189) The port of Cape Town proved an 
unusually important bridgehead for liberaiism. This was clearly evident in 
the intervention by her commercial interests, including Fairbairn and 
Solomon, in struggles described in the following pages - however unsuc-
cessful they ultimately proved. 
4.6.3 Fairbairn and the Master and Servant Law 
Fairbairn had long campaigned against what he considered superfluous 
legislation in the sphere of the Master and Servant Law and undue inter-
ference in the supply of labour. Throughout the period, in response to 
blood-curdling demands by farmers for increased control of rural workers, 
Fairbairn had vainly maintained that improvements would eventually come 
about if the natural laws of supply and demand were allowed to take their 
At the time the draft Master and Servant.Bill came before the Cape parlia-
ment in 1855 - it was not passed as an Act till 1856 - Fairbairn took ad-
vantage of the oppor-turii ty to r··ef 1 ect on the e;·~ i sting state of tl1e 1 a~-1, in 
an editorial of May 1855. He criticized the legislation in force as con-
sisting of too many chapters and sections. It attempted too much and thus 
gave no satisfaction by extending its terms beyond the relationship of 
master and servant into Spheres governing fellow-subjects. He considered 
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that the source of complaints against the law lay in farmers who resided 
at great distances from magistrates; redress against servants was conse-
quently expensive and troublesome. The problem he said was the nature of 
the countryside and not the master and servant legislation. Converting 
justices of peace to magistrates for this purpose was no solution either, 
he argued rather glibly, because masters too then would be in the hands of 
ignorant justices of peace. Having sketched his recommendations for a 
simplified Bill, he concluded by alluding to.what was probably the crux of 
the problem, viz. the silent resistance of peasants and farm workers to 
further proletarianzation: ''And when the circumstances of the Colony 
render service necessary or essential to subsistence, severe punishments 
will not be required. The Laws of Nature will provid~ a remedy for all 
remediable evils under this head. At prese~t by the law of circumstances 
there is, and will for sometime be, much imperfection on all sides.'' (191> 
Objections by Fairbairn and others to the draft Master and Servant Bill 
were still bei~g raised in the form of various amendments just before the 
Bill was sent to the Council, but these apparently were finally put aside 
in an effort to avoid further delays. The feeling was that any more argu-
ment would prove futile. The opponents of the measure declared that the 
Bill anyway would have no practical success. Fairbairn, for instance, was 
till the last moment protesting at the extent of magisterial jurisdiction 
and also the poor state of the prisons to house offenders. But farmers 
were determined to have the Bill passed, no Opposition was to be borne 
and they were.delighted with its eventual success. (192) 
In 1859 J.C. Silberbauer, a Cap~ Town share broker, general agent, bank 
director and member for Caledon (an,area which included the Genadendal 
Mission), brought up the matter of the 185& Master and Servant Law in the 
Assembly. (193) He asked for ret~rns to show the operation of the law, 
believing it ''to be very oppressive towards a very large class of our 
fellow-s~bjects, n~mely the servants of this colony.'' It was his intentio~ 
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later to introduce a Bill to alleviate the situation. Silberbauer objected 
in particular to oral contracts being binding for one year and less and 
punishment for certain offences being hard labour, and not merely fines, 
which was unfair, he said, to the many hundreds of respectable sevants. 
(194) 
Beau·fort 's .J .• c .. Molteno'; .~llhD shDI.rJed ... himself to be an. arch .. repre-:-..• ,. 
sentative of the landed interests, disputed Silberbauer's objections. 
Molteno claimed that Silberbauer had been bottling up this motion for some 
time and that his objections were already known in advance, as he had been 
airing them to certain classes, i.e. the people of Genadendal. Molteno 
asserted: "I have had an opportunity o·f seeing the ~·Jorking o·f this la~t-1; 
and I must say that it has been most satisfacto~y.'' <195) 
While there is no report of a contribution by Fairbairn an the occasion, 
Saul Salomon intervened to second Silberbauer's motion, disputing the 
statement by the MLA for Worcester, .Munnik, that th~ previous House.had 
passed the Bill with equal attention to both master and servant. Solomon 
remarked: '' ••• my own impression at that time was that this was a most op-
pressive law towards the servant. My impression is the same still; the 
only neutralizing element in the matter is that the law happens to be so 
stringent that it cannot be acted upon, because if the masters attempted 
to act upon it, they lrJClLtld soon havf2 no servants." Solomon described his 
indignation at one particular clause and how, having expressed his objec-
ticns in the House at that time, they were summarily dismissed; he was 
ficulties. <196) 
Objections to the Master and Servant Law by men such as Silberbauer, 
Solomon and to some extent, Fairbairn, therefore serve to highlight the 
source of liberal opposition as a grouping of Cape Town commercial in-
terests. Such a group, by virtue of its position in exchange and net pro-
180 
duction, had little active interest in the harsh proletarianization 
demanded by agriculture, though the corollary that commerce in general 
proved a constant defender of 'free' labour did not follow. (197> Silber-
bauer's commercial interests are clear and both Solomon and Fairbairn 
shared curiously similar occupations. They were both newspaper owners and 
editors <the Argus and Advertiser repectively) with commercial connections 
- Solomon was the owner of a big steam printing and publishing firm and 
both were chairmen/directors of the Mutual. (198) Despite the efforts of 
such men, however, liberal opposition, by Saul Solomon's own admission, 
generally proved weak and unsuccessful. 
4.6.4 Fairbairn and the immigrant Xhosa 
Fairbairn remained strongly opposed to the motion introduced in the House 
of Assembly during 1854 that mission station lands be subdivided (a 
measure to force potential farm labourers into the market>, saying firmly: 
"I am sure that if hon. members believed there was the slightest chance of 
the motion being carried, a number of them would have been already on 
their legs addressing you'': <199) But his statements regarding the im-
migrant Xhosa rang a different note. 
In 1857 a battery of draft legislation was submitted by the Governor to 
parliament. This was aimed at controlling the recent influx into the 
colony of Xhosa tribespeople as a result of the cattle-killing. <200) 
Fairbairn at this time placed himself squarely behind Sir George Grey's 
general aims of expansionism and incorporation, the replacement of chiefs' 
powe1~ by magi stJ~ates and the integration of black and white settlement. 
(201> He remarked approvingly in an editorial of April 1857: "Sir George 
Grey quickly discovered that the root and spring of innumerable evils in 
Caffraria, and what rendered them dangerous and formidable to the Colony, 
lay in the relation which subsisted between the Chiefs and the people, and 
that the power and influence of the Chief, for mischief, rested on their 
position as absolute proprietors of every member of their tribes, and sole 
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administrators of justice ••• The grand characteristic of Sir George Grey's 
policy is unity of design." (202) 
The differing positions of Fairbairn, Solomon and Molteno, regarding the 
terms of the Kafir Employment Bill, are once more instructive in revealing 
the relationship between agricultural and commercial interests in the new 
parliament. During debates in th~ House of Assembly, Molteno called for 
long, compulsory labour contracts for the immigrant Xhosa. He protested 
that the Bill's chief object was ''to assist starving Kafirs"- what, he 
asked, about the needs of the country? He predicted the results as a 
"disgorging of Kafirland" with "roaming l<afirs" everywhere, if strict con-
tracts were not enforced. While Saul Solomon vehemently opposed this un-
Just imposition on starving men - he was in favour of allowing the Xhosa 
to make contracts for as long as they wanted, with the maximum of five 
years - Fairbairn by contrast came to the support of Molteno and other 
country MPs in voicing obJections to the tel-ms of the Bi 11. (203) 
After the Bill, referred to the Legislative Council, was returned to the 
Assembly with amendments introduced in favour of less stringent periods of 
contract, Fairbairn's remarks during the further debate were reported: "He 
[Fairbairn] objected to the introduction of large numbers of people into 
the colony. They would form a savage element in the population, and he 
thought that the armed savage was even less to be dreaded than the 
domestic savage." He agreed with Molteno that there would be no proper 
control. <204) In an editorial o·f the same month, Fairbairn elaborated on 
his parliamentary viewpoint. Discussing the difficulty of the passage of 
the Bill, as a result of the conflicting viewpoints between the two 
Houses, Fairbairn described the immigrant Xhosa as "despisers of labor"; 
their "manners are brutish, their passions violent and irrepressible". He 
said: "For the last hundred years or more, the European has been steadily 
civilizing this portion of Southern Africa, in ways sometimes right, some-
times questionable, or wrong, but the good cause has prevailed over all 
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obstacles, and in spite of all mistakes ••• It is contrary to all prin-
ciple, to all precedent, to all experience to attempt to civilize a savage 
continent by directing the flood of barbarism down upon the single ·spot 
where a feeble civlization has but recently taken root.'' <205) The House 
of Assembly subsequently referred the Bill back to the Legislative Council 
in its original form. The Council then agreed to some of the amendments 
(though not all), in an attem~ to satisfy the Lower House. Throughout the 
passage of the Bill, it was vainly and valiantly opposed by a handfLtl of 
Assembly men, in particular Saul Solomon. (206) 
The Zuid-Afrikaan meanwhile continued to reflect the interests of farmers, 
keeping up a barrage of editorial condemnation against the threatend inva-
sion, ranting that ''every mountain and kloof [would beJ infested with 
prowling savages". (207) It warned against the constitutional dangers of 
granting land to such men: ''If you allow such people to become 
proprietors, you cannot withhold from them that measure of political power 
which belongs to the elective franchise ••• '' (208) 
In this way commercial and agricultural i.nterests both in and outside par-
liament ranged themselves around the issue of the accelerated 
proletarianization of the African people. Greenberg has stated that: 
''Racial domination [in South Africa] is rooted in the precapitalist coun-
tryside. Long before there were businessmen demanding controls on subor-
dinate labor or trade unions constructing racial job barriers, there were 
dominant landowners and farmers.'' <209) This may be regarded as something 
of an overstatement. Racial discrimination as evolved by mining capital, 
for instance, proved a decisive factor in the shaping and in-
stitutionalization of racism. Yet, it underlines the key role played by 
farmers in entrenching and widening the exploitation of the subject 
peoples of South Africa, and in keeping alive the tradition of Cape racial 
discrimination. 
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It has been shown that commerce in Cape Town, in the shape of Saul Solomon 
and others, proved too weak to mount any substantial resistance to the 
Kafir Employment Bill and, in Fairbairn's case, there appeared a new ele-
ment of fear in 1857 - absent entirely from a Saul Solomon. Fairbairn in a 
way admitted to his differing attitude, stating that ''The taffers come to 
conquerors whom they naturally hate.'' In the case of the Mfengu, their ad-
mission had been accompanied by submission. (210) The Xhosa this time were 
"foreigners and barbarians who cannot forget that they were till recently, 
an independent people, subject to little control. •• " (211> 
4.7 Fairbairn's liberalism over the whole period 
Looking at Fairbairn's position on the question of accelerated 
proletarianization, described above, had he fundamentally changed his 
position since his early crusading days during the 1820s and the 1830s? 
Had he lived long enough to recant evey principle he had once held, as 
Solomon accused him of? 
Fairbairn's early editorials frequently concerned his fight, together with 
the London Missionary Society and in opposition to·both Eastern Province 
opinion and Western Cape farme~s, for protection of the mission in-
habitants in the Kat River settlement, Hankey, Bethelsdorp and elsewhere. 
His editorials also gave expression to his c~paign for a fairer and 
·systematic treaty system with the chiefs in the Eastern Cape, at times 
even advocating the return of lands unjustly expropriated. (212) Fair-
bairn's actions then had elicited extreme anger, resulting in libel suits 
and a boycott of his newspaper. The height of his unpopularity in the 
Western Cape was during his defence of the cause of slave emancipation. 
Yet, des~ite these early actions and campaigns and the liberal reputation 
Fairbairn gained as a result, there was probably no fundamental reversal 
of his position regarding the indigenous people of South Africa, as 
Solomon's accusation seemed to imply. 
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Throughout his life, the premise on which he based his attitude towards 
the African people was that of the unquestionable rights and privileges of 
civilization over savagery. Many a justification and refuge for ex~ 
pansionism, expropriation and destruction were found precisely in this at-
titude. In 1841 he spoke of the rights of the Cape colonists as Christians 
and Europeans to representative government, as opposed, for example, to 
the people of India, who were heathens. "In this Colony, we have been duly 
prepared for the e>:ercise and enjoyment of this form of Liberty. Not only 
as Europeans, but as Christians, the Idea o·f Representation is herfclitary 
amongst us." (213> 
In an editorial of 1844 he summarized with approval the recent writings of 
a Mr Macqueen in Blackwood's Magazine, who had reasoned that it was from 
temperate and healthy bases that civilization spread towards the heart of 
the central regions of Africa. Discussing this with regard to Natal, Fair-
bairn remarked, ''British and Christian laws, British capital, and British 
enterprize, would speedily penetrate with life-giving power, would exhibit 
one of the greatest triumphs achieved over the evil genius of Africa." 
(214) Fairbairn, in fact, entertained great concern for the weakness of 
so-called civilization at the Cape to survive "the evil genius of Africa". 
<215) In 1841 he remar~~ed: "The popLtlation of new colonies require con-
stant supporters of population from abroad to keep it from sinking. 
Savagery there is constantly dragging the civilized man back towards the 
natural state of the savage.'' <216> Ten years later he stated in the same 
vein: "The strength of the Colony is on its coast, and some hundred, or 
say two hundred miles from it;- its coast and bays, that is, its sea line, 
is the basis of its power. At every step northwards you become weaker, and 
the repellin~ genius of Africa becomes stronger.'' <217> 
Yet, in presenting this basic assertion of the rights of so-called civi-
lization, Fairbairn frequently balanced this with appeals for humanity and 
Justice. In his review of the year 1846, he acknowledged the heavy losses 
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and ruination recently suffered by the frontier farmers but cautioned that 
cruelty was a bad policy, even in a system of military occupation;' 
savages' should not be met with their own weapons; and ''the i~pati~nt and 
retributive ferocity of an exasperated army is not a fitting instrument to 
conciliate the affections of the natives, or consolidate the settlements 
of the strangers.'' (218) With the expropriation of Namaqualand as a result 
of the mineral discoveries there, his balancing act was again pLtt to the 
test.· Reporting on the Surveyor-General's <Bell> investigations of Nama-
qualand, Fairbairn said of its people: 
Their habits are consequently unsettled, their numbers small, and 
their civilization low. They are still men, notwithstanding, and re-
quire as such humane and just treatment by the Government •.. The ab-
stract question of right has never been settled by argument. It has 
often been settled by time, that great resolver of knotty points be-
tween the weak and the strong. This country will be ransacked by 
European enterprise [author's emphasis -surely a contradiction in 
termsJ, and the wandering native must submit and accommodate himself 
to new and higher modes of life, or perish. We believe his extermina-
tion is not inevitable, and that just and humane Government has in 
its power, not only to save him, but to ameliorate his condition, and 
eventually raise him to a level with the civilized natives in the 
1
gs( older districts o-f the Colony. <219) 
In 1852, discussing the Xhosa chief, Sarili, Fairbairn called for ''the 
complete and utter subjugation" of the black man, while in the same breath 
ad vising that: "It is not the work or the intention of the white to e>:-
terminate the black man, or even to tyrannize over him or reduce him to 
slavery; more enlightened views now prevail. There is room enough in the 
counfry for all, and the arts of civilized life will speedily find sub-
sistence and employment equally beneficially for both." And then he im-
mediately continued: "But there must be no question left as to which of 
them is the strongest - the barbarism or the civilized. This war must 
settle that point without the chance of it being revived." Calling not for 
revenge but justice, Fairbairn then declared: "On the contrary lasting 
tranquility can only be secured by equitable rules and a mild though firm 
{ form of administration. No people, civilized or savage, will long remain 
\:, 
quiet under pain, hunger, or a dread of encroachment.'' (220) 
Clearly, a common thread runs through Fairbairn's stated attitudes towards 
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the indigenous:people of South Africa; no fundamental reversal of attitude 
emerges in his'later life in this respect- but a balancing of force and 
justice, based,on an inherent belief in the rights of the 'civiilized' 
European. 
Students of litieralism at the Cape cannot fail to point to the distor-
tions, contradfctions and inconsistencies of principle expressed by its 
leading spokes~en. And in regard to such characteristically 'liberal' at-
titudes, outliMed by researchers, Fairbairn's attitudes read like a 
manual. These ~re evident in the jarring, paternalistic mixture of racism 
and justice, co,ntained in the conviction O·f the Ltltimate goodness, rights 
and privileges of the white ruling class - with its civilization based on 
the British model, i'ts Christianity, education, capital, commerce and 
agriculture, which entitled it to rule over the people o·f A·frica. (221) 
Liberalism invo~ved a struggle for civil rights, the rule of law, th~ in-
dependence of the courts, freedom of speech, religion and the press. But 
once the liberai franchise had been granted, it never aimed at the further 
expansion and reform of de~ocratic institutions; at the most only at the 
maintenance o·f e)·:isting institution's. <222> In such aspects as outlined 
above, Fairbairn's role over the period emerges as a perfect and typical 
e:.-:ampl e. 
The precise com6ination of historical conditions, personal ability, inde-
pendence of spirit and age, which led to the conflicting standpoints of 
Solomon and Fai~bairn, is not important for this study. Certain point~ do, 
however, emerge from their disagreement during the early years of the Cape 
parliament and ~rom the conflict between them and the Moltenos of South 
Africa, which a~e relevant to commerce's position at the Cape and to Fair-
bairn's role as :representative of commerce. 
By turning his back on the more progressive, urban seat of Cape Town and 
agreeing to represent the relatively unprogressive rural Swellendam, Fair-
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bairn had in this regard beaten a noticeable retreat, evident in the out-
come of the usury question. Saul Solomon, by contrast, was able to rely 
heavily on the progressive nature of his constituency of Cap~ Town ·when, 
in his nomination speech of 1854 he spoke of his commitment to his prin-
ciples. He would not sacrifice even one to secure the vote~ of Cape Town, 
he declared~ 
But so much as this I can say, and do say;- if you want a man to ad-
vocate the interests of Cape Town to the exclusion of those of other 
portions of the colony, - then don't vote for me: - if you want a man 
who will confine his sympathies to the Western Province, ~nd who will 
deny that the Eastern Province has claims to be adjusted, or incon-
veniences to be remedied, -then don't vote for me (cheers):- if you 
want a man who will advocate a policy of extermination towards the 
natives of this continent, and who will ignore their claim to be 
treated with justice, because they happen to have black skins, and to 
be called barbarians; then dont't vote for me, Cloud cheering): -if 
you want a man who will go in to support of the government when he 
believes it to be wrong ••. then don't vote for me ••• (223> 
The """'t_ypi call y contradictory and · i 11 i beral ' nature of Fairbairn's 
··~---~~"··-:-~-~--"":""~~~-......-·:-=-;r:,"~:---:-~·7·~·~:~---~·-•••-••-•--.·-- •••• ~ -••••- • 
liberalism towar_ds_the __ incligenous-peop-1-f;!. of South Africa re·flects the 
c-.·-~--
limited potential for its development in a colonial society where demands 
~----..~--- --- ... 
for subjugated agricultural labour from early on moulded racist attitudes. 
The positions of the group, Fairbairn, Solomon and Silberbauer, on the 
Usury 'Law' and the Mast~r and Servant Law, partly reflect commerce's ob-
jective ability, because of its position in e:-:ch·ange, for some independ-
ence of action from production (agriculture), its potential to undermine 
and menace the dominant class in the sphere of production <224) - what 
Trapido and Bundy have described in the Eastern province as a merchant-
liberal nexus. <225) The group's defeat over these same issues reflects 
the effective opposition mounted by landowning interests during the first 
two parliaments, as well as commerce's abilility to menace but not to 
adopt any fundamentally independent position in relation to the farmers, 
the class that organized production and the exploitation of labour. <226> 
It has been shown that Fairbairn's alliance with the Popular Party ~nd 
afterwards his representation of Swellendam, were partly the result bf his 
own early ambitions for a united white ruling class <Dutch and 
English/farming and commerce>, as well as the consequence of the economic 
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and political climate prevailing. Fairbairn's course of action may also, 
however, reflect commerce's own limited potential for adopting any 
fund~mentally independent position in relation to farming interests~ 
Taking into account the fact that he was not strictly a man of commerce 
he was not a trader but primarily a newspaper owner and editor - his 
ability to take up the cause of the country could, nevertheless, be in-
dicative of the dependent nature of merchant capital. 
NOTES 
1. Cape Argus, 26 Mar. 1921. 
2. SACA, 17 Mar. 1824. Fairbairn and Greig's partne1~ship of the Adve1~tiser 
began in Aug. 1825, with Fairbairn assuming sole editorial 
responsibility - Botha, John Fairbairn, 31-32. 
3. SACA, 2 Jan. 1841. 
4. Ibid., 20 Sept. 1848. 
5. Ibid., 25 May 1850. 
6. H.J. Mandelbrote, "Constitutional development, 1834-1858", in E. Walker 
(ed>, Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, 367; R~ Kil-
pin, Romance of a Colonial Parliament (London 1930>, 55; CCGHBB, 1840-
1853; Kilpin, Romance of a Colonial Parliament, 123-126; J.J. Breiten-
bach, "The development of the secretaryship to the Government at the 
Cape of Good Hope under John Montagu 1843-1852'', Archives Year Book for 
South African History, 1959 <II>, 250, note 2. 
7. SACA, 8 Feb. and 19 Apr. 1834; see also S. Trapido, ."White conflict and 
non-white participation in the politics of the Cape of Good Hope 1853-
1910" <PhD, University of London, 1970), 17; S. Trapido, "The origins 
of the Cape franchise qualifications of 1853'', Journal of African 
History, vol. V, no. 1, 1964, 41. 
8. Trapido, "White conflict and non-white participation"; Kirk, "Self-
government and self-defence'', ch. VII-XII; Le Cordeur, The Politics of 
Eastern Cape Separatism, ch. 7; Warren, "Merchants, municipal commis-
sioners ••• ", ch. VI. 
9. Botha, John Fairbairn, ch. VII, esp. 164-166. 
10. Ibid., ch. VII, esp. 16·4-169; S. Trapido, "From paternalism to 
liberalism: the Cape Colony 1820-1834'', Unpub. discussion paper, Post-
graduate Seminar, University of London, Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, Nov. [1988], 16-17. 
11. SACA, 30 JLme, 1841. 
12. Warren, "Merchants, municipal commissioners ••• ", 199, 203 210-224. 
13. See below for further discussion, 148-149. 
14. A.F. Hattersley, The Convict Crisis and the Growth of Unity: 
Resistance to Transportation in South Africa and Australia 1848-1853 
<Pietermaritzburg 1965); Warren, "Merchants, municipal commis-
sioners ••• ", ch. VI; l<irk, "Self-government and self-defence", ch. VII. 
15. Warren, "Mel~chants, municipal commissioners ••• ", 201-209. In Australia 
there had also been contempora~y organized resistance to transporta-
tion by groups in some regions. But it appears that the demand for 
labour was one reason why the opposition was successfully counteracted 
unt i 1 1867, wt-.en transportation was abolished - see Hatters! ey, The 
Convict_.Crisis and the Gr_owth o·f Unity, 127-135 and A. Gren·fell Price, 
"Experiments in colonisation", in J. Holland Rose, A.P. Newton and 
E.A. Beni.~ns (eds), Cambridgg_J:!Jstory of the_.British. Empire, val. VII, 
pt. 1, Australia <Cambridge 1933>, 230. 
16. SACA, 27 June and 4 July 1849. 
17. Ibid., 30 June and 4 July 1849. 
189 
18. Kilpin, Romance of a Colonial Parliament, 71; Botha, John Fairbairn, 
esp. 200, 205, 215 and 219. 
19. See below, 162, note 123. 
20. ZA, 13 Aug. 1849. 
21. There was also 'coloured' opposition to the landing of cdnvicts at the 
Cape, mainly by missionary inhabit~nts and churchgoers - see. SACA, 19 
May 1849 for report of a meeting by a Paarl congregation and also a 
memorial from Malay priests; SACA, 16 June 1849 for a Kat River 
settlement meeting and SACA, 11 ~July 1849 for a letter. by Adam Kok to 
the Governor. 
22. Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualifications", 45; J<irk, 
"Self-government and self·-defence", 319; Warren, "Merchants, municipal 
commissioners ••• ", 210-211. 
23. Botha, John Fairbairn, 276-277; see below, 139-140, 145. 
24 • .SACA, 20 Feb. 1850. 
25. I b i d . , 2 Mar • 1850. 
26. See above, 134. 
27. Trapido, "White conflict and non-white participation'', 27-28; Trapido, 
"The origins of the Cape franchise q•-talifications", 38, 47, 49; Botha, 
John Fairbairn, 86-87, 172-173. 
28. ZA, 21 Feb. 1850. 
29. Ibid., 18 Mar. 1850. 
30. I b i d • , 28 Mar • 1850. 
31. Botha, John Fairbairn, 240-241; Warren, ''Merchants, municipal commis-
sioners .•• ", 217-218; Breitenbach, "The development of the secre-
taryship to the Government", 256-258. 
32. Botha, John Fairbairn, 241-260, esp. 246; Kirk, "Self-government and 
self-defence", 344. 
33 • Z A , 7 Oct • 185<) • 
34. I b i d . , 4 Nov. 185(). 
35. In fact the Cape Town municipality had formally requested the Popular 
members to draft a constituti6n. See Warren, "Merchants, municipal 
commissioners", 218, 222; A.H. Duminy, "The role of Sir Andries 
Stockenstr8m~ in Cape politics (1848-1856)'', Archives Year Book for 
·South African Historx, 1960 <II>, 113-117; Botha, John Fairbairn, 258-
277; Kilpin, Romance of a Colonial Parliament, 76-80. 
36. ZA, 28 Oct. 1850. 
37. Kirk, "Self-government and self-defence", 383-403. 
38. SACA, 4 May 1853. For details of 1848 proposals and the influence of 
Porter, see Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualifica-
tions'', 38, 49-50. For details of the Popular Party's draft and the 
importance of the 1850 1 egi slat i ve pt-oceedi ngs, see Both a, John 
Fairbairn, 258, 286. 
39. Botha, John Fairbairn, 301. 
40. R.W. Murray, South African Reminiscences <Cape Town 1894), 13. 
41. Ibi.Q.., 3-4; Cape At··qus, 26 Mar. 1921, article by R. Kilpin, "Pioneers 
of Parliament in South Africa''; Botha, John Fairbairn, 294. 
42. The definition used in this study follows Marx, CClQ.tital, vol. 3, 379 
-"Merchant's or trading capital is divided into two forms or sub-
species, commercial capital and money-dealing capital ••• ~ Commercial 
capital is thus identified purely in terms of commodity-dealing capi-
tal. For Kirk's discussion of commercial middle class, see ''Self-
gover-nment and self-defence", 310·-312 and Warren, "Merchants, 
municipal commissioners ••• '', 45-46; for further discussion see above, 
5-7. 
43. Pud::is, "Politics, capital and labour of railway building", 14-15. 
44. Such an analysis amounts to nothing more than some variation of a 
theory of internal colonialism, in which colonial merchants are viewed 
as an external colonizing group, exploiting all classes, including the 
farmers. This analysis I believe underlies Dubow's examination of the 
Graaff-Reinet merchants. The argument there constructed led the author 
to blame the merchants of the area for the financial crisis of the 
early 1860s- see Dubow, Land, Labour and Merchant Capital, 20-25. 
190 
45. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 448. 
46. G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: a Marxist analysis (London 
1975>, 93. 
47. See above, ch. 2 and 3, passim, for growth of local commerce and com-
panies. 
48. Warren, "Merchants, municipal commissioners ••• ", 208-210, esp. 209, 
note 84. 
49. Le Cordeur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 223-236. 
50. Ibid., 227; Trapido, "White con·flict and non·-1-'Jhite participation", 31-
37; Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualifications", 49-
50. 
51. Warren, "Merchants," municipal commissioners ••• ", 218. 
52. Ibid., 220; Cape Monitor, 1 Nov. 1850; British Parliamentary Papers, 
1362, 1850-1851, "Papers re propsed representative Assembly", 137. 
53. Breitenbach, "The development of the secretaryship to the Government", 
263-264; DLtminy, "The role of Sir Andries ,Stockenstrom", 114; Le Cor-
deur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 233-236; Trapido, "The 
origins of the Cape franchise qualifications", 50-51. 
54. A continuity of composition of the two groups is implied in Warren's 
qiscussion, ch. VI, passim of "Merchants, municipal commissioners ... " 
55. Warren, "Merchants, mLtnicipal commissioners ••. ", 209, note 84. 
56. CCGHBB, 1854; Cape Monitor, 1 Nov. 1850; British Parlia~entary Papers, 
1362' 137. 
57. Murray, South African Reminiscences, 4; Kilpin, Romance of a Colonial 
Parliament, 134, 157. 
58. Kirk, "Self-government and self-defence", 506. 
59. Warren, "Merchants, mLtnicipal commissioners ••• ", 224, 231-232. Yet 
still into the later period the privileged circle of the merchant 
princes, the Jaggers and others, continued to represent a special 
British-connected elite with unassailable status, the pinnacle of the 
colony's representatives of capital, with the enviable trappings of 
visible wealth - during a period of underdeveloped production and few 
competing wealths- even beyond the mining period- see B. Bozzoli, 
The Political Nature of a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South 
A·frica 1890-1933 <London 1981>, 118 and Marx, Capital, ·vol. 3, 444. 
60. Murray, South African Reminiscences, 4; see also Botha, Fairbairn, 
292. 
61. Ibid., 66. 
62. SACA, 17 Apr. 1856, House of Assembly proceedings; see also Cape of 
Good Hope Parliament, Votes and Proceedings House of Assembly, 1855; 
Append!>: to. Votes and Proceedings House of Assembly, 1855, "Report of 
Select Committee on Reponsible Parliamentary Government 1855". 
63. Warren, "Merchants, municipal commissioners ••• ", 255, Appendix H. For 
local commerce's involvement with farming and slavery, see above, 49-
50, 53, 75, 80-81. 
64. Kirk, "Self-government and self-defence", 346-347. 
65. Trapido, "White conflict and non-white participation", 36. 
66. SACA, 20 Sept. 1848, see above, 133; Botha, John Fairbairn, ch. IV 
passim. 
67. SACA, 2 Aug. 1853.; SAL, Manuscripts Collection MSB 193," John Fair-
bairn correspondence, etc.'', no. 14- A letter to his son, Jim, where 
he talks of "wicked wretches" who have set blacks against whites. 
"They failed to create any violence but a spirit of suspicion and 
jealousy has been awakened ••• The Constitution which secures the 
rights of all classes will reconcile all classes if anything can." 
68. Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualfications", 52; 
Trapido, "White conflict and non-white participation", 31-36. 
69. ZA, 8 May 1851. 
70. Ibid., 18 Feb. 1856. 
71. A. du Toit and H. Giliomee, Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis and 
Documents, 1780-1850 (Cape Town 1983>, vol. 1, 27; A. dLt Toit, "The 
Cape Afrikaners' failed liberal moment· 1850-1870", !11 J. Butler, R. 
Elphick and D. Welsh (eds>, Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its 
191 
History and Prospect (Middletown Connecticut 1987), 41. 
72. For example, see SAL, South African Bound Pamphlets CSABP 6>, An 
Englishman, The Cape and its new 'New Constitution' CGrahamstown 
1852), 348, "'The En,glishmen wish to take care of their own concerns', 
but they do not want Dutchmen to do so for them, which is the danger 
now impendin~··· The Colonists, as a numerical majority, are not 
animated by British feelings. They have not acqLlired that social inde-
pendence, or political education which Englishmen, of every grade in 
society, must necessarily obtain in their own country, ~ore or less, 
during their progress to mental maturity. They were but lately slave 
owners. Their ideas of liberty of conscience and speech are as con-
tracted as natural ignorance, national jealousy, and a morbid hatred 
for the British name, can make them." 
73. Du Toit, "The Cape Afrikaners' failed liberal moment", 37-38. 
74. Ibid., 35-63. The editor of the Cape of Good Hope Observer, F.S. 
Watermeyer <who married Jane Agnes Fairbairn, daughter of John Fair-
bairn, during the events of the Anti-Convict Agitation, had referred 
to the influence of the revolutionary events in Europe on the Cape -
Trapido, "White conflict and non-white participation", 23. 
75. SACA, 6 Apr. 1854, in a special add1~ess to the electors of the Western 
Province and Swellendam in particLllar. According to Trapido, "White 
conflict and non-white participation'', 382-390- initially mission 
stations provided a few examples of seats where the 'coloured' vote 
was important - it was only towards the end of the 19th century that 
the black vote was keenly sought after in terms of what has been 
called electoral arithmetic. On this point, see also P. Lewsen, "Cape 
liberalism in its terminal phase", in D.C. Hindson <ed), Working 
Papers in Southern African Studies, vol. 3, 1983, 42. 
76. l<irk, "Self-government and self-defence", 491, 497-499: S. Trapido, 
'''The friends of the natives': mercharits, peasants and the political 
and ideological structure of liberalism at the Cape 1854-1910", in 
Marks and Atmore (eds), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South 
A·frica, 262. 
77. Anderson, "Figures of descent", 136; see also F'.J. Cain and A.G. Hop-
kins, "Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas: 1. The 
old colonial system, 1688-1850'', Economic History Review, 2nd series, 
val. XXXIX, 4, 1986, passim; see below, 26. 
78. ~<irk, "Self--government and self-defence", 30-37, 377-381. 
79. Ibid., 496-497. 
80. Ibid., 36-37. 
81. Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, 12-13. 
82. Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualifications", 38, 52; 
Trapido, "t.oJhite conflict and non-white participation", 15, 37-38. 
83. Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualifications", 38-39; 
Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, class and ethnicity", 72-73; see above, 150 
- ZA, 8 May 1851. 
84. Trapido, "The origins of the Cape franchise qualifications", 52. 
85. Trapido, "White conflict and non--white participation", 457. 
86. Ibid., 27; Tl~apido, "'The friends of the natives'", 262; Trapido, 
"From paternalism to liberalism", 2. Porter's famous statement at the 
time was: "I would rather meet the Hottentot at the hustings voting 
for his representatives, than meet the Hottentot in the wilds with his 
gun Llpon his shoulder." - see Trapi do, "The origins of the Cape fran-
chise qualifications", 53. See also J.N.C. Marincowitz, "Rural produc-
tion and labour in the Western Cape 1838 to 1888, with special 
reference to the wheat growing districts'' <PhD, SOAS, University of 
London, 1985>, 79-105. 
87. Trapido, "White conflict and non-white participation", 27. 
88. SACA, 4 May 1853; CGHGG, 3 May 1853. 
89. H.R. Hahlo and E. Kahn, The Union of South Africa: The Development of 
its Laws and Constitution <London 1960>, 54-55; Kilpin, Romance of a 
Colonial Parliament, 87-88. 
90. For Molteno's role as farming representati~e, see below, 162-163, 179; 
192 
he had been a merchant too, see reference in note 195, ch: 4. It is 
difficult to know precisely what is meant here by 'capitalist'. What 
is clear is that such a person was not a professional trader or 
merchant; though the term probably included businessmen, such as 
shareholders in companies and banks and private mortgagees and · 
moneylenders. 
91. SACA, 6 June 1854. 
92. CCGHBB, 1854; E.H. Burrows, Overberg Outspan <Cape Town 1952>, 255-
257; Almanac, 1854-1855. 
93. CCGHBB, 1854; Almanac, 1854-1855; Burrows, Overberg Outspan~ 116-141; 
Warren, "Merchants, municipal commissioners ••• ", 244, Appendix B 
<Reitz> and 257, Appendix H <Van Breda). 
94. DLtminy, "The role o·f Sir Andries Stocken;;t.r_pm~~ _, 163; Murray, SoLtth 
African Reminiscences, 28; A. Gordon-Brown, Pictorial Africana: A Sur-
vey of Old South African Paintings, Drawings and Prints to the End of 
the Nineteenth Century with a Biographical Dictionary of One Thousand 
Artists <Cape Town 1975), 236. 
95. Le Cordeur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 4~, 217, 287, for 
EP merchants and Breitenbach, "The development of the secretaryship to 
the Government", 108 for Joubert. 
96. Marincowitz, "Rural production and laboLtr in the Western Cape", 114. 
97. See below, 208, 209. 
98. See below, 156-164. 
99. ZA, 19 Apr. 1854. The ne>:t year saw a return to the old, familiar 
refrain in editorials: - "So long as the importation of british mer-
chandise remains exclusively in the hands of people who have no stake 
in the colony, we must not look for improvement in business transac-
tions". The 1 avi sh e:-:pendi ture of this "grandi 1 oquent gentry" was con-
trasted to earlier times when ''they had neither country residences or 
costly equipages, they did not gamble, treat their friends ~o hock, 
claret and champagne and "import sumptLtOLIS shop fronts from London." 
<ZA, 5 July 1855). Blaming the merchants for the copper mining crash 
that year, the editor declared: "By their [merchants'] losses, impru-
dently incurred, they have injured not only themselves, but the Colony 
as a whole, and they owe the community some reparation." <ZA, 11 JLme 
1855). 
100. Van Zyl, Kaapse Wyn en Brandewyn, 153-155. 
101. Ironically, it was a free trade treaty between Britain and France in 
1860 that resulted in the abolition of all remaining favourable 
tariffs enjoyed by Cape wines in the British export market and 
provoked once again a crisis in the local wine industry- Van Zyl, 
Kaapse Wyn en Brandewyn, 156. 
102. Van Zyl, l<aapse Wyn en Brandelo'JYn, 201--207. 
103. Ibid., 207. 
104. l<i rk, "The Cape economy", 228-229. 
105. Marincowitz, ,;Rural prodLtction and labour in the Western Cape", 23. 
1 06 • I b i d • , 1 59 • 
107. Ibid., 113-114. I-n 1865 some opposition had been mounted in parlia-
ment but unsuccessfully. Western Cape wheat farmers held their first 
large meeting in 1869 and subsequently there were vociferous demands 
for protection- Ibid., 209, 242. 
108. Ibid., 211, 252--253. 
109. Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society Rules and Regulations, Fifth 
Annual Report of the Committee <Cape Town 1837); ditto but Sixth An-
nual Report (1838>; Almanac, 1857. 
110. Van Zyl, Kaapse Wyn en Brandewyn, 73, 204. 
111. H. Giliomee, "The beginnings of Afrikaner nationalism", South African 
Historical Journal, no. 19, Nov. 1987. 
112. The year 1823 had seen the submission of a petition by the Albany 
settlers directly to the British government - Botha, John Fairbairn, 
164. 
113. SACA, 21 May 1853. 
114. Ibid., 22 Dec. 1853 <Legislative Council elections>. 
193 
115. Ibid., 5 Jan. 1854. <Legislative Council elections>. 
116. Ibid., 29 Dec. 1853 <Legislative Council elections>. 
117. Ibid., 7 Jan. 1854 <Legislative CoLincil elections>. 
118. Ibid., 13 June, 1854, "To the Electors of Swellendam". 
119. Ibid •. , 22 Apr. 1854. 
120. Ibid., 25 Apr. and 13 May 1854. Saul Solomon mentioned the fact of no 
parties too in his nomination speech- Ibid., 2 May 1854. 
121. Marincowitz, "Rural production and labour in the Western Cape", 312. 
122. Ibid., 57-63. 
123. ZA, 28 Dec. 1848. The ZA's role dL1ring the period has been described 
variously. Botha has seen it as the protector of Afrikaans interests 
-- Botha, "Die rol van Christoffel J. Brand", 88-90. Marincowitz, 
"Rural production and labour in the Western Cape", 55, has called it 
the organ of commercial farmers; Kirk in hSelf-government and self-
defence'', 310, the organ of the commercial middle class; and Ross, 
"The origins of capitalist agricultLire", 83, spokesman of the farming 
community. · 
124. ZA, 18 Dec. 1848. 
125. Ibid., 25 Dec. 1848. In 1851 there was an unsuccessful attempt by the 
rump Legislative Council to introduce an anti-sqatting measure,.which 
even in its draft form resulted in a hitherto unknown depth of rural 
'coloured' resistance, reaching right into the heartland of the West-
ern Cape, and leading to the speedy withdrawal of the measure -
Marincowitz, "Rural production and labour in the Western Cape", 87-
105. 
126. ZA, 29 Jan. 1854. 
127. SACA, 27 July 1854, House of Assembly pl~oceedings; for di-scussion of 
the labour demands of farmers in the period, see also Ross, "The 
origins of capitalist agriculture", 76-86. 
128. ZA, 6 Dec. 1855. 
129. See below, 177-180. 
130. ZA, 24 Jan. 1856. 
131. Ibid., 31 Dec. 1857. 
132. Indications of small rumblings of discontent by farmers fearing com-
petition for labour from pLiblic works and railways, etc., see SACA, 7 
Mar~ 1854 and 20 Apr. 1859, where Mr Haupt in the House of Assembly 
expressed alarm at the railways removing labour from the farms. 
133. Act No. 1 of 1855, For Granting Duties of Customs in the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope <Cape Acts>. 
134. J. Foster, H. Tennant and E.M. Jackson (eds>, Statutes of the Cape of 
Gciod Hope 1652-1886, <Cape Town 1887>, vol. 1; E.M. Jackson (ed), 
Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope 1652-1905, <Cape Town 1906), vol. 
IV, Inde:-:. 
135. SACA, 5 Oct. 1831, 15 June 1836, 29 JLily 1837. 
136. Foster et al Ced>, Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope 1652-1886, vol. 
I. 
137. See preamble of Ordinance No. 13 of 1846 <Foster et al (eds>, 
Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope 1652-1886, vol. I>; see Deeds of 
Settlement of the CGH Marine Assurance Co. (Cape Town 1838>, EP Bank 
CGrahamstown 1839), SA Bank <Cape Tow~ 1838>, CGH Bank <Cape Town 
1837), PE Jetty Co. <Cape Town 1838>, CGH Trust and Fire Assurance 
Co. <Cape Town 1837> in SAL, South African Bound Pamphlets <SABP 6>; 
Deed of Settlement of CGH Steam Navigation Co., SACA 27 July 1836; 
CA, Notarial Protocols, NCO series, is full of such deeds of settle-
ment drawn up the notaries of Cape Town at this time, see, for. ex-
ample, above, 105-106; finally, see. L. Meltzer, "Limited companies 
and share certificates: commercial developments in Cape society 
around 1861", Bulletin of the South African Cultural History Museum, 
no. 4, 1983, 23, 22, figure of a Malmesbury and Cape Town Omnibus ~o. 
share certificate of 1858, which states ''established under and by 
virtue of the Company's Deed of Settlements'', compared to 26, figure 
of an English Brewery Co. Ltd. share certificate (c. 1861>, which 
states ''established under the Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability 
Act, 1861 and under and by virtue of the Company's Deed of Settle-
ment". 
194 
138. Banks however continued to be formed under deeds of settlement during 
the period and were excluded from developments in legislation dis-
cussed here. The first commercial bank in South Africa, Ebden's Cape 
of Good Hope Bank, had tried to obtain an Ordinance for its estab-
lishment in 1836, but unsuccessfully and so it resorted to a trust 
deed, which became the prototype for subsequent bank formation at the 
Cape - see Arndt, Bankio..g and Currency_pevelopment, 236, 244. The 
Cape of Good Hope Savings Bank, which was not a proper commercial 
bank, catering mainly for small depositors, exceptionally obtained an 
Ordinance governing its establishment, viz. Ordinance No. 86 of 1831, 
For Establishing and Regulating a New Savings Bank in the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope, amended by Ordinance No. 10 of 1848. 
139. SAAASE -- Ordinance No. 6 of 1836, For Incorporating and Establishing 
the South African Association for the Administration and Settlement 
of Estates, sections XXVIII-XXVIX, while section XXXVI shows an 
attmept to introduce the personal non-liability of shareholders: Or-
dinance No. 10 Of 1837 then limited the duration of the 1836 
Ordinance: the attempt at personal liability was not evident in the 
repeal of these tlo'IO OJ-di nances, as represented in Act No. 9 of 1855, 
For Incorporating the South African Association, section XLV, to sue 
and be sued. Board of Executors - Ordinance No. 8 of 1839, For Ena-
bling the Board of Executors to Sue and Be Sued in the Name of their 
Secretary, e>:pired, vide, Act No. 17 of 1859, For Regulating the Af-
fairs of the Board of Executors. CGHT & A Co. - Ordinance No. 11 of 
1844, To Enable the Cape of Good Hope Trust & Assurance Co. to be Ap-
pointed by that Name as Trustees and Tutors, and to Sue and Be Sued 
in the Name of their Secretary <Cape Ordinances and Acts). 
140. Cape Acts, 1859-1861. 
141. L.C.B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law <London 1957), 32. 
142. Ibid., 36-42. 
143. Ibid., 34, 39, 42; H.A. Shannon, "The coming of general limited 
liability", in E.M. Carus-Wilson (ed), Essays in Economic: History, 
<London 1963), vol. 1, 369. 
144. Shannon, "The coming of general limited liability'', 371-372. 
145. Ibid., 368-372; Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 41. 
146. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 46-48. 
147. Ibid., 42, 48-50. 
148. Hahlo and Kahn, The Union of South Africa, 18-19. 
149. Cape Acts, 1861; J.W. Wessels, History of the Roman-Dutch Law 
(Grahamstown 1908), 659. 
150. Murray, South African Reminiscences, 17; Smalberger, Aspects of the 
History of Copper Mining, 47-48. 
151. SACA, 23 Feb. 1856, 15 Mar. 1856; Almanac, 1855. 
152. Ibid., 2 Sept. 1856, 19 Feb. 1857, 3 Sept. 1857. 
153. Ibid., 19 June 1856, 5 July 1856, 23 Dec:. 1856, 17 Feb. 1857. 
154. Ibid., 2 Mar. 1858. 
155. Meltzer, "Limited companies and share certificates", 21-23. 
156. SACA, 26 Jan. 1858; see above, 110. 
157. Ca12_e ArgLIS, 1 June 1861 (editorial and report of pari i amentary pro-
ceedings on same day). 
158. See above, 122-123. 
159. See below, 199. 
160. See above, 138-139. 
161. For his popularity with the Commercial Exchange and merchants, see 
above, 35-37, 50, 108, and his unpopularity with farmers, 44, 138; 
Botha, John Fairbairn, ch. IV and V, passim, for Fairbairn's un-
popularity in the Eastern Province. 
162. Murray, South African Reminiscences, 3-4, 13. 
163. Burrows, Overberq Outspao, 116-141, 198-228. 
164. ~' 31 Jan. 1854. 
165. Ibid., 9 Feb. 1854. 
19:: 
166. See above, 36-38, and below, 209-212. 
167. See below, 212-213. 
168. SACA, 22 Mar. 1826. Botha, John Fairbairn, 35, relates that Fairbairn 
was scornful of his partner, George Greig, whom he described as ter-
rified of certain merchants of Cape Town during the 1820s. 
169. SACA, 22 Jan. 1831. . 
170. For discussion see above, 108-109. 
171. SACA, 16 Oct. 1839. 
172. Ibid., 2 Nov. 1839, Legislative Council proceedings. 
173. Ibid., 9 and 12 Oct. 1839. 
174. SACA, 1 Apr. 1856, House of Assembly proceedings. 
175. Ibid., 27 Apr. 1858, HoL1Se of Assembly proceedings. 
176. Ibid., 4 May 1858. 
177. See above, 109. 
178 •. SACA, 28 May 1859, House of Assembly proceedings. 
179. Ibid., 8 May 1858, House of Assembly proceedings. 
180. Ibid. 
181. Saul Solomon had introduced a motion in the House of Assembly regard-
ing the expedition against the Xhosa chief, Sarili <Kreli>. The mo-
tion criticizing the role of the frontier police beyond colonial 
boundarie~, was vehemently opposed by most of the members of the As-
sembly, including Fairbairn, who rejected it mainly on the grounds 
that it amounted to a vote of censure against the Governor, Sir 
George Grey -- SACA, 1 and 4 May 1858. 
182. Trapido, "'Friends of the natives'", 247-248. 
183. Ibid., 251-264. For criticism of the division between a macro and 
micro-tradition, see Lewsen, "Cape liberalism in its terminal phase", 
35--36. 
184. C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of a South African Peasantry <Berkeley 
1979), 59, 74-83 - for the destruction of the peasantry, see 109-145. 
185. Trapido, "'Friends of the natives'", 263. 
186. Ibid., 264-265. 
187. Ibid., 265. 
188. Ibid. , 26 7. 
189. Ibid., 251-252. 
190. SACA, 14 Feb. 1829 and 22 Jan. 1840. 
191. Ibid., 1 May 1855. 
192. Ibid., 5 Apr. 1856, House of Assembly proceedings. Marincowitz, 
"Rural prodr_,cti on and 1 abour in the Western Cape", 128, has stated 
that so efficacious was the 1856 law that it had not to be replaced 
for another hundred years. 
193. Almanac, 1860 - share and general broker, house, estate and commis-
sion agent and director of the Cape Commercial Bank. See SACA, Aug.-
Oct. 1860, for his opinions re the imminent arrival of the new Im-
perial bank, acting as protector of local banking interests. 
194. SACA, 9 Apl-. 1859, House of Assembly proceedings. 
195. Ibid.; Dictionary of South A·frican Biography, vol. II <Cape Town 
1972>, 482-485. 
196. SACA, 9 Apr. 1859. 
197. Marincowitz, "Rural production and laboLir in the Western Cape", 312; 
see below, 206-207, 209. • 
198. For SaL1l Solomon's commercial activities, see his shareholding in a 
copper mining company, above, 169; Henry Solomon <Saul's brother) and 
a Solomon (no initial) shareholders in the Natal Joint Stock Co. 
<SACA, 6 Mar. 1847; Sa-ul Solomon and Fairbairn in a water company 
which never got off the groLmd <SACA, 22 and 29 May 1847>; Saul 
Solomon eligible for directorship of the SA Bank <SACA, 28 Jan. 
1860>; his ownership of a big steam printing and publishing firm and 
owner of the Argus a·fter Oct. 1863 <W.E.G. Solomon, Saul Solomon: the 
Member for Cape Town <Cape Town 1948>, 14, 64>; Fairbairn was 
chairman and director of the Mutual 1845-1850, 1853-1864 and Solomon 
director 1857-1884 and chairman 1873-1884 <R. van Selm, History of 





























1945)); SAL, MSB 193, "John Fairbairn correspondence, etc.", item 18, 
a letter from Eagle Insurance Co., London, indicating Fairbairn's 
share in the company, 1862. 
SACA, 9 Sept. 1854, House of Assembly proceedings; see report of pre-
vious proceedings 7 Sept. 1854. 
SACA, 30 June 1857, House of Assembly, Governor's speech. E.M. Jack-
son (ed>, Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope 1652-1905, vol. IV, 
Inde>:. 
Bundy, The F<i se and F.:~,_U_ of.._tb.§ .... lJQ.t:J.tb... .... ttf..r...i c_an ..E.f-'a§.~ntr:y, 4·9--52. 
SACA, 14 Apr. 1857; 14 JLtly 1857 Fairbairn e>:presses some hesitancy 
in regard to Grey's expaMsionist policy. 
Ibid., 2 May 1857, 16 June 1857, House of Assembly proceedings. 
.!J:l..id., 16 June 1857, House of Assembly proceedings. Interesting here 
is the role of the Upper House in moderating the labour ambitions of 
the MPs 'in the Lower House. 
SACA, 23 JLme 1857. 
Ibid., 18 and 27 June 1857, House of Assembly proceedings. 
ZA, 23 Nov. 1857. 
I b i d. , 21 Aug. 1857. 
S.B. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development: South Afri-
ca in Comparative Perspective (Johannesburg 1980), 53. 
SACA, 20 ALtg. 1857. 
Ibid. , 29 Aug. 1857. 
Botha, John Fairbairn, ch. IV and V, passim. 
SACA, 25 ALtg. 1841. 
Ibid., 14·Sept. 1844. 
Ibid., 23 June 1857- quoted earlier, see above, 181-182. 
Ibid., 29 May 1841. 
·Ibid. , 13 Dec. 1851. 
lQid., 2 Jan. 1847. 
Ibid., 6 Feb. 1855. 
Ibid., 28 Aug. 1852. 
Lewsen, "!;;ape lit:feralism in its terminal phase", 34-35. 
Ibid.. .. .. 
SACA, 2 May 1854. 
Kay, Development and Underdevelopment, 94-95. 
See above, 175-177. 
Kay, Development and Underd_evel opment, 95. 
19} 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial expansion 183~-1859 
Commercial growth at the Cape had been severely curtailed under the Dutch 
mercantilist regime of the 17th and 18th centuries and only slowly im-
proved during the early period of British rule, viz. the first three 
decades of the 19th century. Local production and shipping gradually ex-
panded as the colony was integrated into the trade-dominated network of 
the British empire. (Chapter One> 
During the late 1830s emancipation and the arrival of the slave compensa-
.tion money contributed to a quickened economic tempo. The freeing of slave 
labour resulted in an increased market orientation of daily life and pro-
vided a great impetus to commodity prodLtction. The first economic boom of 
the period under discussion occurred during those years. It assumed the 
forms of increased trade, expansion in the money supply and a fall in the 
rate of interest, a rise in property prices, the establishment of new com-
panies and finally, and not least of all, an increase in the size of the 
commercial bourgeoisie itself. <Chapter Two> While an increasing supply of 
money, as a result of the compensation awards, certainly fuelled the rise 
in property values, emancipation itself may have provided a further 
stimulus. The release at the Cape of the slaves was perhaps a factor in 
the accelerated subdivision of existing large erven, a phenomenon evident 
in newspaper advertisements of the late 1830s. <Chapter Two> The loss of 
slaves, it may be speculated, resulted in the ownership of larger erven, 
formerly worked by slaves, becoming an unviable financial proposition. The 
boom in the wake of emancipation seems largely to have been the result of 
a chain reaction within the economy, set in motion as a result of the 
freeing of labour. As the Genoveses have stated in relation to the slave-
owning American South: 
The South had a plantation economy embedded in a world market, but it 
also had a huge subsistence sector that severely circumscribed the 
penetration of market relations into the regional economy as a whole. 
The South~ in other words, may be said to have had a market economy 
only in a very restricted sense. And it did not have a market 
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society. At the roots of the restrictions on a regional market 
econom~ and of the absence of a market society lay the absence of a 
market in 1 abor power. ( 1) 
While hesitating to put forward a causal relation, it is interesting in 
this regard that it was in the Eastern Province, where slave relations of 
production were outlawed and pre-capitalist forms of production not 
entrenched, that capitalist agriculture first took off on a large scale. 
It· v1as, however, the e>:pansi on of colonial wool faJ~mi ng after 1846 which 
provided the greatest single boost to the G~pe economy. On the basis of 
the growth of this export commodity, sighificant agricultural and commer~ 
cial fortunes were amassed, both in the Eastern and in the Western Pro-
vinces. Internal trade, the export trade in wool and in other local 
agricultural goods and the import of mainly British manufactures and proc-
essed goods, in the course of a gen~rally expan~ionary period, ensured the 
expansion of the commercial bourgeoisie on a scale as never before. It was 
mainly the pooling of trading capital which produced the mushrooming of 
joint-stock companies in the period. The names of many merchants as 
shareholders and directors in these companies and the re-occurrence of 
these same names in the form of interlocking directorships, are proof of 
the commercial base of the new companies. <Chapter Three) 
The radical changes set in motion after the 1870s mineral discoveries 
should not obscure the fact that substantial capitalist advance had 
nevertheless been made in the preceding period. Mabin, taking up Turrell, 
has stressed the importance of pre-mining economic growth. He maintains 
that historians have tended to ignore the general accumulation of wealth 
in the colony as a factor in the growth of capital concentration and ac-
cumulation on the diamond mines. <2> Long-established Cape merchants, such 
as William George Anderson, became diamond company shareholders, while 
others such as the De Pass brothers and the Mosenthals, were involved in 
diamond marketing. (3) Bozzoli has also indicated a continuity in discuss-
ing the fundamental transformation of South Afritan society by the gold 
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mining industry. She has argued that diamond mining merely "disrupted" the 
existing Cape economy and thus was incorporated into the existing mer-
cantile Cape economy, whereas the Rand gold mining industry involved an 
essentially revolution~ry restrcturing of satiety. <4> Capital concentra-
tion and entrepreneurship were thus important achievements of the pre-
mining era. 
The developing maturity of local agriculture and a locally-based commerce 
found its reflection in the determined move for self-government by thes~ 
groups after 1848, leading eventually to the establishment of repre-
sentative government in 1854. The new parliament gave precise reflection 
to local economic strengths, viz. the two great sectors of the colonial 
bourgeosie, agriculture and commerce, within the constraints of a system 
of colonial administration. <Chapter Four> A partially locally-run parlia-
ment resulted in significant advances in legislation passed by the first 
parliament (1854-1859) 1 which strengthened the infrastructure of the 
colonial state. Some measures formed the prelude to later important legis-
lation, such as the Joint. Stock Companies Limited Liability Act of 1861. 
Cape company legislation developed at this time was significant in laying 
the groundwork for all company law in South Africa. The Transvaal in turn 
took its Law No. 5 of 1874 from the Cape Act of 1861. <5> At the Cape it 
was only in 1892 that the old Act of 1861 was repealed in terms of the 
Companies Act, No. 25 of 1892 and this in turn, after Union, by the Com-
panies Act of 1926. (6) The 1 egal infrastructure for rapid company growth 
in South Africa during a subsequent period had thus been created during 
the decades around the mid-century. <7> In general, with the greater con-
trol by local class forces after 1854, legislative measures in the sphere 
of free trade, labour and companies were thus passed and an economic in-
frastructure, a parliament and a legal framework were created as powerful 
'ingredients for later developments, against a background of expansion of 
agriculture and trade and the growth of local companies and financial in-
stitutions. <Chapters Three and Four> 
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The successful Supreme Court ruling on 'usury' in 1860 marked a sig-
nificant victory for merchant capital at the expense of agricultur~l capi-
tal. Adherence to the idea of a usury law at the Cape, as elsewhere, was 
clearly viewed as being in the vested interests Of the landed class, op-
posed to the commercial and/or manufacturing classes. The lines were in-
deed clearly drawn. Thus, in 1839 opposing petitions were submitted on the 
usury issue at the Cape. One was forwarded by "650 Agriculturalists, Land-
owners and Tradesmen'', while an opcising memorial to lift the interest 
limit, was presented by the merchants of the Commercial Exchange. (8) The 
solution of the usury question in 1860 also proved a deciding factor in 
the decision to found South Africa's first Imperial bank. (9) In two im-
portant respects, therefore, legislative and legal changes were ac-
complished at the Cape between 1860 and 1861, a direct result of preceding 
pressures and events, which in theory at least paved the way for potential 
overseas company investors to enter the Cape capital market on more 
favourable terms. 
Yet, the scale of economic advance in the period was noteworthy in 
colonial terms only. The limited nature of local capital accumulation is 
reflected in figures showing comparative capitalization of Cape and 
British companies. C10> The inadequacy of local capital accumulation was 
brought home in the welcome given news of the arrival of "overseas banking 
capital, in the form of the London and South African Bank in 1860. (11) 
Overseas capital investment at the Cape before 1861 continued to remain 
marginal, which was not especially surprising when seen within the context 
of overseas patterns of capital investment. Its main role was confined to 
th~ sphere of short-term commercial credit. (12> The little there was of 
overseas investment in Cape companies was confined to family and partners 
of a small number of members of the London-based Cape of Good Hope Trade 
Society. The 8ritish~connected merchant at the Cape and his family and 
correspondents resident in London, both centred on the Cape of Good Hope 
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Trade Society, were important shareholders in the Cape's first commercial 
bank, the Cape of Good Hope Bank. (1837) The same few names crop up again 
in a few other shipping and insurance companies, a particular·domain of 
English merchants. Finally, these men proved an interesting bridge between 
local and overseas capitalists in the two successful compariies floated in 
London for business at the Cape, as well as in the few failed overseas at-
tempts. ( 13) 
The contradictory nature of merchant capital and its implications for the 
role of the commercial bourgeoisie in the Cape 
Merchant capital's role in market expansion, its stimulus to commodity 
production, capital accumulation, company formation and the development of 
financial and entrepreneurial skills have been discussed throughout this 
th~sis. <14> The crucial early role of merchant capital, viz. its solvent 
effect on pre-capitalist and subsistence-orientated economies - its neces-
sity as a condition of capitalist development in general - underlies this 
.argument. 
Thus there is no problem at all in understanding why commercial capi-
tal appears as the historic form of capital long before capital has 
subjected production itself to its sway. Its existence, and its 
development to a certain level, is itself an historical precondition 
for the development of th~ capitalist mode of production (1) as 
precondition for the concentration of monetary wealth, and <2> bec-
ause the capitalist mode of production presupposes production for 
trade, wholesale outlet rather than supply to the individual client, 
so that a merchant does not buy simply to satisfy his own personal 
needs, but rather concentrates in his act of purchase the purchase of 
many. On the other hand, every development in commercial capital 
gives production a character orientated ever more to exchange value, 
transforming prodL1cts more and more into commodities. <15) 
The description "light cavalry o·f capitalism" has been applied to the· role 
of the international commercial bourgeoisie as an agent of free trade in 
the first half of the 19th century. (16) Merchant capital's promotion of a 
free trade ideology and its pursuit of free trade practices at this time 
was a particularly suitable agency for the spreading of capitalist market 
structures throu~hout the world. However, the fact that propagation of 
these same policies by commerce in a later period, had reactionary im-
plications for the growth of the South African economy leads directly on 
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to the problem of what appears to be the inherently contradictory and de-
pendent nature of merchant capital. Bozzoli has vividly recounted the 
reactionary role played by the entrenched import-export merchant elite 
during the early 20th century· in their powerfully-voiced opposition to the 
introduction of policies aimed at protection of fledgling South African 
secondary industry. As a result of this opposition to local manufacture, 
she has described their role as instigating patterns of economic under-
development and undermining manufacture, whose representatives she equates 
with a national bourgeoisie. (17> Yet, she indicates, simultaneously, by 
the end of World War 1 the merchant elite, previously spokesmen par excel-
lence of free trade in opposition to manufacture, were forced to reverse 
their stand in the face of the growth in strength of manufacture, and to 
support the latter's call for protection. (18) Merchant capital's al-
legiance had shifted over to the side of manufacture, revealing their 
chronically dependent nature. To describe this dependent nature of mer-
chant capital, the Genoveses evolved the description of the so-called 
"Janus· face of merchant capital". ( 19> 
Such understandings of merchan± capital in turn owe much to Marx's seminal 
analysis. This explained that merchant capital's main function because of 
its trading nature, was confined to the sphere of circulation. It had no 
basis in production. Merchant capital was therefore able to mediate be-
tween different forms of production, though there were occasions when its 
conservative bias resisted the establishment of new patterns of trade and 
older modes of production being replaced. (20) In the 20th century South 
African context this would explain import-export capital's initial 
vociferous opposition to protectionism in South Africa and its upholding 
of established free trade policies. 
The present discussion necessitated reference to similar problems, includ-
ing one touched on by the Genoveses' already-mentioned study of slavery in 
the American South. The question that emerged was to what extent commerce 
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at the Cape involved itself with pre-capitalist forms of slave property. 
This study found that Dutch/Afrikaans wine merchants Cas well as auc-
tioneers and retailers> formed a grouping within the commerci~l 
bourgeoisie which was generally more heavily involved than the rest of the 
commercial sector in mortgages based on slaves. Similarly, a pattern of 
slave mortgage was apparent in the wine merchant sector as a whole, i.e. 
including English merchants. Perhaps the reason for wine-based, particu-
larly Dutch/Afrikaans commerce's involvement was its closer organic con~ 
nections with a slave-based agriculuture. More generally, it might be 
speculated that this connection with slave owners gave the Dutch/Afrikaans 
commercial bourgeoisie a special colouring and constituted an important 
factor in its early development. <21) Nonetheless, the commercial sector 
generally (including the English), was not .adverse to lending money on the 
basis of slave property. As a group it certainly participated in such 
transactions, though it was not heavily involved. (22) The ability of mer-
chant capital to intervene simultaneously both in new and old forms of 
property relations was, therefore, apparent at the Cape. But, evident in 
Fairbairn's editorials was commerce's overriding concern with the question 
of adequate compensation, as fellow property owners, rather than as active 
campaigners for the preservation of the institution of slavery. <23) 
Interestingly, this concern by men of commerce with slaves as a form of 
property to be protected in the eyes of the law, was evinced during the 
proceedings of a court case held in Cape Town in the 1820s. G. Anderson, a 
Cape Town merchant, was attempting to prevent the manumission of a slave 
woman he had gained possession of through marriage. Steyntje, the woman, 
hoped to obtain her right of manumission by proving that she had lived 
with and had had a child by a previous white master. During the court 
case, Anderson made the following statement: 
The first and chief cause of the formation of every social union, 
under whatever government it may be, is to secure the preservation 
and protection of private property. No social right is therefore more 
sacred, and lays a stronger claim to the protection of every judge or 
magistrate, than this right of property and dominion, over whatever 
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each priv~te individual has legally acquired and preserved as his ac-
cording to the existing laws of the community he lives in. If, there-
fore, a person living in a country where slavery i• still tolerated, 
be in the legal possession of a slave, he is to be maintained in that 
possession as much and as strongly as in that of any other sp~cies of 
property whatsoever. This is just, reasonable, and humane, as we well 
maintain against those false advocates for humanity, who, either 
through affectation, or too much sensibility, launch out into such 
high sounding phrases, with so little of calm and sound reasoning in 
them, and who continually call in the favor to be shewn to the cause 
of liberty, contrary to the most approved principles of law and 
justice. (24) 
The second aspect of merchant capital's ambiguous role was in relation to 
the import-export sector. The British economic connection was crucial and 
remained the material basis for the import-export sectc~ in particular, 
resulting in the growth of dependent arrangements of overseas credit. (25) 
In establishing such trade and credit patterns, conditions were created 
for easier access to the colonial economy by overseas capital once it ap-
peared on the scene, in the wake of investment in public works and mining. 
Yet, this was an important aspect of the process of the periphery's 
gradual inclusion into the orbit of the metropolis and the creation of a 
capitalist world economy, with the attendant underdevelopment of the 
former on the terms of the latter. (26) 
The riature of this British-connected import-export elite can be elucidated 
again by reference to the growth by the mid-19th century of a cosmopolitan 
bourgeoisie trading internationally under British naval protection. Posi-
tioned at the interstices of regional, semi-autonomous and the 
metropolitan economies, such a group remained the most ambiguous in terms 
of nationality. (27> Political conflicts arising from what Jones has 
termed the d~racin~ nature of this commercial sector, were reflected at 
the Cape during the Anti-Convict Agitation and the fight for self-
government, when the British-connected merchant elite assumed a pro-
colonial government stance and led a fight for an exclusive property fran-
chise. (28) Jones has sketched a similar situation of conflict which ex-
isted in Argentina in the early 19th century. Federalists (merchant-
landowners> criticized the denationalized city elites, allied with newly 
·, 
arrived overseas merchants. The former contrasted their own 'authenticity 
and familiarity ~ith rural life, as opposed to Unitario intellectuals who 
stressed unobstructed international trade and investment. <29) This same 
'false' nature of a British-connected commerce at the Cape was underlined 
by the Zuid-Afrikaan, the newspaper which claimed the special support of 
the Dutch/Afrikaans farmers in the Western Cape. In 1855 the editor 
declared: ''So long as the importation of british merchandise remains ex-
clusively in the hands of people who have no stake in the colony, we must 
not look for improvement in business transactions.'' (30) The claim to 
rural authenticity was carried over by Fairbairn in his reconciliatory 
editorials in the Advertiser, in his glorification of the slow but steady 
contributions of the Dutch/Afrikaans landowners and his plea for commerce 
to identify with the land. <31) 
The dependent nature of merchant capital at the Cape in the period is also 
revealed i~ the context of its role vis a vis agriculture. The beginning 
of this study witnessed unorganized and politically inexperienced commer-
cial and agricultural groups. The merchants were the first to remedy thi~ 
with their own organization, the Commercial Exchange. (32) But there was 
considerable hostility between the English, connected to the new and alien 
government, typified by their commerce and the English-orientated Commer-
cial Exchange, on the one hand, and the mainly Dutch-Afrikaans landowners, 
on the other. The antagonism to Fairbairn during the period of slave eman-
cipation wer~ partly a reflection of this. (33) The 1840s, however, gave 
way to a growing accord and reconciliation between the agricultural sector 
and a newly-emerging, more locally-based commerce in the Western Cape. It 
was a process greatly facilitated by Fairbairn's intervention. (34) The 
accord took the form of a loose political alliance between these two sec-
tors of the local bourgeoisie in the events leading to the grant of self-
government based on a low franchise. Farmers on the one hand and liberal 
intellectuals like Fairbairn and representatives of commerce on the other 
hand, formed strange bedfellows in the 'popular' struggle for a low fran-
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chise. Yet, the emphasis of these groups, it was shown, fell differently. 
Fairbairn, Porter and a number of Dutch/Afrikaans intellectuals shared 
some concern for the incorporation of 'coloured· voters and thus a mo·re 
genuine commitment to a non-racial franchise. Many Dutch/Afrikaans 
colonists, however, hoped to wrest political power· from the Engli'sh ele-
ment by means of the low franchise, which would work to the advantage of 
the majority Dutch/Afrikaans element. The alliance was facilitated by the 
general enthusiasm for the workings of the first parliament. It was feasi-
ble, furthermore, because of the generally expansionary economy and the 
consequent reduced competition and conflict over labour and credit. (35) 
The accord was subsequently strengthened (albeit temporarily> in the first 
parliament by the commercial bourgeoisie's lack of opposition to the 
measure introduced in 1856, enforcing stricter legislative control by 
farmers of labour. (36) Merchant capital's dependency was reflected by the 
unsuccessful opposition mounted by commercial interests to this Master and 
Servant Law of 1856 and also by its failings within the Cape parliament, 
with regard to the Usury Bill. On the question of the latter, it was the 
Supreme Court which made the final ruling to legalize a higher than 6% in-
terest on bills of exchange and promissory notes, mainly because commer-
cial interests in parliament failed consistently in their attempts at ap-
propriate legislation to lift the interest rate restrictions. (37) Despite 
the numerical strength of commercial interests in the new parliament (38>, 
landowning interests were able to achieve these successive victories. 
I 
Cape Town commercial ~nterests' attempt to prevent the passing and the 
Master and Servant Law, reflected their ability to harass the farmers, the 
sector that controlled most production at the Cape. Their limitations were 
revealed, however, in their inability to prevent the passing o~ the Master 
and Servant Law and to obtain legislative clarity on the usury issue. 
Gili.omee has thus .rightly concluded: "Merchant capital was steadily ex-
tending its economic control and with ~t British cultural influence but it 
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was not necessarily a revolutionary influence. It did not aim at trans-
forming productive relations and tended to form alliances or act as 
political spokesmen for the dominant class in the rural areas." <39) 
The overall assessment of dependency should not, however, obscure the fact 
of merchant capital's achievements in the sphere of market and commodity 
expansion, in laying the general basis for capitalist market relations. 
Its important role in the period of the Anti-Convict Agitation and the 
subsequent fight for a constitution based on a low, non-racial franchise, 
also cannot be ignored. (40) Although ultimately unsuccessful, commerce 
had attempted to oppose the rapid and harsh proletarianization demanded by 
the farmers in the form of the Master and Servant Law. This type of inter-
vention has in fact been traced by other authors, such as Colin Bundy, 
describing the rise and fall of a peasantry in the Eastern Cape from the 
1870s to 1890s. As Bozzoli has remarked in regard to the changes set in 
motion by mining capital in its attempt to establish control of the 
economy at the end of the 19th century: '' ••• there were other mercantile 
imperialist forms which mining opposed vigorously. For ex~mple, it 
denounced the extent to which African peasants had been allowed to develop 
in the late nineteenth century, and rejected the Cape liberal ideology ac-
companying this development." (41> 
Finally, linked to the que~tion of the somewhat more liberal nature of 
merchant capital, are questions of class and race in Cape Town society. 
Bickford-Smith, tracing the growth of ethnic differences, rather than 
class distinctions in Cape Town during the later years of the 19th 
century, makes the point that the city's domination by merchant capital, 
in the form of large mercantile firms, before the 1880s/1890s, determined 
that Cape Town's ruling bourgeoisie had no immediate interest in making 
ethnic distinctions. Such distinctions became of increasing signifance 
towards the turn of the century when the Mineral Revolution fuelled 
. / 
changes in the city's economic activity and demographic composition. <42> 
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The heyday of the commercial bourgeoisie's alliance with landowning in-
terests, however, did not last much beyond the first parliameht. Droudht, 
depression, the ensuing heavy mortgaging of farm property, dumping of 
overseas goods and the consequent movement for farmers' pr6tection which 
began in the 1870s, led in turn to Afrikaans ethnic-inspired movements 
during the 1880s. (43) Along with these local developments, the extent of 
merchant capital's role was curtailed by the advent of overseas railway 
and mining capital to South Africa, in the wake of new public works and 
the discovery of minerals, more especially gold. This capital, raised 
mainly on the London Stock Market and independently of local commercial 
interests and their overseas connections <44>, limited commerce's position 
of strength in the context of the South African economy as a whole. Also, 
during the the mid-century the introduction in Britain of limited 
liability for shareholders in joint~stock companies opened the doors for 
British overseas investment and gave metropolitan shareholders greater in-
dependence of action at the expense of local shareholder~. <45> The 
marginalisation of 2ommerce and the import-export sector in particular is 
b~st understood against the background of the reversal of fortunes of the 
commercial bourgeoisie trading internationally during changes leading 
towards the age of imperialism, a result of growing economies of scale, 
technological improvements, business integration and a general move 
towards monopolization. <46) Thus local and international developments had 
led by the 1870s and 1880s to a relative erosion of the component of local 
commerce both-within the ruling alliance and in the economy in general. 
Despite this decline, however, import-export's function as a pivot between 
the imperial and the local economy continued, within the context of what 
Bozzoti and others have described as the hegemony of a British mercantile 
imperialism. Indeed, Bickford-Smith has traced the renewed growth in local 
power in Cape Town of large English merchants in the later decades of the 
19th century, evidenced in the emergence of the Clean Party and in that 
group's take-over of the municipality. This was clearly in contrast to 
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developments in the period discussed here, when the municipality had oper-
ated as a base for the newly-emerging, locally-based, Dutch/Afrikaans com-
mercial, property·-ov·ming and professional bourgeoisie. <47) 
Merchant capital's contradictory tendencies were evident in the ambiguous 
position of Fairbairn, himself. His alliance with agriculture, symbolized 
by his election as MLAfor the rural constituency of Swellendam, was partly 
a reflection of commerce's dependent position, though his own ambitions. 
for a united English and Dutch/Afrikaans ruling class had moulded his 
agitation for reconciliation between the English and the Dutch/Afrikaans 
from early on •. (48) The pressures exerted on him by his constituen~y with 
regard to the usury issue was evident in the reversal of his stand in 
favou1~ of the landed interests. (49) Ag;:dnst th1s backgl~ound must be 
weighed the objective strength of Fairbairn's vanguard role for commerce 
Ull' .. ough the medium of the fir,jvf?l'::tist-~1"·_. In no onE' wer-e bath the st.t-engths 
and weaknesses of merchant capital better reflected than in Fairbairn. It 
·remains finally to sum up his commercial role. 
Fairbairn's commercial role 
1-~ "wavt~less calm, th<:1.t s;lumbe1·- o·f the df"·ad" wa~; how FaiJ~bairn once dE·: .. •·--
cribed life in Cape Town during the 1820s. ''It existed, moved or stood 
still, ~·Jithout -friction, noise ell~ p<2rc:eptible vibration." (::':iO) But "th£~ 
sleepy hollow'' (51) had by 1859 undergone steady and significant economic 
advance. Fairbairn had intervened as a leading agent in arousing the town 
from its slumber - propelling, guiding and advising its inhabitants 
through a period of till then unprecedented commercial and agricultural 
growth. He had assumed the task of promoting the men of the Commercial Ex-
change and their London connections in the period when they could claim to 
be the main and certainly the most self-conscious section of the commer-
cial bourgeoisie. In this context he had added his vocal opposition to the 
fight against the mercantilist privileges of the English East India Com-
pany and fought then, and subsequently, for the rights of free trade. (52) 
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He had enthusiastically campaigned to convince the colony's slave-owning 
farmers of the importance and benefits of slave emancipation, governed by 
adequate compensation awards - an historical requisite for subsequent com-
mercial and, indeed, capitalist expansion at the Cape. (53) 
Overseas developments provide the context for the struggles conducted by 
Fairbairn and the merchants of the Commercial Exchange. Throughout his 
editorship, Fairbairn steadfastly espoused the cause of free trade, 
whether a~ainst mercantilist monopoly, unfairly heavy market dues exacted 
by the Cape Town municipality on farm produce, or restrctions on the in-
terest rate payable on bills of exchange. (54) He kept up a barrage of 
reporting during the struggle in Britain leading to the repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846, and in this period showed himself to be sympathetic to the 
Whigs and an unhesitating supporter of the free trade champion, Robert 
Peel. In 1846 Fairbairn declared joyfully~ and with a touch of Scottish 
patriotism, at the time of the success of Peel's Anti-Corn Laws campaign 
and the victory of free trade: 
r 
This speech [Lord M8rpeth'sJ and Sir Robert Peel's two speeches at 
the commencement of the Session, would form a most worthy appendix to 
the next edition of Smith's Wealth of Nations. 'Scotch Philosophy' 
has at last triumphed, and its triumph in Great Britain will be 
celebrated in every region of the civilized world. Its genius is the 
spirit of brotherly kindness, of friendly intercourse, of mutual 
help. It causes every nation to rejoice in the prosperity of its 
neighbours. Envy never assails an ~nlightned merchant. He loves a 
rich customer, an unquestionable correspondent, and ready returns. 
The artisan in Birmingham feels a lively pleasure in hearing that the 
peasants in Poland have reaped a good harvest, and that the seasons 
have been favorable in the Far West of Amercia. In these facts he 
discerns an extending market for his wares, and more daily bread for 
his children and poorer neighbours. The 'Scotch Philosophy' is the 
Spirit of Peace. It tends to convert all mankind into the ready-money 
customers of each other, - a sort of people always welcomed with a 
smile and dismissed with kind wishes. (55) 
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Fairbairn identified with this group of free traders as representatives of 
progressive merchants and manufacturers, opposed to the Tory landowning 
aristoct-acy. In the strugglE? o·f the "Land ve1rsus the Loom", he informed 
r·eadeir·s, the l21.t tet- repl'-es;ent.ed "i ndust1r·y, intellect and moving c.:1pi tal." 
(56) 
Jones has highlighted the essential significance of the policy of free 
trade as advocated by the Radical, Richard Cobden and others. The ultimate 
result of a free trade victory, he argues, was the strengthening of the 
bourgeoisie as a class, at the expense of the aristocracy. Free trade 
entailed the destruction of state monopoly, privileged merchants and the 
altering of the high prices traditionally enjoyed by the landed interests. 
Reduction in import revenue which had frequently been devoted to financing 
the army, also challenged the rule of the Tory military caste. (57) It is 
illuminating that opposition forces in Britain employed the rhetoric.of 
slavt~ f:mancipation "a~. models for- their- a~ssault upon thr.= Corn La\.-Js". (5\3) 
Overseas trends found their local reflection in:policies advocated by 
men such as Fairbairn, who may have seen free trade as a prerequisite for 
the continued growth of the tiny colonial middle class and who campaigned 
for slave emancipation <with compensation) in order to further advance 
thi E':.' QlrCl\'\ltl-'1• 
Fairbairn also encouraged a local orientation for the ~erchant elite and 
kept a c l osf-:? lrJatch C:•n the ne.wl y·-emeJ·-gi ng, 1 ocall y-b,:;:..sed comm~=rc:i a.l 
bourgeoisie, offering advice where he could, during its first experience 
of boom and joint-stock company fever in the wake of emancipation. (59) He 
campaigned hard over the years for the formation of companies, banks and 
insurance houses, encouraging and alternatively threatening when ventures 
appeared on the brink of failure. He continually advanced and legitimised 
212 
\ 
the principle of a joint-stock company, a major advance in the potential 
growth of capital accumulation. (60) He simultaneously never ceased to 
praise and encourage agriculture, especially the great improvements wit-
nessed in merino sheep farming after 1846 (61), while the promotion of 
transport and an economic infrastructure - ro~ds, railways and harbours 
remained a constant topic, if not one of the most common threads of his 
editorial discussion in the 6dvertiser. 
I 
Yet, up to this point discussion of Fairbairn as 'organic intellectual· of 
I 
the commercial bourgeoisie has been avoided, though there is much in this 
concept that is of reieva~=~ when identifying the guiding role played by 
FairbairT1 in thf:? ea.r-ly gr·o~rJth o·f Cape To!-'m commr,:~-ce. "Every soci.;';l.l class", 
de·c:lared Grarnsci, "corning into E~:d.stencE? on thr: origina.l bas:;is o·f an es· .. · 
sential function in the world of economic production, creates with itself, 
organically~ one or more groups of intellectuals who give it homogeneity 
and consciousness of its function not only in the economic fields but in 
the social c:md political field c:\!:; WE·?ll .•• " (62) FajxbaiJ~n, it w,:\s shovm, 
certainly identified topics and initiated and/br supported campaigns which 
were directed towards the economic, social and political growth and 
mobilization o~ commerce. He suggested strategies and gave advice with 
regard to joint-stock company structures~ slave compensation awards and 
even a new constitution. However, describing him as an organic intellec-
tual is maybe stretching the tolerance of this concept for he was careful 
never to take up the cause o~ commerce at the expense of agriculture. (63> 
To some extent the ambiguities of merchant capital may itself have cir-
cumscribed his actions, preventing him from conducting a factious policy 
aimed at support of one capital against another. However, there were other 
political motives, which cannot be simply equated with the exigencies of 
merchant capital~ His views on reconciliation between the English and .the 
Dutch, town and country and commerce and farming reflect a situation in 
v.Jhtch capitc:dis:,m itself, rat.he1~ th.::tn a pa1··tic:ular· capital, vJas struggling 
to take root. It was entirely different to the period of South African 
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history sketched by Bozzoli at the turn of the century, when space had 
been created for organic intellectuals to mount platforms in defence of 
their specific capitals. Whether mining, commerce or manufacture, these 
capitals vied for dominance in an already established capitalist 
framework~ (64) But in the broader sense as propo~ent of middle class 
UQity at the Cape and the establishment of the roots of capitalist social 
relations, Fairbairn undoubtedly did perform the role of organic intellec-
tual. Nor did he hide this orientation, which he in no way saw an as ob-
stacle to reconciliation and unification of the two main sectors of the 
white ruling class, viz. commerce and farming. 
Hesitating to apply the term organic intellectual of the commercial 
bourgeoisie to Fairbairn, however, does not imply an underrating of his 
contribution to the cause of commerce at the Cape. It reflects rather on 
material conditions at the Cape. His opinions and the powerful medium of a 
newspaper such as the Advertiser appear to fight against the restraints 
placed here on his full identification as commerce's organic intellectual. 
The Advertiser's readership, it must be remembered, was essentially an 
urban, commercial or commercially-linked professtonal one. Fairbairn's 
commitment to the advance of commerce was evinced in the continuing title 
of his newspaper, the 'Commercial· Advertiser. Its existence was inex-
tricably interwoven with commercial developments, not only in Fairbairn's 
editorials, but in a host of published reports and statistics relating to 
commercial matters. Fairbairn's own shareholding and company directorship, 
though not substantial, only served to further cement the material basis 
of his commercial interests. (65) 
Objectively too, there were reasons for Fairbairn's commercial orienta-
tion. His sympathies arose from the historical role of commerce. To a man 
of progressive economic ideas, confronted by an absence of manufacture at 
the Cape, commerce by default represented the highest possible rung in the 
progress of capitalist development. Commerce, too, best captured the 
I 
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entreprene~rial spirit - that desired spirit of the age - so necessary for 
the upward movement of the middle class. It was most clearly associated 
with what he praised as "active" or "moving" capital. <66) In his many 
campaigns to promote commercial expansion, Fairbairn actively facilitated 
the creation of the historically necessary pre-conditions for the ''take-
off" of capitalism and commerce in the colony. 
Despite the ambiguous effects of his alignment with agric~lture after 1848 
and Saul Solomon's actusation that he had lived long enough to recant all 
hia principles, Fairbairn had fought long and hard for commerce. In 1860 
the editors of the Cape Monthly Magazine paid tribute to Fairbairn on his 
retirement from the Advertiser: 
\ 
His history in South Africa is the history of South Africa itself 
during more than thirty years of his career among us. From his first 
arrival to the day on which he resigned his position as the leader 
and and veteran of the Cape press, his name stands foremost in con-
nection with every movement and agitation for promoting the improve-
ment and development of this country. (67) 
Taking Murray's words quoted earlier and placing them in a specifically 
commercial conte>:t: "he had done a work o·f a lifetime before the first 
parliament was convened and had done it well.'' (68) Fairbairn had dedi-
cated a very subtantial part of his life to a struggle for the advance of 
the Cape economy, the union of its middle class and had made a lasting 
contribution to the laying of a commercial infrastructure necessary for 
the progress of capitalism in South Africa. For as long, some three and 
half decades <1825 to 1859>, the Advertiser had proved his most valuable 
tool. 
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